In recent years, the evolving geopolitical landscape of South Asia has been redefined by an emerging alignment among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The growing convergence between these three countries, particularly under China’s Initiative, is reshaping regional dynamics and presenting new challenges to India and broader Indo-Pacific security arrangements.
China-Pakistan Relations. The China-Pakistan relationship, often described as an “all-weather friendship,” has been a cornerstone of regional geopolitics for decades. Rooted in shared strategic interests, particularly countering India, it has been institutionalised through defence cooperation, economic assistance, and infrastructural integration. It has been further deepened through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, connecting China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. This strategic partnership has been further solidified by China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear program and military modernisation, with Pakistan acquiring 70–80% of its weapons from China over the past five years. China has also become Pakistan’s largest arms supplier and a crucial diplomatic ally at forums like the United Nations Security Council, where it has repeatedly shielded Pakistan from international scrutiny over terrorism-related issues.
Bangladesh’s Gradual Pivot. Bangladesh’s inclusion in this dynamic marks a shift, particularly following the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024. Hasina’s government maintained a balanced foreign policy, fostering close ties with India while engaging China economically. However, the interim government under Muhammad Yunus has pivoted toward closer relations with Beijing and Islamabad, driven by deteriorating India-Bangladesh ties and China’s proactive engagement. This shift was evident during Yunus’s March 2025 visit to China, where he positioned Bangladesh as a gateway for Chinese economic cooperation in the region, a move that strained relations with India. The motivations behind this convergence are multifaceted. For China, expanding influence in South Asia counters U.S.-India strategic alignment and secures access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. Pakistan seeks to bolster its regional relevance. Bangladesh, navigating domestic political transitions, sees alignment with China and Pakistan as a means to secure economic and diplomatic support, particularly through BRI projects.
The Triangle Takes Shape. A pivotal development was the trilateral meeting in Kunming, China, on June 19, 2025, involving representatives from China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This “informal” consultation, hosted by China, focused on regional cooperation and connectivity, sparking speculation about a new regional bloc to replace SAARC. While Bangladesh’s interim government dismissed claims of a formal alliance, the meeting signaled a strategic intent to enhance collaboration among the three nations.
Implications for India. The proposed bloc poses a direct challenge to India. India’s concerns were heightened by comments from Bangladesh’s leadership, such as Yunus’s claim that Bangladesh is the “only guardian” of the Indian Ocean. India, finds itself encircled by Chinese-influenced states on nearly all fronts, Nepal to the north, Pakistan to the west, and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the east. From a maritime perspective, China’s presence in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Chittagong (Bangladesh) gives it a foothold in the Indian Ocean, threatening India’s naval supremacy and potentially undermining the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategic alignment also threatens India’s northeastern states, especially the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, which connects mainland India to its northeast.
Broader Geopolitical Ramifications. The China-Pakistan-Bangladesh convergence complicates the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S., viewing China’s growing influence as a challenge to its regional strategy. This dynamic could intensify Sino-U.S. competition, with Bangladesh’s strategic choices shaping the regional balance of power. Smaller South Asian states, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, may face pressure to align with either the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh bloc or India, complicating regional integration. The dormancy of SAARC, exacerbated by India’s boycott following the 2016 Uri attack, has created a vacuum that China seeks to fill, potentially reshaping South Asia’s geopolitical architecture.
Conclusion. The emerging China-Pakistan-Bangladesh alignment reflects a strategic realignment in South Asia, driven by shared economic and geopolitical interests. While not yet a formal alliance, this convergence challenges India’s regional dominance and complicates the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. As China expands its influence through BRI and diplomatic engagements, India must navigate a complex dilemma, balancing regional influence with global partnerships. The future of South Asian stability hinges on how these dynamics evolve and whether a new regional bloc can foster cooperation without exacerbating tensions.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
For regular updates, please register your email here:-
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Hindustan Times. “CDS Chauhan Says Convergence between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh Has Implications for Regional Stability.” July 9, 2025.2.
India Today. “To Counter India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh Creating a Saarc-Replacement.” June 30, 2025.
The Hindu. “Bangladesh, Pakistan, China Hold Inaugural Trilateral Foreign Office Discussion.” June 20, 2025.
The Hindu. “Pakistan, China Working to Establish New Regional Bloc with Potential to Replace SAARC: Report.” June 30, 2025.
Modern Diplomacy. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Thaw and a Regional Realignment.” February 23, 2025.
South Asian Voices. “The Bangladesh-Pakistan-China Triangle and India’s Strategic Dilemma.” April 26, 2025.
The Express Tribune. “Ex-Bangladeshi General Urges China Alliance to Seize India’s Northeast If Pakistan Is Attacked.” May 3, 2025.
United States Institute of Peace. “China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia.” December 16, 2020
My Article published on the “Indus International Research Foundation” website on 18 Jul 25.
In the grand theater of global geopolitics, alliances and rivalries shape the dynamics of diplomacy. Over the past decade, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy that extends well beyond its traditional spheres of influence. One of the most intriguing and consequential elements of this strategy is Turkey’s deepening engagement with India’s neighbours. Turkey’s relations with India’s immediate neighbours form a complex web of strategic, military, economic, and ideological engagements. Turkey has pursued a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, leveraging historical ties, Islamic solidarity, and defence exports to expand its influence in South Asia. This “strategic tango” has significant implications for South Asia’s balance of power, particularly from New Delhi’s perspective.
Turkey and Pakistan: Ideological Brotherhood beyond Diplomacy
The relationship between Turkey and Pakistan is characterised by its closeness and growing complexity, grounded in a shared Islamic identity, historical connections, and reciprocal geopolitical backing. Under the leadership of Erdoğan, these ties have developed into a strong strategic partnership.
The two nations have engaged in collaboration concerning military training, defence manufacturing, and joint naval exercises. Turkey ranks as Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier, following China, providing sophisticated military equipment, including Bayraktar TB2 and Asisguard Songar drones, corvettes, missile systems, and enhancements for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet. These exports have strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities, notably in drone warfare, which constitutes an increasing concern for India along the Line of Control (LoC) and other unstable border regions. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict (Operation Sindoor), reports suggest Turkey supplied Pakistan with between 300 and 400 drones, along with other military assistance, thereby intensifying tensions.
Turkey has also supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, frequently raising the issue at the United Nations and other international forums. Ankara has consistently condemned India’s 2019 abrogation of Article 370, which nullified the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, and has articulated this position at various international platforms, including the United Nations. Conversely, Pakistan endorses Turkey on issues such as the Cyprus dispute and Azerbaijan’s stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, thereby reinforcing their strategic alliance.
By clearly aligning with Pakistan on a sensitive bilateral matter, Turkey has indicated its readiness to confront India on the international stage. This has led to a strong Indian reaction, with tourism bookings to Turkey decreasing by 60% and cancellations increasing by 250% in 2025, along with calls for trade boycotts.
Bangladesh: Growing Engagement and Deepening Ties.
Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Bangladesh have markedly strengthened, primarily due to defence collaboration and economic prospects. Ankara has employed a strategic approach incorporating humanitarian assistance, cultural diplomacy, and religious outreach to foster rapport with Dhaka. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been actively engaged in Bangladesh, financing educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and infrastructure developments. Furthermore, the administration of President Erdoğan has adopted a firm stance regarding the Rohingya crisis, providing refuge to displaced persons and vocally criticising Myanmar’s policies. This stance aligns closely with the perspectives held by Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has reportedly acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones, whilst augmenting Bangladesh’s military capabilities, evoke concerns in India regarding their possible deployment along the shared 4,096-kilometre border. Economically, Turkey has actively engaged with Bangladesh through trade and infrastructure initiatives, capitalising on Dhaka’s expanding economy and strategic positioning. Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions align with certain political factions within Bangladesh, notably those sympathetic to Islamist rhetoric, thereby further fortifying bilateral relations.
This ideological alignment, coupled with defence cooperation, has raised concerns in New Delhi, which fears that Turkey’s influence could destabilise its eastern neighbourhood.
Emerging Engagements With Other Neighbours
Turkey has also expanded its focus to smaller South Asian nations, including Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar, and the Maldives. These countries, often overlooked in global strategic considerations, possess significant geopolitical importance due to their strategic locations and vulnerability to external influences.
In Nepal, Turkey’s influence is predominantly diplomatic and cultural. Ankara has increased its embassy presence, provided scholarships, and facilitated interfaith dialogue through its Diyanet Foundation. Although not explicitly political, these initiatives form part of Turkey’s broader strategy to extend its influence via cultural engagement and religious diplomacy.
Turkey’s engagements with Sri Lanka are less pronounced but strategically significant. Turkey has pursued economic ties and limited defence cooperation, including potential drone exports. In Bhutan, Turkey’s presence is primarily economic, with investments in infrastructure and trade.
Myanmar, notwithstanding its political instability, has experienced Turkey’s outreach through humanitarian aid and limited defence negotiations, capitalising on shared Islamic affiliations with specific communities. Although these efforts are less advanced than those with Pakistan and Bangladesh, they demonstrate Turkey’s broader strategy to augment its presence in India’s vicinity.
The Maldives, a small island nation located in the Indian Ocean, has attracted interest from numerous international actors, including China, India, and currently Turkey. The government led by Erdoğan has enhanced bilateral engagements and extended development aid. As the archipelago increasingly assumes a pivotal position in the contest for influence within the Indian Ocean, Turkey’s engagement signifies its aspiration to participate actively in regional maritime geopolitics.
The China Factor: Converging Interests, Diverging Identities
While not a neighbour in the strict sense, China has a significant influence on India’s strategic outlook and is becoming increasingly important for Turkey as well. Ankara and Beijing share common viewpoints in criticising Western dominance and promoting multipolarity. Turkey participates in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though with varying enthusiasm. Economic needs have motivated Erdoğan to pursue Chinese investment, especially during Turkey’s ongoing financial instability.
Nevertheless, the relationship encounters some friction. Turkey has historically been a vocal critic of China’s treatment of the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority in Xinjiang. Erdoğan previously characterised Chinese policies as “genocide,” although such rhetoric has become less prominent in recent years as economic pragmatism has gained precedence.
From India’s perspective, Turkey’s ties with China heighten concerns. Both nations have shown a readiness to oppose India on Kashmir and support Pakistan. Although their ideological bases differ—Turkey with its neo-Ottoman and Islamist inclinations, and China with its authoritarian state capitalism—their strategic interests sometimes align, especially in efforts to counter Indian influence.
Strategic Implications for India
Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, propelled by President Erdoğan’s vision of global Islamic leadership, frequently conflict with India’s secular, multipolar foreign policy. Turkey’s increasing engagement with India’s neighbouring countries carries strategic implications that New Delhi must carefully consider. Although Turkey does not possess the economic strength or geographical proximity to directly challenge India, its ideological assertiveness and alignment with adversarial interests render it a disruptive presence in South Asia.
Ankara’s vocal endorsement of Pakistan regarding Kashmir elevates the issue to an international level, countering India’s stance that it is a bilateral matter. This not only strengthens Pakistan’s position but also offers diplomatic protection for narratives that contest India’s territorial sovereignty.
The Turkey-Pakistan alliance, fortified through defence cooperation and shared stances on issues such as Kashmir, remains highly contentious. Turkey’s provision of advanced weapons, including drones and naval equipment, boosts Pakistan’s military strength, directly challenging India’s security along its western border. Additionally, Turkey’s defence collaborations with Bangladesh and the Maldives pose a threat to India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
Turkey’s soft power efforts, particularly in Muslim-majority areas, aim to establish Ankara as a leader within the Islamic world. This contrasts with India’s approach, which focuses on building ties with Muslim-majority nations through economic and developmental partnerships, rather than religious solidarity.
Turkey’s growing collaboration with China and Pakistan may constitute a loose yet influential axis characterised by common objectives to curtail Indian influence. While the establishment of a formal alliance appears improbable, convergences on particular issues, such as opposing India’s ascent or supporting anti-Indian narratives, could pose a persistent strategic challenge.
India’s Options
In response to Turkey’s assertiveness, India needs to adopt a multifaceted strategy. India’s displeasure needs to be signalled by reducing high-level diplomatic exchanges, and through economic levers such as trade and tourism advisories. Another option is to strengthen ties with countries that view Turkish policies with suspicion. Enhancement of defence and economic cooperation with Greece, Armenia, Cyprus, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would convey the right message. Closer at home, India needs to leverage its cultural diplomacy, economic strength, and infrastructure investments to counter Turkish influence in neighbouring countries. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and the Indo-Pacific outreach provide platforms that could be used to build alternative narratives to Ankara’s Islamic solidarity approach.
Conclusion
Turkey’s strategic engagement with its neighbours in South Asia, often described metaphorically as a Tango, appears to be more than mere diplomatic manoeuvring. It seems to constitute a deliberate effort to reshape regional alliances and enhance Ankara’s influence within the Muslim world and beyond. For India, this diplomatic dance presents both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge to its strategic environment and regional influence, and an opportunity to refine its diplomatic strategies and foster resilient partnerships. India must navigate these intricate geopolitical developments with vigilance to safeguard its regional interests. By fortifying its alliances and leveraging its economic and military capacities, India should endeavour to ensure that Turkey’s actions do not destabilise the delicate balance of power in South Asia.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Hindu, T. (2025, March 10). India Sees 60% Drop in Tourism to Turkey Amid Kashmir Tensions.
Dawn. (2025, February 15). Turkey Supplies 300–400 Drones to Pakistan During Operation Sindoor, Sources Say.
Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2024, November 20). Turkey’s Defence Exports to Pakistan: Bayraktar TB2 and Beyond.
Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2024). India’s Response to Turkey’s Stance on Kashmir at the UN. New Delhi: Government of India.
Reuters. (2025, January 5). Bangladesh Acquires Turkish TB2 Drones, Raising Concerns in India.
Sharma, A. (2023). Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman Ambitions in South Asia. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.
Siddiqui, N. (2024). Pakistan-Turkey Strategic Partnership: Defence and Diplomacy. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies.
Times of India. (2025, April 2). 250% Surge in Cancellations of Turkey Travel Bookings After Operation Sindoor.
Yilmaz, I., & Shakil, K. (2023). Turkey’s Foreign Policy Under Erdoğan: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism. Journal of South Asian Studies, 46(3), 231–245.
The Diplomat. (2023).Turkey’s Growing Footprint in South Asia: Soft Power or Strategic Intent?
Asia Foundation. (2022).Turkey’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Bangladesh and the Rohingya Crisis.
Pantucci, R. (2022).China-Turkey Relations: A New Axis of Authoritarian Influence? Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
Sharma, R. (2021).India’s Strategic Realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean: Balancing Turkey’s Outreach. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS).
Kugelman, M. (2020).Turkey and Pakistan: A Budding Strategic Alliance? Wilson Center.
Anadolu Agency. (2020).Erdoğan Says Kashmir Is as Important to Turkey as It Is to Pakistan.
Raja Mohan, C. (2020).The Rise of Turkey in Asia: A Challenge to India’s Regional Position? Carnegie India.
Yavuz, M. H., & Hakan, M. (2019).Erdoğan’s Vision and the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy. Middle East Critique, 28(3), 217–232.
My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 20 Apr 25
On April 17, 2025, Bangladesh and Pakistan held their first foreign secretary-level talks in 15 years in Dhaka, marking a significant step toward resetting bilateral ties: Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary, Md. Jashim Uddin and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch led the Foreign Office Consultations. The discussions covered various issues, including trade, economic cooperation, regional matters, and historically unresolved disputes.
Bangladesh demanded a public apology from Pakistan for alleged atrocities committed during the 1971 Liberation War and sought $4.52 billion as its share of pre-1971 assets from undivided Pakistan. Other issues included the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis and the transfer of foreign aid funds related to the 1970 cyclone. Jashim Uddin emphasised resolving these issues to build a “solid foundation” for relations, while Baloch described the talks as “constructive” and focused on harnessing bilateral potential.
Pakistan acknowledged “outstanding issues” but did not confirm commitments to Bangladesh’s demands in public statements. The talks also explored boosting trade, with Bangladesh highlighting investment opportunities in jute and textiles. Both sides noted a January 2025 MoU for rice procurement from Pakistan. Bangladesh has eased visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals and launched direct shipping links, while Pakistan approved Fly Jinnah, a low-cost airline, to operate between the two countries. Baloch met Yunus and the Foreign Affairs Adviser, Md. Touhid Hossain, discussing the revival of SAARC and regional cooperation. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, is scheduled to visit Dhaka on April 27-28, 2025, the first such visit since 2012, with expectations of signing agreements to strengthen ties further.
For over five decades, the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been defined by estrangement, rooted in the traumatic 1971 Liberation War, when East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh with India’s military backing. The war left deep scars, with Bangladesh accusing Pakistani forces of committing genocide, resulting in an estimated 3 million deaths and widespread atrocities. Under Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024), ties remained frosty due to her government’s focus on war crime tribunals and alignment with India. However, the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, following a student-led uprising, marked a turning point. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh and Pakistan have embarked on a path of pragmatic engagement, driven by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. Unanswered questions include the drivers of this thaw, the challenges ahead, and the implications for South Asian geopolitics, particularly India.
Historical Context: A Legacy of Estrangement
The 1971 war remains the defining fault line in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh’s narrative emphasises Pakistani military atrocities, including mass killings and the rapes, claims Pakistan disputes. Post-independence, Bangladesh’s early leaders, such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, sought to balance ties with Pakistan, attending the 1974 Organisation of Islamic Conference summit in Lahore. However, relations deteriorated after Mujib’s assassination in 1975, as subsequent Bangladeshi governments oscillated between secularism and Islamic identity, complicating reconciliation. During Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh pursued war crimes trials, executing figures like Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami in 2016, prompting Pakistan’s condemnation and further straining ties. Visa restrictions, lack of direct flights, and minimal trade underscored the diplomatic freeze, with Pakistani goods often rerouted through third-party ports.
Catalysts for Change: The Post-Hasina Era
The political upheaval in Bangladesh in August 2024, which forced Hasina to flee to India, created a strategic opening for reconciliation. The interim government under Yunus adopted a “friendship to all” foreign policy, distancing itself from Hasina’s India-centric approach and opening doors to Pakistan. This significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy can potentially reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics.
Political Realignment. Hasina’s ouster reduced anti-Pakistan rhetoric, as her Awami League had leveraged 1971 grievances for political legitimacy. Yunus’s neutral stance prioritises economic and diplomatic diversification.
Strained India-Bangladesh Ties. Hasina’s exile in India and Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition have fueled anti-India sentiment, amplified by the “India Out” campaign in 2024. This has pushed Bangladesh to seek alternative partners like Pakistan to counterbalance India’s influence.
Economic Pressures. Both nations face economic challenges, including high inflation and global trade uncertainties. Bangladesh’s 6% GDP growth since 2021 and Pakistan’s “Uraan Pakistan” plan for 6% growth by 2028 incentivise trade expansion.
China’s Role. China’s strategic partnerships with both countries, including Bangladesh’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, encourage a trilateral alignment, raising concerns in India about the potential shift in power dynamics in the region.
Recent Engagements
Diplomatic Engagement. Diplomatic interactions have surged since August 2024. Yunus and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met twice—on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 and the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024—discussing trade, cultural exchanges, and regional cooperation, including reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A symbolic Eid al-Fitr phone call in March 2025 between the leaders underscored goodwill.
Economic and Trade Cooperation. Bilateral trade grew by 27% between August and December 2024, with both nations targeting a $3 billion trade volume within a year, over four times the current level. In November 2024, direct sea trade resumed after 53 years, with two Pakistani cargo ships docking at Chittagong Port carrying sugar and potatoes. Bangladesh also permitted Pakistani vessels at Mongla Port. Bangladesh scrapped mandatory 100% physical inspections of Pakistani goods in September 2024, reducing logistical costs. A memorandum of understanding signed on January 13, 2025, established a joint business council to boost private-sector ties. Bangladesh eased strict security clearances for Pakistani travellers, while Pakistan waived visa fees for Bangladeshis. Plans for direct flights, which have been absent since 2018, are underway.
Military Cooperation. Military ties have seen unprecedented growth, signalling a strategic shift. In January 2025, a Bangladeshi delegation led by Lt. General S.M. Kamrul-Hassan visited Pakistan, meeting Army Chief General Asim Munir to discuss joint exercises, training, and arms trade. Pakistan described the nations as “brotherly,” aiming to reshape South Asia’s security landscape. Bangladesh’s BNS Samudra Joy participated in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise in February 2025. This was the first major Bangladeshi warship deployment to Pakistan in over a decade, and the exercise focused on countering piracy and illegal fishing. Between September and December 2024, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of RDX from Pakistan, tripling the previous year’s volume. Reports suggest interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, co-developed by Pakistan and China, to support Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030” modernisation. Pakistan will begin training Bangladesh’s army in February 2025, with a Pakistani Major General overseeing programs at Momenshahi Cantonment.
Cultural and People-to-People Ties. Shared cultural heritage has facilitated reconciliation, including Urdu-Bengali linguistic ties and a Muslim-majority identity. The 2024 visit of a Pakistani artist to Dhaka and the Bangladesh cricket team’s tour to Pakistan were celebrated as soft diplomacy successes. The “Bay of Bengal Conversation” seminar in November 2024, attended by Pakistani scholars, emphasised Track II diplomacy to rebuild trust.
Challenges to Sustained Engagement
Despite progress, several challenges persist. Bangladesh’s demand for a formal Pakistani apology and $4.2 billion in compensation for 1971 remains unmet, fuelling public opposition in Bangladesh, especially during Victory Day commemorations. While some Bangladeshis welcome renewed ties, others, particularly 1971 war survivors, oppose reconciliation without accountability. Further, Bangladesh’s economic reliance on India and shared counterterrorism goals may constrain its pivot toward Pakistan. Reports of a foiled coup in Bangladesh with alleged ISI backing raise concerns about Pakistan’s intentions, complicating military cooperation.
Implications for India
The Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw could reshape South Asian geopolitics. Given its ties with both nations, it may strengthen China’s regional influence, potentially forming a “trifecta” that concerns India. Unresolved 1971 issues and India’s security concerns may limit the depth of this alignment. India, a key player in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and a close ally under Hasina, views this rapprochement with alarm. The warming ties threaten India’s influence in South Asia, particularly given concerns over the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow 20-22 km strip connecting India’s northeast.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Yunus at the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in April 2025, raising concerns about the safety of the Hindu minority and Hasina’s extradition. India’s High Commissioner Pranay Verma emphasised a “people-centric” approach, advocating for a “democratic, stable” Bangladesh. India has provided Bangladesh $7.862 billion in Lines of Credit to support infrastructure projects. However, it recently terminated transhipment facilities for Bangladesh’s cargo, signalling displeasure.
India has to bolster its 4,096-km border with Bangladesh, deploying technology and increasing Border Security Force inspections to counter infiltration and smuggling. Fears persist that Pakistan’s ISI could transfer weapons to insurgent groups via Bangladesh, threatening India’s northeastern states.
Conclusion
The recalibration of Pakistan-Bangladesh ties since August 2024 marks a significant shift from estrangement to engagement, driven by political changes, economic imperatives, and strategic realignments. Diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, underpinned by cultural ties, reflects an approach to overcoming historical animosities. However, unresolved grievances, public sentiment, and India’s wary response pose challenges to sustained progress. For India, the thaw necessitates a recalibrated strategy to maintain influence in Bangladesh while addressing regional security concerns. As South Asia navigates this evolving dynamic, the Bangladesh-Pakistan rapprochement underscores the region’s complex interplay of history, geopolitics, and pragmatism. The coming years will test whether this engagement can transcend tactical gains to foster lasting reconciliation.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
For regular updates, please register your email here:-
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
AP News. “Bangladesh and Pakistan resume talks after 15 years, seek to mend strained ties.” April 18, 2025.
DW. “How Bangladesh-Pakistan reconciliation impacts India.” December 31, 2024.
India Today. “Pakistan moves to reset ties with Bangladesh as China factor grows.” April 9, 2025.
Lowy Institute. “The revival of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties.” February 2, 2025.
Modern Diplomacy. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Thaw and a Regional Realignment.” February 23, 2025.
Moneycontrol. “With China in the wings, Pakistan-Bangladesh talks resume after 15 years.” April 17, 2025.
NewKerala.com. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Ties: Implications for India’s Diplomacy.” February 2, 2025.
South Asian Voices. “Bangladesh in 2024: Protests, Political Shifts, and a New Path Ahead.” December 19, 2024.
South Asian Voices. “How Naval Diplomacy Could Rewrite Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties.” April 9, 2025.
Takshashila Institution. “India-Bangladesh relations – Challenges and Opportunities.” October 22, 2024.
The Diplomat. “Moonis Ahmar on the Future of Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations.” September 30, 2024.
TRT Global. “Pakistan and Bangladesh: A thaw begins after decades of frosty relations.” April 16, 2025.
World Economic Forum. “Pakistan’s path towards sustainable and inclusive growth.” January 21, 2025.
