Tag: bangladesh

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656: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT: PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH RECALIBRATING TIES

 

My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 20 Apr 25

 

On April 17, 2025, Bangladesh and Pakistan held their first foreign secretary-level talks in 15 years in Dhaka, marking a significant step toward resetting bilateral ties: Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary, Md. Jashim Uddin and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch led the Foreign Office Consultations. The discussions covered various issues, including trade, economic cooperation, regional matters, and historically unresolved disputes.

Bangladesh demanded a public apology from Pakistan for alleged atrocities committed during the 1971 Liberation War and sought $4.52 billion as its share of pre-1971 assets from undivided Pakistan. Other issues included the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis and the transfer of foreign aid funds related to the 1970 cyclone. Jashim Uddin emphasised resolving these issues to build a “solid foundation” for relations, while Baloch described the talks as “constructive” and focused on harnessing bilateral potential.

Pakistan acknowledged “outstanding issues” but did not confirm commitments to Bangladesh’s demands in public statements. The talks also explored boosting trade, with Bangladesh highlighting investment opportunities in jute and textiles. Both sides noted a January 2025 MoU for rice procurement from Pakistan. Bangladesh has eased visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals and launched direct shipping links, while Pakistan approved Fly Jinnah, a low-cost airline, to operate between the two countries. Baloch met Yunus and the Foreign Affairs Adviser, Md. Touhid Hossain, discussing the revival of SAARC and regional cooperation. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, is scheduled to visit Dhaka on April 27-28, 2025, the first such visit since 2012, with expectations of signing agreements to strengthen ties further.

For over five decades, the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been defined by estrangement, rooted in the traumatic 1971 Liberation War, when East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh with India’s military backing. The war left deep scars, with Bangladesh accusing Pakistani forces of committing genocide, resulting in an estimated 3 million deaths and widespread atrocities. Under Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024), ties remained frosty due to her government’s focus on war crime tribunals and alignment with India. However, the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, following a student-led uprising, marked a turning point. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh and Pakistan have embarked on a path of pragmatic engagement, driven by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. Unanswered questions include the drivers of this thaw, the challenges ahead, and the implications for South Asian geopolitics, particularly India.

 

Historical Context: A Legacy of Estrangement

The 1971 war remains the defining fault line in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh’s narrative emphasises Pakistani military atrocities, including mass killings and the rapes, claims Pakistan disputes. Post-independence, Bangladesh’s early leaders, such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, sought to balance ties with Pakistan, attending the 1974 Organisation of Islamic Conference summit in Lahore. However, relations deteriorated after Mujib’s assassination in 1975, as subsequent Bangladeshi governments oscillated between secularism and Islamic identity, complicating reconciliation. During Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh pursued war crimes trials, executing figures like Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami in 2016, prompting Pakistan’s condemnation and further straining ties. Visa restrictions, lack of direct flights, and minimal trade underscored the diplomatic freeze, with Pakistani goods often rerouted through third-party ports.

 

Catalysts for Change: The Post-Hasina Era

The political upheaval in Bangladesh in August 2024, which forced Hasina to flee to India, created a strategic opening for reconciliation. The interim government under Yunus adopted a “friendship to all” foreign policy, distancing itself from Hasina’s India-centric approach and opening doors to Pakistan. This significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy can potentially reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics.

    • Political Realignment. Hasina’s ouster reduced anti-Pakistan rhetoric, as her Awami League had leveraged 1971 grievances for political legitimacy. Yunus’s neutral stance prioritises economic and diplomatic diversification.
    • Strained India-Bangladesh Ties. Hasina’s exile in India and Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition have fueled anti-India sentiment, amplified by the “India Out” campaign in 2024. This has pushed Bangladesh to seek alternative partners like Pakistan to counterbalance India’s influence.
    • Economic Pressures. Both nations face economic challenges, including high inflation and global trade uncertainties. Bangladesh’s 6% GDP growth since 2021 and Pakistan’s “Uraan Pakistan” plan for 6% growth by 2028 incentivise trade expansion.
    • China’s Role. China’s strategic partnerships with both countries, including Bangladesh’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, encourage a trilateral alignment, raising concerns in India about the potential shift in power dynamics in the region.

 

Recent Engagements

Diplomatic Engagement. Diplomatic interactions have surged since August 2024. Yunus and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met twice—on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 and the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024—discussing trade, cultural exchanges, and regional cooperation, including reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A symbolic Eid al-Fitr phone call in March 2025 between the leaders underscored goodwill.

Economic and Trade Cooperation. Bilateral trade grew by 27% between August and December 2024, with both nations targeting a $3 billion trade volume within a year, over four times the current level. In November 2024, direct sea trade resumed after 53 years, with two Pakistani cargo ships docking at Chittagong Port carrying sugar and potatoes. Bangladesh also permitted Pakistani vessels at Mongla Port. Bangladesh scrapped mandatory 100% physical inspections of Pakistani goods in September 2024, reducing logistical costs. A memorandum of understanding signed on January 13, 2025, established a joint business council to boost private-sector ties. Bangladesh eased strict security clearances for Pakistani travellers, while Pakistan waived visa fees for Bangladeshis. Plans for direct flights, which have been absent since 2018, are underway.

Military Cooperation. Military ties have seen unprecedented growth, signalling a strategic shift. In January 2025, a Bangladeshi delegation led by Lt. General S.M. Kamrul-Hassan visited Pakistan, meeting Army Chief General Asim Munir to discuss joint exercises, training, and arms trade. Pakistan described the nations as “brotherly,” aiming to reshape South Asia’s security landscape. Bangladesh’s BNS Samudra Joy participated in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise in February 2025. This was the first major Bangladeshi warship deployment to Pakistan in over a decade, and the exercise focused on countering piracy and illegal fishing. Between September and December 2024, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of RDX from Pakistan, tripling the previous year’s volume. Reports suggest interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, co-developed by Pakistan and China, to support Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030” modernisation. Pakistan will begin training Bangladesh’s army in February 2025, with a Pakistani Major General overseeing programs at Momenshahi Cantonment.

Cultural and People-to-People Ties. Shared cultural heritage has facilitated reconciliation, including Urdu-Bengali linguistic ties and a Muslim-majority identity. The 2024 visit of a Pakistani artist to Dhaka and the Bangladesh cricket team’s tour to Pakistan were celebrated as soft diplomacy successes. The “Bay of Bengal Conversation” seminar in November 2024, attended by Pakistani scholars, emphasised Track II diplomacy to rebuild trust.

  

Challenges to Sustained Engagement

Despite progress, several challenges persist. Bangladesh’s demand for a formal Pakistani apology and $4.2 billion in compensation for 1971 remains unmet, fuelling public opposition in Bangladesh, especially during Victory Day commemorations. While some Bangladeshis welcome renewed ties, others, particularly 1971 war survivors, oppose reconciliation without accountability. Further, Bangladesh’s economic reliance on India and shared counterterrorism goals may constrain its pivot toward Pakistan. Reports of a foiled coup in Bangladesh with alleged ISI backing raise concerns about Pakistan’s intentions, complicating military cooperation.

 

Implications for India

The Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw could reshape South Asian geopolitics. Given its ties with both nations, it may strengthen China’s regional influence, potentially forming a “trifecta” that concerns India.   Unresolved 1971 issues and India’s security concerns may limit the depth of this alignment. India, a key player in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and a close ally under Hasina, views this rapprochement with alarm. The warming ties threaten India’s influence in South Asia, particularly given concerns over the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow 20-22 km strip connecting India’s northeast.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Yunus at the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in April 2025, raising concerns about the safety of the Hindu minority and Hasina’s extradition. India’s High Commissioner Pranay Verma emphasised a “people-centric” approach, advocating for a “democratic, stable” Bangladesh. India has provided Bangladesh $7.862 billion in Lines of Credit to support infrastructure projects. However, it recently terminated transhipment facilities for Bangladesh’s cargo, signalling displeasure.

India has to bolster its 4,096-km border with Bangladesh, deploying technology and increasing Border Security Force inspections to counter infiltration and smuggling. Fears persist that Pakistan’s ISI could transfer weapons to insurgent groups via Bangladesh, threatening India’s northeastern states.

 

Conclusion

The recalibration of Pakistan-Bangladesh ties since August 2024 marks a significant shift from estrangement to engagement, driven by political changes, economic imperatives, and strategic realignments. Diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, underpinned by cultural ties, reflects an approach to overcoming historical animosities. However, unresolved grievances, public sentiment, and India’s wary response pose challenges to sustained progress. For India, the thaw necessitates a recalibrated strategy to maintain influence in Bangladesh while addressing regional security concerns. As South Asia navigates this evolving dynamic, the Bangladesh-Pakistan rapprochement underscores the region’s complex interplay of history, geopolitics, and pragmatism. The coming years will test whether this engagement can transcend tactical gains to foster lasting reconciliation.

 

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Lost In 1971 War, Pakistan Attempts To Rebuild Ties With Bangladesh With China’s Help; Concern For India?

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. AP News. “Bangladesh and Pakistan resume talks after 15 years, seek to mend strained ties.” April 18, 2025.
  1. DW. “How Bangladesh-Pakistan reconciliation impacts India.” December 31, 2024.
  1. India Today. “Pakistan moves to reset ties with Bangladesh as China factor grows.” April 9, 2025.
  1. Lowy Institute. “The revival of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties.” February 2, 2025.
  1. Modern Diplomacy. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Thaw and a Regional Realignment.” February 23, 2025.
  1. Moneycontrol. “With China in the wings, Pakistan-Bangladesh talks resume after 15 years.” April 17, 2025.
  1. NewKerala.com. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Ties: Implications for India’s Diplomacy.” February 2, 2025.
  1. South Asian Voices. “Bangladesh in 2024: Protests, Political Shifts, and a New Path Ahead.” December 19, 2024.
  1. South Asian Voices. “How Naval Diplomacy Could Rewrite Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties.” April 9, 2025.
  1. Takshashila Institution. “India-Bangladesh relations – Challenges and Opportunities.” October 22, 2024.
  1. The Diplomat. “Moonis Ahmar on the Future of Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations.” September 30, 2024.
  1. TRT Global. “Pakistan and Bangladesh: A thaw begins after decades of frosty relations.” April 16, 2025.
  1. World Economic Forum. “Pakistan’s path towards sustainable and inclusive growth.” January 21, 2025.
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647: BANGLADESH: SHIFTING ALLIANCES, STRATEGIC PROJECTS, AND INDIA’S CONCERNS

 

My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 14 Apr 25.

 

During his four-day visit to China from March 26 to 29, 2025, Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, made provocative statements against India. Speaking in Beijing, Yunus referred to India’s northeastern states, known as the “Seven Sisters,” as a “landlocked region” with “no way to reach the ocean.” He positioned Bangladesh as this region’s “only guardian of the ocean.” He suggested that this geographical situation presented a “huge possibility” for China to expand its economy through Bangladesh. He proposed that China could “build things, produce things, market things, bring things to China, and distribute them to the rest of the world,” effectively framing Bangladesh as a strategic gateway for Chinese economic influence.

These offensive remarks triggered strong reactions in India. They underscore the “persistent vulnerability narrative” associated with India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow strip connecting the Northeast to the rest of the country. These statements reflect a deeper strategic consideration and longstanding agenda. Yunus’s pitch came during a time of strained India- Bangladesh relations, following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 and his decision to prioritise China over India for his first state visit. His comments were seen as an attempt to leverage Bangladesh’s geographic position to attract Chinese investment. This shift in Dhaka’s alignment toward Beijing potentially complicates regional security dynamics, especially given the Northeast’s proximity to the sensitive Chicken’s Neck corridor. Prime Minister Narendra Modi later cautioned Yunus during a meeting on April 4, 2025, at the BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand, urging him to avoid rhetoric that “vitiates the environment” and emphasising the need for constructive bilateral ties.

 

Political Upheaval and Anti-India Sentiment. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government marked a turning point in Bangladesh’s domestic and foreign policy. Hasina’s administration had fostered strong ties with India, emphasising economic cooperation, security partnerships, and infrastructure development. However, her ouster, driven by student protests and political unrest, brought to power an interim government that has adopted a less conciliatory tone toward India. Anti-India utterances have gained traction under the new regime. Additionally, public and political discourse in Bangladesh has seen a rise in criticism of India, often centered on issues like water-sharing disputes and perceived interference in Bangladeshi politics. These sentiments are partly rooted in historical grievances and domestic pressures to assert sovereignty but have strained bilateral ties.

 

Cozying Up to China

Bangladesh’s deepening relationship with China is a significant development under the interim government. Beijing has long sought to expand its influence in South Asia, and Bangladesh’s strategic location makes it a key partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Yunus government has actively courted Chinese investment, signaling a shift from Hasina’s cautious balancing act between India and China.

China’s involvement in Bangladesh spans infrastructure, trade, and defence. In March 2025, Dhaka welcomed Chinese participation in multiple projects, including modernising Mongla Port and expanding the China Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram. Bilateral agreements signed during Yunus’s visit to Beijing included cooperation in the blue economy, maritime dialogue, and a potential Free Trade Agreement. These moves indicate Bangladesh’s intent to leverage China’s economic might to bolster its development agenda.

However, this pivot toward China has raised eyebrows in New Delhi. India views China’s growing presence in Bangladesh as part of a broader strategy to encircle it through the so-called “String of Pearls” – a network of strategic assets in the Indo-Pacific. The shift is particularly concerning given Bangladesh’s proximity to India’s northeastern region, which is connected to the mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” The potential threat of China’s growing presence in Bangladesh is a cause for concern in India.

 

The Teesta River Project: A Geopolitical Flashpoint

The Teesta River, which originates in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal and enters Bangladesh, has long been a point of contention between India and Bangladesh. The river is vital for irrigation and livelihoods in both countries, but disagreements over water sharing have persisted for decades. Bangladesh accuses India of restricting water flow through upstream barrages, particularly during the dry season, affecting millions in its northern districts like Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, and Kurigram.

The Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, estimated at $1 billion, has emerged as a new arena for Sino-Indian rivalry. Under Hasina, Bangladesh had leaned toward India for the project, with New Delhi expressing interest in funding it to counter China’s earlier proposal. However, the interim government has shifted course, inviting Chinese participation. In February 2025, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Environment announced plans to collaborate with China on a master plan for the river’s conservation, involving dredging, embankment construction, and township development. This decision was framed as a response to public demand, with hearings held to build consensus.

For India, Chinese involvement in the Teesta project is alarming. The river’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor means that Chinese personnel or infrastructure near the border could provide Beijing with strategic leverage. India fears that data on water flow or the presence of Chinese engineers could be used to monitor or influence the region’s security dynamics. The project’s geopolitical implications underscore the delicate balance Bangladesh must strike between economic development and regional stability.

 

The Lalmonirhat Airfield Project: A Security Concern

Another development raising red flags in India is Bangladesh’s plan to revive the World War II-era airfield in Lalmonirhat, located just 10 kilometers from the Indian border. Reports suggest Dhaka has sought Chinese assistance to transform the abandoned site into a modern airbase, with discussions reportedly held during Yunus’s China visit. While Bangladesh frames the project as part of its military modernisation under the Forces Goal 2030 initiative, India is wary of its potential implications.

The location of the Lalmonirhat airfield, near the Siliguri Corridor, presents a sensitive issue. If developed with Chinese support, the airbase could serve as a dual-use facility, potentially hosting Chinese military assets disguised as civilian infrastructure. The mere prospect of Chinese involvement so close to India’s border is viewed as a provocative move, particularly in light of Bangladesh’s recent overtures to Pakistan, another rival of India.

 

The Chicken’s Neck: India’s Strategic Redline

The Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken’s Neck, is a narrow strip of land in West Bengal, approximately 20-60 kilometers wide, which connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states. Bordered by Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, it is one of India’s most strategically located regions. The corridor is a lifeline for trade, communication, and military logistics to the northeast. Any disruption in the Chicken’s Neck could isolate the northeast, a scenario India has long sought to prevent. The corridor’s importance has prompted New Delhi to bolster its defences, deploying advanced assets like Rafale fighter jets, BrahMos missiles, and the S-400 air defence system.

Bangladesh’s moves to involve China in projects near the corridor – particularly the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield – are seen as direct challenges to India’s security. A Chinese presence in these areas could enable intelligence gathering, influence local dynamics, or even give Beijing a foothold to pressure India in a crisis. The corridor’s proximity to the Chinese-controlled Chumbi Valley, where tensions flared during the 2017 Doklam standoff, further heightens India’s concerns.

 

Improving Connectivity: Kaladan Project

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is a significant infrastructure initiative to enhance connectivity between India and Myanmar, foster economic growth, and strengthen bilateral ties. Launched in 2008 under India’s Act East Policy, the project seeks to connect Kolkata’s seaport with Sittwe in Myanmar’s Rakhine State by sea, then link Sittwe to Paletwa through the Kaladan River, and finally extend from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border in Mizoram by road. Spanning approximately 539 km by sea, 158 km by river, and 110 km by road, it offers an alternative route to India’s northeastern states, bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor and reducing travel distance by about 1,328 km.

Fully funded by India at an estimated cost of $484 million, the project faced numerous challenges, including delays due to political instability in Myanmar, the Rohingya crisis, conflicts involving the Arakan Army, and logistical issues like monsoons and rugged terrain. While the Sittwe port and Paletwa jetty were completed by 2017, with dredging finalised, the road from Paletwa to Zorinpui remains under construction. Recent control of Paletwa by the Arakan Army has raised concerns about the project’s viability, though assurances of cooperation have been made.

The project promises substantial economic benefits, boosting trade and development in India’s landlocked Northeast by providing sea access to Southeast Asian markets. Strategically, it enhances India’s regional influence, countering China’s presence. However, ongoing conflicts and coordination issues underscore the need for diplomatic engagement with local stakeholders to ensure timely completion, making the Kaladan Project a critical yet complex endeavour for regional connectivity and economic integration.

 

Indian Concerns and Regional Implications

India’s concerns about Bangladesh’s recent trajectory are multifaceted. First, the rise in anti-India rhetoric threatens to erode the goodwill built over decades of cooperation. Projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and India’s $8 billion in credit lines for Bangladeshi infrastructure underscore the depth of bilateral ties, but these are now at risk due to political uncertainty.

China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh challenges India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood. New Delhi fears that Bangladesh could become a key node in China’s regional strategy, undermining India’s role as a counterweight in the Indo-Pacific. With planned visits by its foreign minister and secretary in April 2025, Pakistan’s involvement adds another layer of complexity as Islamabad seeks to capitalise on Dhaka’s shift.

Further, the strategic projects near the Siliguri Corridor raise immediate security concerns. India has responded by enhancing its military posture but recognises the need for diplomatic engagement. The meeting between Yunus and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in April 2025 was described as “constructive,” with discussions on water sharing, border issues, and minority rights. However, tangible progress remains elusive.

 

Indian Retribution.

Since 08 April, India has terminated a transhipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to route export goods through Indian ports, airports, and land customs stations to third countries. Established in 2020, the arrangement had facilitated cost-effective and efficient trade, particularly for Bangladesh’s garment industry, which relied on Indian infrastructure to reach markets in Europe and the Gulf.

India cited logistical challenges, including port and airport congestion, as the primary reason for the withdrawal. Indian exporters, especially in apparel, had long complained that the facility strained capacity, inflating costs and delaying shipments. However, the timing suggests a strategic response to Bangladesh’s growing alignment with China, raising regional security and influence concerns. Exceptions were made for exports to Nepal and Bhutan, aligning with World Trade Organization obligations for landlocked nations. The move disrupts Bangladesh’s trade logistics, forcing reliance on longer, costlier routes through its ports like Chittagong.

 

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s recent developments reflect a complex interplay of domestic priorities and geopolitical ambitions. The interim government’s outreach to China and anti-India rhetoric have set off alarm bells in New Delhi, particularly regarding the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield projects. The Chicken’s Neck remains a critical concern, with India taking no chances to secure its lifeline to the northeast. As Bangladesh navigates its path, it must balance economic imperatives with regional stability, while India grapples with the challenge of maintaining influence in a rapidly changing neighbourhood. The coming months will test the resilience of India-Bangladesh relations and the broader dynamics of South Asian geopolitics.

 

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Bangladesh Tries Creating Thorns In India’s Achilles Heal, A Region Defended By Rafale, BrahMos, S-400

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. The Economic Times, April 6, 2025: “Chinese airfield plan in Bangladesh district close to Chicken’s Neck area raises Indian concerns.”
  1. The Diplomat, May 22, 2024: “Teesta River Project Pushes Bangladesh into China-India Cold War.”
  1. The Hindu, March 28, 2025: “Bangladesh welcomes China to participate in Teesta project.”
  1. Business Today, April 8, 2025: “India Alarmed as Bangladesh Plans Strategic Base near Chicken’s Neck with China’s Help.”
  1. Indian Defence Research Wing, April 8, 2025: “Bangladesh Seeks China’s Assistance for Lalmonirhat Airbase: A Strategic Concern for India.”
  1. Pant, Harsh V., & Sahu, Premesha. “China’s Strategic Entrenchment in Bangladesh: Implications for India.” ORF Issue Brief, 2021.
  1. “Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act: Navigating India-China Rivalry.” ISAS Insights, 2022.
  1. Ganguly, Sumit. “India’s Neighborhood First Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?” Carnegie India, 2021.
  1. “Bangladesh’s Mega Projects and the BRI Footprint: Analyzing the Economic and Strategic Layers.” SAM Analysis, 2023.
  1. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia: Strategic Implications for India.” CSIS Briefs, 2021.
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587:CHINESE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR BANGLADESH: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

Bangladesh has shown a growing interest in modernising its air force as part of its broader military modernisation under the “Forces Goal 2030” initiative. The BAF currently operates older platforms. These ageing aircraft are increasingly inadequate against modern threats and require replacement with advanced platforms. The BAF has recently considered acquiring new-generation multirole fighter jets, including Chinese aircraft.

 

Interest in J-10C. The Chinese J-10C, a fourth-generation-plus multi-role fighter jet boasting advanced avionics, weapon systems, and cost efficiency, had featured on Bangladesh’s wish list. This news about the possible acquisition of J-10C aircraft followed Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan’s visit to China in Nov 2024. He reportedly expressed Bangladesh’s desire to acquire about 16 J-10C multi-role combat aircraft from China.

 

Interest in JF-17. A high-level defence delegation from Bangladesh showed interest in JF-17 Thunders during a visit to Pakistan in January 2025. The delegation, led by Lieutenant General SM Qamarul Hassan, Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Bangladesh, met with Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Chief Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar Sidhu at the Air Headquarters in Islamabad. According to the report, Lieutenant General Hassan explicitly expressed interest in the JF-17 Thunder aircraft, sparking rumours about a possible purchase. This was the first time Bangladesh had expressed its interest in the JF-17. Earlier reports suggested that Bangladesh heavily favoured the Chinese J-10C 4.5th-generation aircraft.

 

The J-10C Aircraft. The J-10C, known as the ‘Vigorous Dragon’, is claimed to be a fourth-generation multirole combat aircraft equipped with the Chinese-manufactured WS-10B engine. China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation has developed it. J-10C represents an evolutionary version of the J-10 series.  The J-10C was first unveiled to the Chinese public in July 2017 and has been operational since 2018. It features significant advancements over earlier variants. It is capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions and is well-suited for diverse operational scenarios. With a delta wing-canard configuration and an optional thrust-vectoring engine, the J-10C claims excellent manoeuvrability and agility in combat. The J-10C is equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which offers enhanced detection, tracking, and targeting capabilities in all weather conditions. Advanced avionics and integrated electronic warfare systems for jamming enemy radar and countering electronic threats enhance survivability. The jet can carry various armaments, including the PL-15 beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVR-AAM), which has a range of over 200 km.

 

JF-17 aircraft. The JF-17 Thunder is a single-engine, lightweight, multi-role combat aircraft. With a maximum speed of approximately 1,200 mph and a service ceiling of 50,000 feet, the JF-17 can carry out various tasks. It is designed to carry Chinese weaponry on its seven hardpoints, including the LS-6 GPS-guided glide bombs, the PL-5 short-range air-to-air missile, and the YJ-12 supersonic and YJ-83 subsonic anti-shipping missiles. Although not directly integrated, the JF-17 can also be equipped with external pods that carry self-defence jammers and electro-optical/infrared sensors. Since its induction in the PAF in 2007, the JF-17 has been upgraded several times. If Bangladesh decides to go for the JF-17, it will likely purchase the Block III variant with superior manoeuvrability, extended range, and enhanced combat capabilities.

 

Comparative Analysis: JF-17 Thunder vs. J-10C

 

The JF-17 Thunder and the J-10C are modern fighter jets developed by China. The former was a collaborative effort between China and Pakistan. They are designed for different roles, customers, and operational needs.

 

Development Background. The JF-17 Thunder was developed jointly by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). It is designed as a cost-effective, lightweight, multirole fighter for export markets and Pakistan’s Air Force (PAF).  The aircraft is projected for its affordability and ease of maintenance. On the other hand, the J-10C was developed solely by the CAC for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It is a more advanced, multirole, fourth-generation-plus fighter designed for high-end performance and greater sophistication.

 

Roles and Missions. The JF-17 Thunder is a lightweight multirole fighter suited for air defence, close air support, and precision strike roles. It targets countries with limited defence budgets. In comparison, the J-10C is designed as a medium-weight multirole fighter capable of air superiority, ground attack, and advanced electronic warfare. It operates in high-threat environments against sophisticated adversaries.

 

Airframe and Design. The JF-17 Thunder is lightweight (approximately 12.7 tons max take-off weight), with a conventional layout and a focus on simplicity and agility. It uses composite materials to reduce weight and cost. Being small and lighter, it is easier to deploy from forward airbases. In contrast, the J-10C is medium-weight (approximately 19 tons max take-off weight), with a canard-delta wing configuration for superior manoeuvrability and aerodynamics—higher use of advanced composites for reduced radar cross-section. The larger size offers a better payload and range.

 

Avionics and Sensors. The newer JF-17 Thunder variant has the KLJ-7 or NRIET KLJ-7A active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. It has a decent avionics suite, including a glass cockpit and helmet-mounted display (HMD). On the other hand, the J-10C has an advanced AESA radar with superior range and tracking capability, highly advanced fully digital flight systems and integrated HMD, and a robust EW suite capable of countering high-end threats.

 

Engines and Performance. The Russian RD-93 or Chinese WS-13 engine powers the JF-17 Thunder. The engine has an 85 kN thrust, enabling the aircraft to attain a speed of Mach 1.6, a combat radius of 1,352 km, and a service ceiling of 55,000 feet. Comparatively, the J-10C initially had an AL-31FN (Russian) engine. The newer variants use China’s WS-10B Taihang engine with a 132 kN thrust. The aircraft can attain a speed of Mach 2.2, has a combat radius of 1,700 km, and a service ceiling of 59,055 feet.

 

Weapons Systems. The JF-17 Thunder can carry PL-5, PL-9, PL-10, or PL-15 beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles, precision-guided munitions like laser-guided bombs and cruise missiles (Ra’ad), and CM-400AKG Anti-ship missile. Its total payload is 3,600 kg. The J-10C has a total payload of 6,000 kg, including advanced PL-10 (IR-guided) and PL-15 (BVR) Air to air missiles with longer ranges, precision-strike capability with advanced guided munitions, and advanced anti-ship missiles for maritime strike roles.

 

Stealth and Survivability. The JF-17 Thunder has limited stealth features and focuses on reduced radar cross-section (RCS) using composites. By contrast, the J-10C possesses a semi-stealth design with reduced RCS due to airframe shaping and the use of RAM (Radar-Absorbing Material). It is more survivable in contested environments.

 

Cost. The JF-17 Thunder reportedly costs approximately $30-40 million per unit (depending on the variant), whereas the J-10C costs roughly $60-70 million per unit.

 

The JF-17 Thunder is projected as an affordable and versatile fighter, ideal for nations needing a cheaper and reliable multirole platform. In contrast, the J-10C is a more capable and sophisticated aircraft, suitable for nations looking for high-end performance and advanced technology.

 

Key Dynamics

Bangladesh is considering acquiring the Chinese JF-17 Thunder and possibly the J-10C for its next-generation fighter program. While the JF-17 Thunder offers a cost-effective, multirole platform with decent air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, the J-10C aircraft, with its advanced capabilities, including AESA radar, stealth features, and modern weaponry, aligns with Bangladesh’s ambitions to bolster regional deterrence. However, the final decision will depend upon numerous factors, such as balancing operational requirements, geopolitical considerations, and financial viability.

 

Strategic Ties with China. Bangladesh maintains strong defence and economic ties with China, its largest military hardware supplier. Bangladesh is China’s second-largest arms buyer after Pakistan. China has previously supplied naval ships, tanks, and other defence systems to Bangladesh, making Chinese aircraft a logical choice for continuity.

 

Dependence on China. A heavy reliance on Chinese defence equipment could limit Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from Beijing.

 

Affordability and Financing. Chinese fighter jets are significantly cheaper than Western counterparts like the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, or Lockheed Martin F-16. China offers flexible financing options, which would appeal to Bangladesh.

 

Operational Costs. While the upfront costs are low, operational and maintenance costs can accumulate over time, especially if Bangladesh opts for higher-end platforms like the J-10C. Financing through Chinese loans might deepen Bangladesh’s economic reliance on Beijing, potentially leading to broader strategic vulnerabilities.

 

Challenges and Concerns. Although Chinese aircraft like the JF-17 and J-10C are advanced, they may lag behind Western jets in reliability, engine performance, and software integration. Critics argue that the aircraft relies heavily on older technologies and reverse-engineered components.

 

Geopolitics. Geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific is rising, with China and the United States wanting Bangladesh in their camp. Bangladesh’s shift towards China could strain its relationship with the United States.

 

Balancing Foreign Policy. The U.S. and Western nations might view Bangladesh’s deepening defence ties with China as a shift away from a balanced foreign policy. This alignment might affect Bangladesh’s ability to balance relationships with other major powers. It could also impact Bangladesh’s access to Western defence technology and economic support.

 

Indian Concern. Bangladesh’s acquisition of Chinese jets would deepen its defence ties with Beijing, aligning with China’s broader strategy of counterbalancing India’s regional influence. This could shift the balance of power in South Asia. Acquiring Chinese jets and aligning with China would complicate Dhaka’s relationship with New Delhi.

 

Conclusion

 

Likely Scenario. Bangladesh’s need to rapidly upgrade its air force, budget constraints, strategic ties with China, and other geopolitical considerations make a deal to procure the JF-17 Thunder Block III comparatively more likely.

 

Bangladesh’s potential acquisition of Chinese fighter jets represents both an opportunity and a risk. On one hand, they would enhance the Bangladesh Air Force’s capabilities, improving its deterrence and operational flexibility. On the other hand, the move comes with substantial financial, operational, and geopolitical challenges that could outweigh the benefits if not carefully managed. The decision also carries significant implications for Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy. Bangladesh must carefully weigh its strategic, operational, and economic priorities to make an informed decision that enhances its national security while maintaining a balanced foreign policy approach.

 

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References and credits

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