171: Flavours of China’s Military Reforms

China has given priority to translate science and technology achievements into military capabilities.

 

China’s military capability enhancements in the new era are characterized by an emphasis on new security domains.

 

On the one hand China has improved its long-distance force projection and precision strike capabilities in the respective domains of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.

 

On the other hand, it has attached importance to new security domains, such as space, cyber, electromagnetic, and Information, as key fields for influencing the fate of future warfare.

 

China aims to overtake developed country’s militaries by making concentrated investments in state-of-the-art technologies and deepening military-civil fusion.

 

It hopes to achieve superiority in these fields and thereby overturn its inferiority in overall military capabilities.

 

China has already achieved the status of a major military power by 2021 (100th anniversary of its founding Chinese Communist Party).

 

The Xi Jinping administration has set ambitious goals to further establish China as a global power by the next centenary in 2049 (marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

 

It aims to be leader in overall military capabilities by becoming a cyber-power, a space power, and a manufacturing power of defence hardware and software.

 

While “active defence” as a military strategic concept has been consistently advocated by the PLA, its content has evolved reflecting changes in China’s national power, the international environment, and industry structure, as well as advances in military technology.

 

Its active defence strategy has changed from the tenet of “striking only after the enemy has struck,” (i.e. luring the enemy into one’s territory and then making a counterattack), to offensive actions of active defence.

 

Active defence is expected to take on a more offensive nature in the military strategy in the new era.

 

China has prepared itself for future “unrestricted warfare”, across a variety of domains.

 

To achieve vital information dominance, especially in cyberspace, China has promoted her informatisation and reviewed her cyber strategy.

 

In the space domain, China gives weight to securing space dominance by maintaining its use of space, denying use of space by adversaries, and providing information support from space.

 

China has steadily increased the number of satellites that can be used for military purposes, its space access capabilities, and its space situational awareness capabilities. It also develops capabilities for interfering with an opponent’s use of space through anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, electronic jammers, and other means.

 

The Government of China, which prioritizes the role of S&T in the military, has established the “military-civil fusion strategy” as a national strategy.

 

Under this strategy, the government makes concentrated investments in S&T in new security domains, facilitates military use of advanced technologies, and promotes indigenization of core technologies.

 

The Xi Jinping administration established the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, a CCP organ that has been given powerful authority. Under the commission, the administration aims to build a management system through which organizations of the state, military, and society cooperate with each other for executing military-civil fusion policies.

 

Military-civil fusion efforts place particular emphasis on the cyber, space, and maritime domains.

 

The PLA’s informatisation of the military system and increased reliance on space assets in military operations have created vulnerabilities that accrue from attacks on these systems.

 

China has made a rapid rise in S&T, but it is still in the developing stage. Especially with regard to talent and specific core technologies.

 

The enhancement of China’s military capabilities in new security domains has fuelled international competition over core technologies and technological infrastructure.

 

The PLA has expanded its operational domains in parallel with the rise of its military capability, and is reinforcing the offensive element of active defense.

 

Implications for India

As it prepares for intelligentised warfare in this context, the PLA is likely to test operate new technologies and capabilities.

 

In the near future, besides other countries, India will also face confronting situations and be compelled to respond to them.

 

In the long run, fulfilling the “Chinese Dream” of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” would include resolving the disputes with neighbouring countries in a manner consistent with China’s wishes.

 

Enhancement of the PLA’s military capabilities, and belligerent attitude of China, would necessitate enhancement of India’s military capabilities on priority.

 

Looking ahead to the medium and long term trends of military technology, India needs to invest in technology infusion into its military.

 

India needs to re-orientate and reorganise to develop capability of warfare in strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

 

Thought

Time has come to spend on Military capability enhancement even if it is at the cost of development.

Do You Agree?

 

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References

NIDS China Security Report 2021.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-military-has-a-hidden-weakness/

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/is-china-speeding-up-military-modernisation-it-may-but-its-not-yet

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

 

 

 

 

159: Hypersonic China

Pic: Courtesy Sandboxx US

Introduction

Hypersonic projectiles and platforms are emerging as a highly valued weapon system for militaries world over, due to their unique combination of attributes. The characteristics of hypersonic missiles include sustained high speed (five times the speed of sound), increased manoeuvrability, and High altitude trajectory (in upper atmosphere – higher than cruise missiles but lower than the apogee of ballistic missiles). These attributes make them difficult to be intercepted by the existing missile defence systems.

As in the space race and other high-technology fields, China has made a major effort to match Russian and U.S. capabilities. PRC research into the military potential of hypersonic technologies used to lag far behind that of Russia and the United States. But during the past decade, China has invested heavily in new hypersonic research, development, test, and evaluation programs and facilities, and now her research may have surpassed that of the U.S. in some regards.

Continue reading “159: Hypersonic China”

132: Q & A Series: No War No Peace Situation & Grey Zone Conflict

Recently I wrote an article on “Airpower and Grey Zone Operations”. During the research, one question kept nagging my brain, so I asked all my colleagues and veterans, carrying out research and analysis on defence and security related subjects, individually or in association with different think tanks. Got some clarity on the issue with quite a few perspectives.

 

Question: What is the difference between Grey Zone (GZ) Conflicts / operations and No War No Peace (NWNP) situation?

 

Answer:

NWNP is an existing state (generally at the borders) – GZ is a zone in the continuum of war between peace and declared war.

 

NWNP is generally referred to military domain (actions or matters) – GZ is multi domain in DIME paradigm.

 

NWNP uses military tools as threats and weapons – GZ anything or everything can be used as a threat or weapon from multiple domains (political, economic, information, psychological, diplomatic, cyber and space etc).

 

NWNP includes firing by regular forces, small team actions across border and actions by non-state actors in concert with regulars etc – GZ activities are much broader and ambiguous.

 

NWNP is referred in the context of Indo-Pak border situations – GZ term appeared in the lexicon of defence and security analysts in global context.

 

NWNP was a low level term largely utilised on LOC – GZ is a wider concept that looks at the wide space between peace and war – a zone that is blurred.

 

NWNP situations may or may not have deniability – GZ operations generally have a high degree of deniability.

 

NWNP generally involves kinetic weapons and could lead to escalation – GZ generally employs hybrid warfare techniques (with kinetic weapons being one of the options but rarely used).

 

NWNP is a situation existing between two nations with their militaries face to face – GZ is a conflict between two nations not necessarily in eyeball situation.

 

NWNP is related to posturing, deterrence, coercion and use of force – GZ is achieving the objectives without military confrontation.

 

NWNP: the escalatory ladder can be traversed (up or down) at a rapid pace – GZ the transition is gradual and slower.

 

NWNP: the actions may be localised, limited in area and influence – GZ actions generally affect a large area or number of people.

 

Titbit

We are in NWNP situation with Pakistan

Chinese have mastered the art of Grey Zone operations

 

Comments and value additions are most welcome.

 

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