defence services - Air Marshal's Perspective

August 27, 2021September 27, 2021

China’s Active Defence Strategy

Genesis. China’s Active defence Strategy appeared first time in MAO’s writings in the year 1936. However, its meaning has been changing from time to time along with the war fighting philosophy of China.

Changes in War Fighting Philosophy. War fighting Philosophy of China has changed with the era of person in power. Over the years the changes are as follows:-

Mao Zedong – Final War (with reference to world wars)
Ding Xiaoping – Local War (Shift from world war to limited wars)
Jing Zemin – Local war with Hi Technology.
Hu Jintao – Informatised Local War (Network centric war)
Xi Jinping – Informatised and intelligentised war (Unrestricted War – including elements of hybrid and unconventional warfare even in the Grey Zone).

Initial Connotation. When the idea was conceived initially it meant allowing the enemy to come into own territory, in area of own choice and up to pre decide depth. Allow the enemy’s logistics supply lines get stretched out and dry down and at an opportune moment attack and defeat him. It was sort of offensive defence.

Present Framework. China articulates its Active Defence response as:

“China would never invade or expand, at the same time would never permit any piece of Chinese territory to separate from China & PLA will strike after enemy has attacked”.

Analysis & Implications

There is always a gap between what china preaches and practices. China although states that she will not expand, but is driven by the baser instinct of expansionism, considering herself as an empire state rather than nation state.

China decides as to what is part of China, by staking claims and producing conveniently select and doctored historical and legal documents.

China has left definition of enemy attack intentionally vague. It is not limited to military attack by kinetic means. It may include any action by the adversary which is against the interest of China.

In other words China decides what enemy attack is, and reserves the right to respond in a way it feels is appropriate.

It means China will always have the initiative and will have the legitimacy (in her opinion) for her actions.

China justifies her approach to this active defence strategy as strategically defensive but operationally offensive.

In tune with her war fighting philosophy of unrestricted warfare, the attack on enemy would be any domain (land, air, sea, cyber, space, electronic, information, psychological or even nuclear). It could use everything and anything as a weapon from the instruments of national power (DIME).

This strategy coupled with China’s practiced strategic approach of “achieving objectives without firing a shot”, would mean that China would continue to perpetuate grey zone warfare (inclusive of hybrid and unconventional warfare).

China’s formation of Strategic Support Force as a separate service, is in tune with the above mentioned strategy and actions.

Bottom Line

There is an urgent need for reorientation and gearing up (not only by military) to deal with these challenges.

Question

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August 22, 2021September 27, 2021

Flavours of China’s Military Reforms

China has given priority to translate science and technology achievements into military capabilities.

China’s military capability enhancements in the new era are characterized by an emphasis on new security domains.

On the one hand China has improved its long-distance force projection and precision strike capabilities in the respective domains of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.

On the other hand, it has attached importance to new security domains, such as space, cyber, electromagnetic, and Information, as key fields for influencing the fate of future warfare.

China aims to overtake developed country’s militaries by making concentrated investments in state-of-the-art technologies and deepening military-civil fusion.

It hopes to achieve superiority in these fields and thereby overturn its inferiority in overall military capabilities.

China has already achieved the status of a major military power by 2021 (100th anniversary of its founding Chinese Communist Party).

The Xi Jinping administration has set ambitious goals to further establish China as a global power by the next centenary in 2049 (marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

It aims to be leader in overall military capabilities by becoming a cyber-power, a space power, and a manufacturing power of defence hardware and software.

While “active defence” as a military strategic concept has been consistently advocated by the PLA, its content has evolved reflecting changes in China’s national power, the international environment, and industry structure, as well as advances in military technology.

Its active defence strategy has changed from the tenet of “striking only after the enemy has struck,” (i.e. luring the enemy into one’s territory and then making a counterattack), to offensive actions of active defence.

Active defence is expected to take on a more offensive nature in the military strategy in the new era.

China has prepared itself for future “unrestricted warfare”, across a variety of domains.

To achieve vital information dominance, especially in cyberspace, China has promoted her informatisation and reviewed her cyber strategy.

In the space domain, China gives weight to securing space dominance by maintaining its use of space, denying use of space by adversaries, and providing information support from space.

China has steadily increased the number of satellites that can be used for military purposes, its space access capabilities, and its space situational awareness capabilities. It also develops capabilities for interfering with an opponent’s use of space through anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, electronic jammers, and other means.

The Government of China, which prioritizes the role of S&T in the military, has established the “military-civil fusion strategy” as a national strategy.

Under this strategy, the government makes concentrated investments in S&T in new security domains, facilitates military use of advanced technologies, and promotes indigenization of core technologies.

The Xi Jinping administration established the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, a CCP organ that has been given powerful authority. Under the commission, the administration aims to build a management system through which organizations of the state, military, and society cooperate with each other for executing military-civil fusion policies.

Military-civil fusion efforts place particular emphasis on the cyber, space, and maritime domains.

The PLA’s informatisation of the military system and increased reliance on space assets in military operations have created vulnerabilities that accrue from attacks on these systems.

China has made a rapid rise in S&T, but it is still in the developing stage. Especially with regard to talent and specific core technologies.

The enhancement of China’s military capabilities in new security domains has fuelled international competition over core technologies and technological infrastructure.

The PLA has expanded its operational domains in parallel with the rise of its military capability, and is reinforcing the offensive element of active defense.

Implications for India

As it prepares for intelligentised warfare in this context, the PLA is likely to test operate new technologies and capabilities.

In the near future, besides other countries, India will also face confronting situations and be compelled to respond to them.

In the long run, fulfilling the “Chinese Dream” of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” would include resolving the disputes with neighbouring countries in a manner consistent with China’s wishes.

Enhancement of the PLA’s military capabilities, and belligerent attitude of China, would necessitate enhancement of India’s military capabilities on priority.

Looking ahead to the medium and long term trends of military technology, India needs to invest in technology infusion into its military.

India needs to re-orientate and reorganise to develop capability of warfare in strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

Thought

Time has come to spend on Military capability enhancement even if it is at the cost of development.

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References

NIDS China Security Report 2021.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-military-has-a-hidden-weakness/

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/is-china-speeding-up-military-modernisation-it-may-but-its-not-yet

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

August 20, 2021September 27, 2021

Pillars of China’s Military Modernisation

China’s military modernisation has been top driven, well guided process.

Through observing other countries’ wars, including the Gulf War, the China realised that the information dominance was key to winning modern warfare.

Active Defence Strategy and Unrestricted Warfare

China has consistently followed the military strategy of “active defence”. However, the meaning and interpretation of the strategy has undergone changes from time to time.

In Mao Zedong’s era the strategy was premised on “striking only after the enemy has struck” in the overall back drop of total war (World war scenario).

In Deng Xiaoping’s era, local war using conventional weapons was elevated to strategic level, and the active defence strategy came to encapsulate the concept of pre-emptive attack conceived in local wars.

In Jiang Zemin’s era, the goal was to win “local wars under high-tech conditions.”

In Hu Jintao’s era, China recognized the importance of information in warfare, and the goal became winning “local wars under the conditions of informationisation.” Network-centric war is the closest equivalent of this terminology.

After Xi Jinping came to power, China’s aim shifted to winning informatised and intelligentised warfare making use of all the domains, including space, cyber, electromagnetic and psychological. Unrestricted warfare is the terminology introduced in the Chinese military lexicon.

The targets of attack in this type of warfare will include not only physical objects but also nontangible targets in cyber and cognitive spaces. The warfare is not restricted to military and military hardware. This type of warfare uses anything as a weapon in the DIME paradigm.

Information Warfare and Cyber Domain

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has recognised that “information dominance” is crucial for seizing core initiative in modern warfare.

In this process, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in late 2015. It appears that the SSF is responsible for achieving information dominance as well as providing information support for joint operations, including the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, and converting advanced technologies into military capabilities.

To achieve information dominance, the PLA also attaches importance to information warfare and cyber operations. This includes monitoring (surveillance), offensive operations (cyber-attacks) and defensive operations.

To cope with these challenges, China has sought to indigenise core technologies and train specialists in the cyber field.

Military Use of Space

China considers space as an essential domain for the prospective intelligentised warfare.

China’s space activities from their inception have been closely linked to military activities. However, it was only from the 1990s through the 2000s that the military value of space began to be recognized more widely in the PLA.

The PLA uses space to provide information support for operations on land, sea, and air and is also developing capabilities to disrupt other countries’ use of space.

In China, emerging space enterprises have rapidly boosted their technological capabilities with government and military support. The future is expected to herald an era in which the military adopts the technologies developed by the private sector and uses their services.

China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy

In China, military capabilities are being enhanced through military-civil fusion (MCF).

The MCF strategy advanced by the Xi administration aims to strengthen military capabilities and promote national development by tying together the military and socio-economy.

Since its establishment, the PLA has maintained close relations with the private sector, including participating in production activities. However, this relationship has changed with the times.

As science and technology takes on an increasing role in the security sector, and against the backdrop of the rising technological level of China’s private companies in the shift to a market economy, emphasis has been placed on MCF to enhance the military capabilities of the PLA.

The Xi administration created the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, a powerful organization. It has launched measures in succession to ensure the smooth implementation of MCF.

In conjunction, the commission promotes the prioritisation of science, technology, and industry for national defence in new security domains, the active use of cutting-edge technologies for military purposes, and indigenisation of core technologies.