Q & A SERIES: INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY POWER

 

Q-1   Has Indian foreign policy become more assertive about India’s interests? 

A-1

  • The trend for foreign policy is changing worldwide.
  • Multilateralism is changing to mini-lateralism.
  • The engagements between countries have become interest and issue-based.
  • India’s policy has changed from a policy of non-alignment to a policy of equidistance.
  • The engagements are governed by own interests, needs, and gains.
  • The world is accepting Indian stand on various issues.
  • Indian assertion level is appropriate, generally in take it or leave it mode without thrusting it upon others.

 

Q-2   Comments about India’s focus on Asian region and neighborhood.

A-2

  • Focus on Asia and the neighborhood has come a bit late with China having made inroads into our neighborhood adopting the string of pearls policy.
  • We need to be magnanimous in our approach towards our neighbours to retain them with us.
  • Like any other country, our global engagements are based on our interests first and then on ideology and principles.

 

Q-3.  Comments on India’s moral-based foreign policy, with a principled approach, and not using its military power for foreign policy objectives.

A-3

  • In agreement with the statement that “India foundationally remains a pacifist state, following moral based foreign policy, the strength of soft power and principled approach”.
  • It is not necessary to use force and military might to attain one’s foreign policy objectives.
  • Hard power can be used as a soft power as well using Military Diplomacy to achieve one’s objectives.
  • Foreign policy and military diplomacy need to work cohesively.
  • Notwithstanding the above, India has in the past used its hard power to attain its foreign policy objectives. Examples include Bangladesh liberation, Sri Lanka and Maldives operations.

 

Q-4.  India needs to spend more on its conventional military forces, building military capabilities and deterrence, due to its regional and global aspirations.

A-4

  • At the moment India’s necessity to invest in building conventional military power is governed more by its threat perception and need to guard its interests.
  • Regional and or global aspirations come next.
  • Military capability and deterrence are essential to be considered as a major regional power.
  • Military power alone is not sufficient, it has to be backed by economic clout and strength.

 

Q-5   In an age of comprehensive security, is military power by itself adequate?

A-5

  • While it is true that, military power is a significant ingredient of power projection it greatly impacts international dynamics and relations between nations.
  • It alone cannot achieve national objectives. It has to be backed by economic clout and a balanced all-round deterrence capability.
  • Earlier the debate used to be between money being spent on development or military capability.
  • Military power is essential even for unhindered growth.
  • The nature of warfare is changing. Firstly, hostile actions do take place even in no-war scenarios and secondly, the hostilities are not limited to the military alone.
  • New dimensions of warfare have emerged that affect the entire nation and demand a whole of national response.
  • The question of choice is not as simple as “either one or the other”. A balanced approach is required for multi-dimensional holistic capability enhancement.
  • Balance has to be maintained between:-
    • Military power and other tools of statecraft.
    • Conventional military power and other dimensions of warfare.
    • Military capability and capacity to wage war.
    • Quality and quantity of platform, weapons, and war-waging wherewithal.
  • Military capability and adequate deterrence are required first and foremost for safeguarding own interests, thereafter comes regional/global responsibilities and aspirations.

 

Q-6   India with its present stage of development, can ill afford to suffer a military setback, due to loss of deterrence as a result of inadequate defence funding.

 A-6

  • In agreement with the statement.
  • The minimum credible deterrence value of the military needs to be maintained at all times.
  • The minimum deterrence value depends upon, the number of enemies, their military capabilities, and their attitude.
  • In India’s case, the enemy’s capabilities are racing ahead creating a wide gap and the attitude has become more belligerent and aggressive.

 

Q-7. What does a ‘credible military capability’ entail?

A-7

Credible military capability to my mind would entail the following in sequence:-

  • Adequate deterrence.
  • The ability for strategic coercion.
  • Punitive capability.
  • Ability to wage war if required,
  • Adequate war endurance.
  • Ability to provide human assistance and disaster relief (HADR) domestically as well as externally.
  • Capability to exploit Defence Diplomacy.

Collective security is valid not only during the war but also to deal with grey zone operations during the time of peace.

 

Q-8.   What capabilities are required for military hard power to become an effective means of state-craft?

A-8

The military alone cannot achieve the national objectives. Besides aspects mentioned earlier areas which need attention are:-

  • Ability to meet challenges in the nonconventional and new domains of warfare including Nuclear, Biological, Space, Cyber, Electronic, and Information.
  • Any reorganization should be to cater for future challenges in these domains.
  • A robust defence industry and production eco-system are essential.
  • Intangible factors like morale and training are very important along with doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
  • Reach, precision, standoff, and a robust supply chain are equally important.

 

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US REPORT ON CHINA 2023: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY

CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY

 

  • The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national The PRC views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.

 

  • The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.

 

In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”

 

  • The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems.

 

  • In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.”

 

FOREIGN POLICY

 

 

  • The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ” The PRC’s ambition to reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.

 

  • Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.

 

  • In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.

 

  • Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.

 

ECONOMIC POLICY

 

 

  • At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID The decision to implement China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local governments.

 

  • The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.

 

  • The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of China’s broader national development aspirations.

 

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

 

 

  • The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

 

  • In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy.

 

  • Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.

 

MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

 

 

  • The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to “fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.

 

  • The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.

 

  • Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”

 

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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Disclaimer:

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