CHINA: OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND MILITARY ROLE

China: National Political Objectives

Like any other nation Chinese national political objectives can be broken into two basic categories: security and development. According to USA these objectives would include the following:

Security objectives would include:

Protection of the CPC as China’s ruling party.
Protection of Chinese sovereignty.
Protection of borders.
Internal security
Nuclear deterrence.

Development objectives would include:

Protection of Chinese economic interests at home and abroad.
Ensuring freedom of navigation for Chinese goods.
Procuring important commodities such as energy and raw materials.
Establishing new export markets for Chinese goods.

Chinese Grand Strategy

China end state desire is to achieve a world power status.

Incremental Approach. China views this final objective as incremental: it seeks to be a “prosperous society” by 2035, with the CPC still remaining the dominant political entity in China. The country desires to transition to a “leading world power” by the year 2049 (the centennial anniversary of the country’s founding), complete with a “world-class military.” These objectives are written into the CPC Constitution.

Towards this aim, smaller goals could be:

Global influence.
Economic development.
Internal security.
CPC primacy.

Chinese Strategic Objectives

China’s strategic objectives support her broad political goals dominance by 2035 and becoming a leading world power by 2049. They are also influenced by certain elements of Chinese culture and history: the importance of status and honor, the desire for peace through power, and the belief in Chinese Communism, among other aspects.

Chinese strategic objectives and involvement of PLA is as follows:

Maintain Internal Security And Stability. Foremost in maintaining internal security and stability is ensuring the position of the CPC as the dominant political entity in China. PLA is the military components of the government. While maintaining domestic stability is the primary mission of the civilian police force and Peoples Armed Police (PAP), in extreme situations the PLA may be required to assist these forces in internal security operations.

SECURE AND PROTECT LAND BORDERS AND COASTLINES. China’s long historic struggle with border security manifests itself today in a vast array of border security measures. Even China’s shared border with India is a source of friction and conflict. PLA needs to be geared up to meet these situations.

Maintain Regional Stability. China feels maintaining regional peace and stability is a one of its responsibility as a regional dominant Force. This requires the PLA to be capable of conducting shaping and deterrence operations in the region.

MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. China’s economy is largely dependent on exports, most of which travel via the world’s oceans. Maintaining safe and free passage through the international waters is necessary for Chinese political stability and economic development. Expeditionary capability would be required for this.

RESOLVE MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. China views several land masses and their surrounding territorial waters in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific as strategically important. Their importance is derived from their proximity to important global shipping lanes, and also their potential usefulness as military bases (particularly for naval and coast guard ships, fixed-wing aircraft, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and land-based antiaircraft and ant ship missile systems).

ESTABLISH POSITIVE CONDITIONS FOR POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES. China views conflict along a continuum, ranging from steady-state deterrence operations in peacetime (Grey Zone) to full-fledged combat operations. While China has mastered the art of grey zone operations, it is also expanding on overseas basing for the PLA, enabling force projection outside of Chinese borders and giving Chinese leadership greater flexibility in choosing how and where to employ military force.

Chinese Objectives and Military involvement

China’s history is deeply intertwined with its military.

Relationship between the PLA and the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a complex one.

In contrast to Western militaries, the PLA is deeply politicized.

While Western militaries are generally apolitical and are divorced from political parties, the PLA is officially the armed wing of the CPC.

It retains significant ties to Maoist and Marxist-Leninist political thought and has generations-deep connections with the CPC.

Today, with the primacy of the CPC virtually assured and few internal security threats, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) has taken over much of the internal security mission, while the PLA focuses primarily on development-related external objectives.

Military Modernisation

Historically, the PLA had little to no expeditionary capability, minimal mechanization, low-technology systems, and a severe lack of military professionalism.

Chinese Objectives and strategy requires a significant enhancement of PLA capabilities.

Chinese objectives require meaningful force projection capabilities:

A blue-water navy.
A modern air force.
Long-range targeting and strike capabilities.
Enhanced long-range air and sea strategic lift capabilities.
Well-trained, well-equipped, professional ground force.

Military modernization with economic development is a basic tenet of Chinese national strategy. This has guided the significant increase in annual defence budget for the past two decades.

This principle is now manifesting in China’s Military-Civil Fusion program, which seeks greater cooperation between military and civilian elements in achieving shared objectives. An important objective of Military-Civil Fusion is leveraging civilian assets and capabilities as a cost-efficient method of managing limited military resources.

Due to one of the largest and longest economic growth cycles in history, China has been able to fund the reform and development of the PLA, modernizing it over the last three decades from a force of poorly armed and poorly trained conscripts into a viable modern military.

Bottom Line

China is marching ahead at a very rapid pace.

Question

Are we gearing up to meet future challenges?

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References:

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf

September 6, 2021September 27, 2021

Major Arms Transfers to Afghanistan (Last Two Decades)

SIPRI published a Topical backgrounder on 03 Sep 21, giving an overview of known international flows of major arms transfer to the Afghan armed forces between 2001 and 2020. The document discusses the supplier states, volumes, types and numbers of major arms deliveries.

Relevant extracts are as follows:-

Since 2001, significant numbers of major arms had been delivered to bolster the Afghan military and security forces, in the expectation that they would eventually be able to maintain security and suppress the Taliban insurgency without international support.

Sixteen states are known to have supplied major arms to Afghanistan.

Slightly over three-quarters of the major arms delivered, by volume, were newly produced, while the rest were second-hand, but in some cases modified prior to delivery.

Transfers from the USA

The USA was the largest major arms supplier to Afghanistan (74 per cent of country’s imports of major arms by volume).

Deliveries from the USA to Afghanistan included an estimated 21 924 armoured vehicles (e.g. HMMWV-UA, ASV-150/M-1117), 66 MD-530F armed light helicopters, 34 Cessna-208B armed light transport aircraft, and 53 UH-60A transport helicopters.

The USA also delivered 65 ScanEagle (unarmed) unmanned aerial vehicles and an estimated 250 Paveway guided bombs. Most of the arms were supplied to Afghanistan as aid.

Transfers from Russia

Russia was the second largest supplier of major arms to the Afghan armed forces in the period, accounting for 14 per cent of imports, by volume.

Deliveries from Russia mainly consisted of 90 second-hand and newly produced Mi-8MTV and Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Early deliveries were in the form of aid, but later, most of the transport helicopters were bought via and financed by the USA or United Arab Emirates.

Transfers from other suppliers

Several other states, mainly North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, delivered smaller volumes of major arms to Afghanistan directly or supplied major arms through US-run and US-funded programmes.

Italy accounted for 3.8 per cent of all deliveries of major arms to Afghanistan, by volume. These consisted of 16 second-hand G-222 transport aircraft in 2009–2012, financed by the USA. The aircraft were modernized in Italy before delivery.

Czechia supplied six Mi-24 combat helicopters and six Mi-17 transport helicopters. All were second-hand but were modernized in Czechia before delivery.

The United Kingdom supplied two Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia and Turkey supplied a total of 128 second-hand artillery pieces

Norway supplied an estimated 159 TOW anti-tank missile in 2009. All these transfers came as direct aid or were financed by the USA.

Brazil was the fourth largest supplier, accounting for 2.7 per cent of all deliveries. These were 26 Super Tucano (A-29B) trainer/combat aircraft. They were bought through a US programme, financed by the USA and modified in the USA before delivery to Afghanistan. They became the main combat aircraft of the Afghan air force.

Switzerland supplied 18 PC-12 light transport aircraft in 2015. These reached Afghanistan via the USA and were probably modified in the USA for reconnaissance before final delivery.

India supplied three Cheetal light helicopters and four second-hand Mi-25 combat helicopters. It also financed the supply of four second-hand Mi-24V combat helicopters from Belarus in 2019.

Present State

The Afghan military and security forces received a substantial number of major arms in the last twenty years.

Despite this very substantial material investment, not to mention years of military training and combat support, the Taliban were able to seize most of Afghanistan from Afghan Government.

Some of the major arms listed were subsequently lost or scrapped. However, a substantial number have been captured by the Taliban.

Air Force Assets and Equipment

The Afghan Air Force was considered as Kabul government’s lethal advantage over the Taliban.

The Afghan Air Force once stood at approximately 200 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, including A-29 Super Tucanos, AC-208 light attack aircraft, Cessna 208s, PC-12 Pilatus surveillance aircraft, C-130 Hercules transport planes, and a fleet of helicopters that included UH-60 Black Hawks and Russian-made Mi-8 and Mi-17s.

It is estimated that 25% of Afghan Air Force Fledm (to Uzbekistan), and remainder is in Disarray. Very few of the aircraft left behind are fly worthy due to lack of spare parts and maintenance support.

While the Taliban now controls a number of attack, surveillance, and transport aircraft, it still requires pilots to fly them. Taliban had been on a campaign to assassinate Afghan Air Force pilots to diminish the air strategic advantage. It is not known how many crews fled across the border or are in hiding. Aircrew shortage will further diminish their capability.

Analysis

Concern is about the effect of presence of these weapons on security and stability, both within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

It is unclear how many of these are or can be made operational.

The aircraft will need specialized maintenance and spare parts that are probably not easily available to the Taliban.

Other, simpler to maintain, major arms such as the light armoured vehicles can easily be operated for many years.

All in all, it seems unlikely that the major arms captured by the Taliban would pose any serious threat to stability in Afghanistan or neighbourhood.

However, the large numbers of small arms and light weapons and associated ammunition are potentially of much graver concern.

In India, concern is that these weapons may soon find a way into Pakistan, and then, through Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, to India, especially Jammu and Kashmir.

There is also a possibility that these weapons may get used for violence in Pakistan itself.

Questions

Taliban in Afghanistan has an Air Force, Will they be able to revive it and make it operational?

Will China and Pakistan help Afghanistan in its revival?

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References

https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/transfers-major-arms-afghanistan-between-2001-and-2020

https://www.airforcemag.com/afghan-air-force-fled-remainder-in-disarray-sources-say/

September 4, 2021September 27, 2021

Taliban’s Runover: Some Factors

Setting and Population Density Pattern.

Afghanistan’s overall population density is only about 148 people per square mile / 57 people per square kilometer (Indian population density is 1202 per square mile / 464 per square kilometer).

Even in the populated areas of Afghanistan, people are quite spread out, with only 26 percent of the population living in urban centres. This dispersed population pattern, is a challenge for the state army to defend while, it favours the Taliban’s quick-moving offensive.

Taliban Strategy.

Following the withdrawal of Western forces, the Taliban swiftly and easily occupied vast swaths of sparsely populated territory. They then used that territory to launch coordinated and fast-moving offensives.

Instead of traditional tools of warfare (like artillery and armour), the Taliban moved quickly in weaponised pickup trucks to defeat dug-in defensive They forced The Afghan forces to retreat from outposts and checkpoints to (safety of) urban areas, thereby ceding control of supply lines and major highways. This allowed Taliban forces to surround and isolate urban centers.

Local officials were quick to accept Taliban control because they had little allegiance to the central government and knew that Afghan forces were unwilling (and unable) to defend their areas from Taliban

Taliban Advantages.

Taliban enjoyed a presence throughout the country, allowing them to pressure the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in multiple locations.

The Taliban were able to conduct lightning offensives across many fronts, which fatally stressed the limited cohesion of the Afghan National Defense and Security.

Afghan Security Force: Challenges

Low force-to-space ratios meant that defenders had significant ground to cover and had to move swiftly and in a coordinated fashion to stand any chance of successfully countering Taliban threats from many The Afghan security forces were not geared up to these tasks.

The Afghan military lacked the capacity and cohesion required to stand firm and defend against fast-moving offensives across many fronts.

Afghan forces had always been heavily dependent on S. air support for troop movement, re-supply, and combat operations. In absence of the air support, the Afghan military was unable to regroup or move units around quickly.

Afghan forces were hampered by lack of cohesion, leadership, motivation, and limited training & mobility.

Outcome.

The weaknesses of the Afghan security forces, combined with the low force-to-space ratios generated by Afghanistan’s terrain and its population distribution, made a quick Taliban victory a reality.

Taliban rarely had to use force because they could leverage their geographic reach to intimidate local leaders and convince defenders to flee or surrender.

Lessons