This Establishment began as the Aircraft and Armament Testing Unit in 1957, responsible for flight testing of the Gnat aircraft. It has come a long way since its inception. Logically and steadily, the establishment expanded the scope of its activities to flight testing and operational evaluation of various armaments & airborne equipment. As an institution it trains test pilots and test engineers.
Today’s world of rapidity advancing technology places enormous responsibilities on the test crew. They are the vital link between the designers and the operators. Their work calls for an exceptional ability to correctly apply “theory” into solving the practical problems of the aircraft and its systems. These very aircraft and systems operate in some of the highest airfields, the hottest deserts and the densest jungles which span the length and breadth of our country.
Click on the link below to watch the video on ASTE (Nitin Gokhale in conversation with Commandant ASTE) hosted on Bharat Shakti
Set up in 1992 and located in Bengaluru, the Software Development Institute of the Indian Air Force is considered a force behind the fire power. Its primary job is to develop software for all aviation platforms that the IAF inducts and upgrades from tome to time.
Click on the link below to watch the video on SDI (Nitin Gokhale in conversation with Commandant SDI) hosted on Bharat Shakti
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
My Article published in the Chanakya Diaries (Inaugral issue of Chanakya Forum Journal)
Introduction
Air power theories developed in the early 20th century during the world war period when aviation was at a nascent stage. During WWI, aeroplanes were first used for reconnaissance; later in the war, aircraft were used in combat and to drop bombs on enemies. The militaries realised that air power could be decisive in warfare by striking at the heart of the enemy through the third dimension. Air power became a vital element of the military with a profound impact on the character of war. During the interwar period, many theorists grappled with the issues revolving around airpower and its benefits. These theorists include General Giulio Douhet (Italian), Viscount Hugh Trenchard (British), and General William Mitchell (American). Giulio Douhet is considered to be the father of strategic air power.
Their theories revolved around the idea of winning wars quickly and cheaply and, above all, avoiding the carnage of stalemated trench warfare, which was a traumatic facet of World War I. The idea offered hope and was embraced by statesmen, politicians and the public. These military airmen used the initial air power theories to build the Air Force as a separate service. During World War II, air power played a significant role by striking at the heart of the enemy, but it did not quickly end the war as predicted. The validity of the theories was widely accepted and provided a clear direction for building Air Forces worldwide. Much has changed from the WW era, and it is worth reviewing the original theories to ascertain their validity, maybe with appropriate adaptations.
Airpower Theorists
Giulio Doheut. Giulio Doheut was born into a military family in Italy in 1869. He served as a professional artillery officer and was never trained as a pilot, but he was an innovator and had the quality of stirring things up. He was appointed commander of Italy’s first aviation battalion before World War I. During the War, his indiscreet criticism of his military and civilian superiors resulted in him being court-martialled and imprisoned for one year. However, the war (Battle of Caporetto) demonstrated that he was correct and was later acquitted. Soon after the war, Douhet was given a place of honour, but he left the service and passed his remaining years writing and speaking about airpower. He brought forth his Command of the Air in 1921 as an official publication. Douhet died in 1930.
Hugh Trenchard. Hugh Trenchard, a British theorist, was born in 1873. He learned to fly in 1913 and fought much of World War I as head of the Royal Flying Corps in France. Initially, he opposed the idea of creating an independent air force and strategic bombing. On his return to the United Kingdom in 1918, he was appointed chief of the air staff of the Royal Air Force (RAF). He remained in his post through the first decade of the RAF’s existence and was beleaguered by the army and navy because they were generally determined to undo the creation of the RAF. He soon became an advocate of strategic bombing and colonial control through the use of airpower. He lived on for a long time after retiring in 1929 and died in 1956.
William Mitchell. William Mitchell was born in France in 1879 and spent the first three years there. He came from a wealthy and prominent Wisconsin family (His father was a US senator of the Democratic Party). He attended a private school and was enrolled in the ancestor unit of George Washington University for three years but did not graduate. He left school when the Spanish-American war broke out. He remained in the Signal Corps, serving in Cuba, Philippines and Alaska. Mitchell was appointed to the General Staff at a young age while still a captain and was the only Signal Corps officer so assigned. Mitchell occasionally wrote on aviation subjects but displayed no particular interest in flying then. He completed his flying training near Norfolk in 1916, just before the United States entered World War I. He commanded combat aviation at the front and returned home after the war to become assistant chief of the Air Service. Mitchell wrote several books, some of which were published before he resigned. He deliberately provoked a court-martial in 1925, was convicted of insubordination, and left the Army early in 1926. He lived on his farm in Virginia for the rest of his life and died in February 1936.
Core Ideas and Assumptions
Douhet. Douhet argued that an early air attack on the enemy’s vital centres could win a humane victory, while surface forces could contain the enemy. In his opinion, the air attacks would hasten war termination, and the overall death and destruction would be lesser. Douhet assumed that all wars would be ‘total wars ‘, a term that describes a conflict in which every available weapon and resource is used, and the entire population is mobilised towards the war effort. This assumption was a critical factor in his theories, as it influenced his views on the role of air power in warfare.
Trenchard. Trenchard’s core idea was that victory could be achieved by bombing enemy vital centres and thus breaking his will. He was a little vague on what those centres were, but he suggested that civilian morale could be undermined by attacking vital industrial and communications targets. He also believed the RAF could do more to maintain order in colonial areas, much cheaper than the other services. He assumed that the offensive is the more potent form of air war, air superiority is a prerequisite for all other military operations, civilian morale is fragile (the moral effect of bombing is much more devastating than the physical effect), the bomber will always get through and it does not need escort. The air war aspects like night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing accuracy are manageable problems.
William Mitchell. William Mitchell propagated that Airpower, organised into a separate, equal (to Army and Navy), and autonomous air force under a unified Department of Defence, could serve as the most effective and economical means of defending the homeland. Even for fighting an overseas enemy, airpower could be used to decisively attack the enemy’s vital centres without first defeating his armies and navies. Mitchell assumed that future wars would be total, airpower is inherently offensive, and its use is revolutionary, civilian morale is fragile, command of the air is a prime requirement, the bomber will always get through, and airmen alone can understand the proper employment of airpower.
Airpower Thoughts
Air Superiority. All three thinkers advocated that the first step in war was gaining air superiority, a prerequisite for all other operations (air and surface). Douhet felt it was best to attack the enemy’s airpower on the ground, at the airfields, and in the factories. Trenchard believed that air engagements would cause a clash of air forces to control the air. Like Trenchard, Mitchell also argued that air superiority would be mainly achieved through an air battle, but he also supported the idea of attacks on enemy airpower on the ground.
Air Utilisation. All three theorists were unanimous in their thoughts regarding achieving command of the air/air superiority and exploiting the advantage to target civilian morale. They differed a little bit in the targeting philosophy to achieve it. Douhet felt that the mere act of gaining command might be enough. The enemy’s vulnerability would be so great that their leaders would soon capitulate. If not, attacks on the cities and other vital targets would force the leadership to give way. He wanted to attack the people directly, while Trenchard tried to achieve it indirectly by destroying infrastructure targets. Likewise, General Mitchell advocated operations against vital centers, vaguely described as industrial, infrastructure, and agricultural assets, the loss of which would lead to the collapse of civilian morale.
More ink has been spilt and passion expended over the proper selection of targets than over any other airpower subject.
Targeting. In the words of Douhet, “The selection of objectives, the grouping of (attack) zones, and determining the order in which they are to be destroyed is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare”. He felt that no hard and fast rules could be laid down on this aspect of aerial warfare because the choice of enemy targets will depend upon several circumstances, material, moral, and psychological, the importance of which, though real, is not easily estimated. For Trenchard, as with Douhet, the timing of operations for air superiority took precedence. Trenchard’s targeting scheme against morale was vague, but he insisted on following international law, limiting collateral damage, selecting targets in urban areas for their military significance, and attacking vital centers in the infrastructure and production systems. Mitchell was opposed to targeting civilians directly and generally advocated breaking their morale through the destruction of other vital centers like industry, infrastructure, or even agriculture. He did not dwell too much on strategic targets as we know them today. He was more concerned with tactical functions, concentrating mainly on maritime targeting.
Force Structure (Platforms and Weapons). Douhet’s recommendations regarding force structure were more from an Italian perspective. Keeping in mind the geography and affordability. He suggested a strategic air force structure for the other nations that could afford it (like the United States). He felt that only one type of aeroplane was required, the battle plane. For self-protection, these aeroplanes must have moderate speed, long range, and heavy armour. These planes could be armed with self-defence weapons and embedded in the strike package for escort protection. In contrast to Douhet, Mitchell believed no single type of aeroplane was adequate. At first, he advocated a preponderance of pursuit (By Fighter aircraft) but then increasingly emphasised the need for more bomber units. Douhet and Mitchell believed that the bombers would have to combine high explosive and incendiary and gas bombs to have a synergistic effect. Mitchell also placed some emphasis on big bombs (500 to 2000-pounders) and even on aerial torpedoes and radio-controlled guided missiles. Trenchard always felt that the fighter aircraft had a significant role in the air war. However, after World War I, he prioritised bomber units (two-engine types to four-engine aircraft).
Reorganisation. Douhet argued that surface forces would employ airpower as an auxiliary to them. He advocated organising airpower under a separate air force and using it as an independent force to achieve victory without needing tactical victories on the land and at sea. Trenchard initially opposed (though not as adamantly) creating a single air arm but later became more firmly committed to a separate air force. Trenchard strived to retain the RAF with all airpower centralised under its command. He emphasised that the unified control of airpower was essential for achieving the primary objective of gaining and maintaining air superiority over land and sea. On his recommendation, Britain proceeded with the idea of a separate air ministry and a separate air force, but without a formal organisation above to control all three services. Mitchell endorsed the concept of a centralised command of airpower under a separate and independent air force and created a unified Department of Defence. He asserted that only an airman could have the vision of the proper role of airpower; therefore, all military aviation should fall under the direct control of such an airman.
Joint Warfare. Douhet asserted that the other armed forces would only stand on the defensive until the air force offensive had been quickly decisive. On the other hand, Trenchard was well indoctrinated in ground warfare, having been an army officer himself. While World War I was still being fought, he was firm in his commitment to ground support and allowed only that “excess” aircraft could be dedicated to independent operations. After the war, though, Trenchard increasingly argued that the role of the British army and navy was secondary, and the role of the RAF and strategic attack was primary. Trenchard, although favoured independent operations, made a greater allowance than Douhet for cooperation with other services in operations against the enemy’s fielded forces. Mitchell stressed that the Air Force would have to be a primary military instrument of war and saw a place for independent missions for air forces well beyond the battlefield.
Relevance Today
Core Ideas. All three airpower theoreticians were propagating a separate Air Force’s viability and ability to end the war quickly and humanely. Their thoughts (about humane victory) were that air power would make the conflict termination faster, and overall, death and destruction would be comparatively lesser. War itself can never be humane. The death and destruction is the method of the war. Over the years, mankind has gone on to develop weapons of mass destruction, although the trend these days is for reduced tolerance to the loss of human life. Warfare is changing, wherein resorting to terror is becoming a norm, and terror strives for the loss of human life not only during hostilities but even during peacetime.
Beliefs.
Their belief that the coming of aviation was revolutionary has proved to be true. Over the years, airpower has revolutionised the way wars are fought. Several roles and tasks have been assigned to airpower. These are performed not only during war but also during peacetime and no-war, no-peacetime situations.
Their presumption that all wars will be total wars has been proven right. Warfare has become multi-domain, with the inclusion of new domains of warfare (cyber, space, electronic and information). Grey zone warfare has become a norm, with everything and anything being used as a weapon.
Their assumption that civilian morale is unstable and fragile has not been correct. Human will has lots of resilience and is not easy to break. History is replete with examples of attacks that have strengthened the will instead.
Their insight that airpower is inherently offensive during hostilities is true in some sense. Also, it has been proven that an offensive approach is a better option, even for air defence operations. However, airpower has many roles and tasks (Military Diplomacy, Strategic Coercion, Signalling, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, aid to Civil authorities, etc.) that are not necessarily offensive.
The three theoreticians also believed that the bomber would always get through, it does not need an escort, and anti-aircraft weapons are ineffective in preventing enemy attacks. These assumptions have been far from true. The survivability of bombers in contested airspace is doubtful, and not only bombers but even platforms like fixed-wing transport aircraft, helicopters and drones are vulnerable. They need a certain degree of air superiority and fighter protection under AWACS/AEWC aircraft coverage. Anti-aircraft weapons have evolved over the years with enhancements in their effectiveness. Recent wars have demonstrated the vulnerability of helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft to shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.
Night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing accuracy are manageable problems. These predictions have come true. Weapons have become smarter, with capabilities like stand-off, precision, fire and forget, all-weather, multiple warheads, etc.
Joint Airpower Utilisation. The military thinkers were right that airpower has a lot of potential beyond tactical employment. Airpower has a role in tactical utilisation in support and independent operations towards national security and objectives. Ideally, the surface forces should have their air arm (equipped to their requirement) for utilisation according to the tenets of surface operations. This would be ideal (e.g., the USA has four air arms, USAF, US Army aviation, US Navy air arm, and US Marines). However, it is not achievable by all due to affordability (air assets are costly to procure and maintain). The next best solution, therefore, is the centralised placing of air assets and the conduct of operations with joint planning and execution. Each force has its defined roles, tasks and core competencies. Warfare has evolved into a complex activity wherein no service alone can achieve national or military objectives. It has to jointly coordinate efforts with a proper understanding and utilisation of their respective strengths and core competencies. The warfare is no longer restricted to the domain of the military. It necessitates a coordinated effort by all the means of statecraft. Even the military-civil fusion has become extremely important.
Orchestration of Air War. The three scholar warriors were correct in their belief that using air power and orchestrating air war is a complex subject that is not easily comprehensible. Orchestrating an air war has become both a science and an art, with many imponderables and factors to be considered. Over the years, some guidelines have been articulated. Gripping these and choosing enemy targets constitutes what may be defined as an aerial strategy. These aspects are best understood by airmen directing the air war.
Targeting. The offensive application of airpower essentially revolves around targeting. Early airpower theories advocated attacks on vital centres to break the enemy’s morale and will to fight. Many scholars feel they were vague on targeting and left an impression of sequential warfare. An early attack on the enemy’s vital centres to commence hostilities has become a norm. Still, to create destruction, disruption, chaos and confusion. Subsequent attacks depend upon the national, military, service, strategic and tactical objectives. Airpower allows parallel operations, conducting various campaigns simultaneously. Commanders (of both independent air forces and joint forces) have to decide on the allocation of percentages of air effort towards different campaigns being run concurrently. Also, dynamic changes can be made depending on the developing situation. A carefully prepared joint target list is a prerequisite to any air campaign planning.
Air superiority. The theory that “command of the air is a prime requirement and air superiority is a prerequisite for all other military operations” has changed. Over the years, terms like air dominance, command/control of the air, air supremacy, air superiority, limited air superiority, and favourable air situation have been included in the lexicon of air analysts and strategists. These are generally used interchangeably but have a subtle difference and connotation. Achieving air superiority has a lot of advantages but does not guarantee a victory on its own; it has to be exploited to gain victory. Command/Control of the air is still a very relevant strategy/theory. However, the degree of achievement (air supremacy, air superiority and favourable air situation) varies depending upon the disparity between the opposing forces and the effectiveness of the counter-air campaign. The most desirable method is to obtain air superiority by attacking the enemy’s airpower on the ground. However, alternative means have evolved over the years for its achievement (attack on enemy aircraft on the ground, operating surfaces, attack on storage facilities and supply chain of crucial aviation enabling supplies and reliance on AD weapons, etc.). Another aspect is that the commencement of surface operations has been delinked from the earlier concept of sequential warfare, wherein surface operations commenced after the dedicated air superiority counter-air campaign.
Force Structure. Initially, the focus of airpower was mainly on strategic bombing and the achievement of air superiority. The force structure of the newly formed air forces consisted of bombers and fighter aircraft for their protection and air defence purposes. Over the years, newer specialist platforms, systems, and weapons have been added to the inventory. Specialist aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) for close air support to the surface forces were used for some time. However, with the proliferation of shoulder-fired AD weapons, their efficacy has become doubtful. Secondly, the trend is to develop and maintain a fleet of swing-role, multi-role, and omni-role aircraft. The force structure of a potent air force now contains multi-role fighter aircraft, combat support fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft (AWACS, Aerial Refuellers, Air transport aircraft, particular operation aircraft, variety of helicopters), unmanned platforms, an array of smart weapons (for ground attack, air combat and air defence), long-range vectors (surface to surface missiles including hypersonic weapons), radars, air operation enabling systems, and networks. The trend is to include swarms of drones and a combination of manned and unmanned platforms (loyal wingman concept).
Conclusion
Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchel’s contributions towards air power theory and their efforts for an independent air arm achieved results that advanced airpower’s future growth and impact in warfare. The major war which succeeded their time (World War II) proved to be a testing ground for their airpower theories. Several wars after that validated these theories and brought in appropriate modifications in an evolutionary manner. The wars confirmed that airpower proved to be a decisive factor in the war, precision bombing was more effective than area bombing, and civilian morale was more challenging than expected. The prophecy that the bomber would always get through had been overestimated, and the impact of antiaircraft weapons was underestimated. While the WW II experience succeeded in providing the base of tactical air doctrine, subsequent wars shaped the comprehensive airpower doctrines. Airpower is still developing, with newer capabilities and roles being added to it. The original fundamental airpower theories need to evolve with the times.
Robert S. Dudney. “Douhet”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, April 2011.
MAJOR Brian P. O’Neill, “The Four Forces Airpower Theory” A Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2011.
Giulio Douhet, “The Command of the Air”, Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2019.
Carl H. Builder, “The Icarus Syndrome: Air Power Theory and the Evolution of the Air Force” Rand Brief, Oct 1993.
John F. Jones, “Douhet, Air Power, and Jointness”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (AUTUMN 1993).
Major David Berkland, “Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the Future of Airpower”, Defense & Security Analysis, Volume 27, Issue 4 (2011).
Michael D. Pixley, “False Gospel for Airpower Strategy? A Fresh Look at Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air”, Air University, July 2005.
Disclaimer:
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
My Article published on the Chanakya Forum Website.
The air transport fleet of any Air Force contributes to the air power attributes of speed, reach, flexibility, and responsiveness. Besides speedy induction and sustenance of forces, it is used for rescue missions. The air transport platforms are also utilised in force multiplier roles like air-to-air refuelling (AAR), Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Airborne Command Posts, Special Forces operations, etc. Most armed forces possess several transport aircraft for these crucial roles. Indian Air Force has numerous air transport platforms in its inventory. However, due to the ageing of the existing fleet and the increasing demands on air transport, there is an urgent need for new medium transport aircraft (MTA).
Medium transport aircraft are a category of military and civilian aircraft designed to transport cargo, troops, and equipment over medium ranges. These aircraft usually have a payload capacity of between 20 and 30 tonnes. They have large cargo holds to accommodate various cargo types, including oversized equipment, vehicles, and pallets. They also have configurable interiors to switch cargo, passenger, and medical evacuation roles. Modern navigation and communication systems ensure safe and efficient operations in diverse environments. They can take off and land on short runways (paved and unpaved) in harsh and remote locations with limited infrastructure. These aircraft are crucial in supporting military logistics, humanitarian aid, disaster response, and various commercial cargo operations due to their balance of range, payload, and versatility.
Post-independence, the IAF operated a mix of An-12, Packet Fairchild, Caribou, Dakota and Avro aircraft for Air Maintenance and Logistics support. In the early 1980s, the transport fleet was modernised with the induction of IL-76 aircraft (40 tonnes) and An-32 aircraft (4-6 tonnes). The Indian Air Force (IAF) now operates two types of fixed-wing transport aircraft: strategic heavy airlift aircraft and lesser-capacity tactical airlift aircraft. For strategic airlift purposes, the IAF operates 47-tonne capacity IL-76 and 77-tonne capacity C-17 III Globemaster aircraft. The IL-76 was procured from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and the Globemaster was acquired from the United States in 2011. Medium lift and special operations platform includes 20-tonne capacity C-130J Hercules aircraft. For tactical airlift purposes, the IAF uses the vintage An-32 and Avro aircraft, which have been in service for over 50 years. IAF also operates IL-76-based A-50 AWACS aircraft and IL-78 aerial refueling tanker aircraft.
In the 1980s, the availability of An-12s started declining, and they were phased out in 1991-92. For over two decades, the IAF’s transport airlift capability mainly rested on heavy-lift IL-76 and light tactical airlift AN-32 aircraft. This airlift combination was inefficient, as there was no 20-ton airlift aircraft. Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) requirement was felt as early as 2001. The Russians proposed a HAL-Ilyushin joint development project for a medium-lift aircraft, IL-214, in the 20-tonne payload category. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) entered a joint venture with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation-Transport Aircraft Division in 2012 to design and produce a turbofan-powered military transport aircraft in the 15-20 tonne category. The two countries even signed a pact for co-development. However, for various reasons related to the design, engine, cost and technology transfer, the project was cancelled in 2016.
At its peak, the IAF operated over 200 AN-32 and Avro combinations in the 4-7 tonne tactical airlift category. The British-origin Avro procured in the late 1960s is being replaced by 56 10-tonne capacity Airbus C-295 aircraft. The AN-32 aircraft was upgraded in 2009 and has been the workhorse of the IAF transport fleet. However, they have reached the end of their technical lifespan, and their numbers have now dwindled to a low figure. Sustaining them has become difficult due to the Russia-Ukraine war, which has disrupted the supply of spare parts and maintenance services, underscoring the urgent need for their replacement.
Due to a lack of Indigenous options, the IAF had to opt for acquisition from the international market. In December 2022, the IAF issued a Request for Information (RFI) to purchase medium transport aircraft (MTA) under the “Make in India” category. The RFI mentions the aircraft weight category of 18-30 tonnes, capable of multiple roles. It does not indicate specific numbers but seeks Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost estimates for 40, 60 and 80 aircraft. Large-scale production could be followed up considering the utility in multiple roles, including civilian cargo applications and export prospects. The information sought by IAF from OEMs also includes the scope of technology transfer; possible methods to enhance indigenisation and to set up a dedicated manufacturing line, including design, integration and manufacturing processes in India; capability to undertake indigenous manufacture of systems, subsystems, components and spares; and making India a regional or global hub for manufacturing and maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of the equipment. This project has significant strategic and economic implications and aligns with the government’s Make in India initiative to boost self-reliance in the defence manufacturing sector. It would reduce the dependency on original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the long term, especially for maintenance, repair, overhaul, and future upgrades.
The IAF would be interested in the aircraft’s capability to operate from Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), high-altitude airfields, and semi-prepared surfaces. It would also want the platform’s suitability for multiple roles such as air-to-air refuelling, airborne surveillance, para dropping, and special operations. Acquisition cost, technology transfer, and production in India for Indian and global markets will be major decision-influencing factors. Possible contenders could be:-
Lockheed Martin’s C-130 J-30 Super Hercules. US aerospace firm Lockheed Martin has responded by offering the latest variant, the C-130 J-30 aircraft. The aircraft claims to have exceptional short take-off and landing capabilities even in higher altitudes and unprepared runways. IAF already operates C-130 aircraft and a few aircraft components are already being produced in India by the TATA Lockheed Martin Aero structure PVT LTD. Thus, this facility could produce complete aircraft domestically under the “Make in India” It would be easier on the Air Force in terms of maintenance and avoidance of another type in the inventory. However, besides being expensive, the aircraft is a 60-year-old design at the end of its production life. Also, there is the issue of technology access and transfer.
Embraer’s KC-390 Millennium. Brazilian Embraer Defence and Security is pitching the C-390 as the market’s most modern military transport aircraft. It is a new design jet aircraft with significant operational advantages. It is a versatile aircraft with fly-by-wire controls and a glass cockpit; it can carry a 26-tonne payload and achieve speeds of up to 870 kilometres per hour. It is optimised for multiple roles with low operating costs. IAF operates Embraer AC variants for VIP travel and airborne early warning and control aircraft. Embraer has expressed keenness to produce in India. Producing a new-generation aircraft would be advantageous from a technology acquisition and Indigenous industry development perspective. However, it has many American-origin components (engines, avionics, and sensors).
Airbus’ A400M Atlas. Airbus Defence and Space is jointly executing a project with Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) to equip the Air Force with 56 C-295. It is offering A400M Atlas aircraft. The aircraft payload carrying capacity is 37 tonnes, higher than the prescribed criteria in the RFI. Airbus asserts that the A400M offers superior payload, range and ability to transport heavy and outsized loads over extended distances, presenting a game-changing potential for the IAF.
Russian IL-276. The Russian company would be more than willing to accommodate India’s interests. This could be an option provided the concerns that forced India to walk out of Joint Venture development of the MTA program earlier are addressed.
Most OEMs collaborate with Indian vendors to manufacture their respective aircraft in India. TATA is already collaborating with Lockheed Martin and Airbus to manufacture the components of the C-130 and complete the assembly of the C-295 aircraft. This collaboration could be expanded further for the MTA. In February 2024, Embraer signed a memorandum of understanding with Indian defence manufacturer Mahindra Defence to manufacture C-390 Millennium aircraft locally in India. Airbus has not yet announced who it will partner with to compete for the project. However, TASL and state-run aircraft manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) could be among the likely options. HAL has offered to design and build a 30-ton payload aircraft in collaboration with an international OEM. These joint ventures should focus on production efficiency, supply chain control, and lower costs.
The IAF has been a regular contributor to the statecraft because of the role played by its air transport fleet. The benefits of its mission capabilities have been utilised both domestically and abroad. However, a balanced inventory of air transport aircraft is essential. There is an urgent need for the induction of medium transport aircraft. Acquiring a modern and capable transport aircraft will enhance India’s airlift capabilities and bolster its defence capabilities. Besides capability enhancement, the MTA project is an excellent opportunity to create a private-public industrial ecosystem for transport aircraft manufacturing in the country. The project will have significant strategic and economic implications. Operational requirements, cost vis-à-vis budget constraints, technology acquisition, boost to make in India, and geopolitical strategic partnerships will be crucial factors in decision-making.
Air Marshal (Dr) Rajeev Sachdeva (Retd), “The Versatile Transport Fleet of the IAF”, SP Guide Publications, Issue: 09-2022.
IAF RFI for MTA issued on 03 Feb 2023. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/RFI-for-MEDIUM-TRANSPORT-AIRCRAFT-1.pdf
Atul Chandra, “In Need of Lift”, Force news magazine, Jul 2024.
Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM, VM, PhD (Retd), “The resurrection of Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) Project”, Financial Express. 24 Feb 24.
Ananth Iyer, “Transport, Tanker, Reconnaissance Aircrafts of the IAF”, Team-BHP, 15 Mar 2023.
Rahul Manohar Yelwe, “Modernizing the Indian Air Force’s Transport Fleet”, The Diplomat, 10 May 2024.
Disclaimer:
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
