514: CONFLICTS, MILITARY SPENDING & ARMS TRANSFERS

 

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) launched its Yearbook 2024 on 17 June. The yearbook contains the annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament, and international security.

 

Summarised excerpts from the yearbook:-

 

Conflict Trends

 

Although the number of states experiencing armed conflicts fell from 55 in 2022 to 52 in 2023, the estimated number of conflict-related fatalities worldwide rose from 153,100 in 2022 to 170,700 in 2023, reaching the highest level since 2019.

 

In 2023, four conflicts were categorised as major armed conflicts (i.e. conflicts involving 10,000 or more conflict related fatalities in the year), one more than in 2022: the civil wars in Myanmar and Sudan, and the Israel–Hamas and Russia–Ukraine wars.

 

The number of high intensity armed conflicts (i.e. conflicts involving 1000–9999 conflict related fatalities) also increased, from 17 in 2022 to 20 in 2023.

 

The Russia–Ukraine war continued throughout 2023 at a high cost to both sides. Russian air attacks continued, and Ukraine began to reply in kind, although not on the same scale. Both sides sought and received ammunition and weapons from their allies. There were no formal Russian–Ukrainian peace talks during the year, and the one noteworthy diplomatic success—the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative—unravelled in 2023.

 

In contrast to the stalemate in Ukraine, in September 2023, Azerbaijan secured a decisive victory in its long running conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

High intensity armed conflicts continued in Iraq, Syria and Yemen throughout the year.

 

Israel responded to the events of 7 October (the killing of over 1000 civilians and more than 350 Israeli soldiers and police, and the capture of around 240 hostages) by declaring a state of war for the first time since 1973. By the end of the year, more than 22,000 Palestinians had been killed in the ensuing air strikes or ground operations by Israel. Houthi forces in Yemen, claiming support for the Palestinians, started to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, prompting Western powers to dispatch warships to the area to address the threat.

 

Sub­Saharan Africa remained the region with the most armed conflicts, although many were low intensity conflicts (involving fewer than 1000 conflict-related fatalities), and levels of violence fluctuated considerably. There were decreases in conflict related fatalities in several countries experiencing high intensity armed conflict, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Sudan. However, there were notable increases in conflict­related fatality rates elsewhere, including in Sudan (+537 per cent compared with 2022), Burkina Faso (+100 per cent) and Somalia (+28 per cent).

 

The fighting that erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023 between forces led by rival military generals triggered a humanitarian crisis and resulted in an all-out civil war.

 

In the Sahel, a coup in Niger and a decision by Mali to expel United Nations peacekeepers added to regional tensions.

 

The Americas is the only region not to have had a major armed conflict in 2018–23. The two countries in the region with the highest number of conflict­related fatalities—Brazil and Mexico—primarily faced criminal rather than political violence in 2023. Criminal gang related violence also escalated significantly in Haiti during the year.

 

Despite the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, the overall conflict­related fatality rate for Asia and Oceania more than halved between 2021 and 2023. This was partly due to a continuing decline in conflict­related fatalities in Afghanistan following the return to power of the Taliban in 2021.

 

Military Spending

 

Estimated global military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year in 2023, surpassing $2.4 trillion, driven by the Russia–Ukraine war and broader geopolitical tensions.

 

The 6.8 per cent increase in total military spending in 2023 was the largest rise since 2009, pushing estimated world spending to the highest recorded level.

 

As a result, the global military burden {world military expenditure as a share of world gross domestic product (GDP)} rose to 2.3 percent.

 

Governments allocated 6.9 per cent of their budgets to the military or $306 per person.

 

Estimated military spending increased across all five geographical regions for the first time since 2009.

 

Spending by African countries rose the most (by 22 percent in 2023), while the smallest increase was in the Americas (2.2 percent).

 

The United States remained by far the largest military spender in the world. Its $916 billion expenditure was more than the combined spending of the nine other countries among the top 10 spenders and 3.1 times as large as that of the second biggest spender, China.

 

The trend for increased military spending by European states in response to Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine gained traction in 2023. 39 of the 43 countries in Europe increased military spending. The 16 per cent surge in total European expenditures was driven by a 51 per cent rise in Ukrainian spending and a 24 per cent rise in Russian spending, as well as by 10 of the 28 European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaching or surpassing the 2 per cent of GDP spending target in 2023.

 

Estimated military expenditures in Asia and Oceania rose for the 34th consecutive year. Half of the regional total consisted of spending by China, which grew by 6.0 per cent to reach $296 billion in 2023. China’s spending influenced spending decisions in neighbouring countries and the broader region: in Japan, for example, spending rose by 11 per cent, the largest year­-on-­year spending increase since 1972.

 

Estimated military spending in the Middle East grew by 9.0 per cent in 2023, with increases in all three of the biggest spenders in the region: Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkiye. The Israel–Hamas war was the main driver for the 24 per cent increase in Israel’s military expenditure.

 

Arms Transfer

 

Suppliers of Major Arms

 

In 2019–23, 66 states exported arms, but most were minor exporters. The 25 largest suppliers accounted for 98 per cent of the total volume of exports, and the top five (the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany) accounted for 75 per cent.

 

The USA’s share of global exports has increased in recent years while Russia’s share has decreased. In 2019–23, the USA’s arms exports were 17 percent higher than in 2014–18, and its share of the global total increased from 34 to 42 percent. In contrast, Russia’s arms exports decreased by 53 per cent, and its share of the global total dropped from 21 to 11 per cent.

 

France’s exports rose by 47 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the second largest exporter of major arms in 2019–23.

 

Known plans for future deliveries of major arms strongly indicate that the USA will remain unchallenged as the largest arms exporter in the coming years and that France will consolidate its position in second place. They also indicate that Russia’s arms exports may reduce even further, while some of the other current top 10 exporters are likely to remain steady or increase.

 

Recipients of Major Arms

 

In 2019–23, 170 states imported arms. The five largest importers were India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine, and Pakistan, accounting for 35 percent of total arms imports.

 

Asia and Oceania received the largest volumes of major arms in 2019–23, accounting for 37 percent of the total, followed by the Middle East (30 percent), Europe (21 percent), the Americas (5.7 percent), and Africa (4.3 percent).

 

Between 2014–18 and 2019–23, the flow of arms to Europe increased by 94 per cent, while flows to all other geographical regions decreased: Africa (−52 per cent), Asia and Oceania (−12 per cent), the Middle East (−12 per cent) and the Americas (−7.2 per cent).

 

Many of the 170 importers are directly involved in armed conflict or in tensions with other states where the imported major arms play an important role.

 

Moreover, many exporters are direct stakeholders or participants in at least some of these conflicts and tensions, which partly explains why they are willing to supply arms, even when the supply seems to contradict their stated arms export policies. It is also noteworthy that, for most suppliers, arms exports are only a small part of the financial value of their total exports.

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent, international think tank based in Stockholm that provides research, data, and analysis on arms control, disarmament, military expenditure, and armed conflict. It was founded in 1966 by Alva Myrdal and Tage Erlander. SIPRI’s work is intended to help researchers, policymakers, and the public understand the state of the arms industry and the preconditions for a stable peace. 

 

SIPRI’s work is based on open sources and includes:

 

  • Databases. SIPRI’s Arms transfers, Arms industry, and Military expenditure databases provide data on nearly every country in the world.

 

  • Documents. SIPRI provides documents on arms embargoes since the 1950s and national reports on arms export controls.

 

  • Analysis. SIPRI researchers analyse the data to identify trends and potential impacts on global security. 

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

510: APACHE HELICOPTER DELIVERY DELAYED

 

 

It is always a pleasure to interact with Shiv Aroor on contemporary defence and security issues.

 

On the latest episode of Battle Cry (India Today), the focus is on the delay in the delivery of Apache attack helicopters from the United States to the Indian Army. This delay has impacted the Indian Army’s preparedness, as these helicopters were intended for close air support to tanks and troops. This is the second major US defence supply contract to be affected by supply chain related slippages, the first being the delay in the supply of engines for the Indian Air Force’s Tejas fighter jets.

 

 

 

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INDIAN AIR FORCE CHALLENGES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORY

 

 

My Article published in the News Analytics Journal Jul 2024.

 

 

India faces two nuclear-powered inimical neighbours. China is emerging as a major regional power with the aspiration to be a global power, and her desire to dominate Asia and, finally, the world has implications for India. India’s relations with China have changed from cooperative to competitive to combative. China sees India as a competitor and would like to keep India off-balance. On the other hand, Pakistan remains a security threat and continues to use non-state actors to maintain a situation of unrest. Asymmetric warfare will remain an instrument of its state policy. These two countries have a close and longstanding strategic partnership that includes cooperation even in areas of defence and security. Pakistan openly boasts of collusive support from China in case of a war with India. Due to its unique geographical location and geopolitical environment, India faces a collusive threat with significant chances of military conflict. Therefore, her national interest dictates that the country be able to deter her inimical neighbours from any military misadventure, either singly or collusively.

 

China’s warfare strategy focuses on developing a modern and capable force to support its national security interests and regional/global ambitions. The Chinese forces are undergoing significant modernisation and expansion at a rapid pace, with particular emphasis on developing advanced technologies and capabilities. China’s investment and progress in space-based systems, quantum technology, unmanned platforms, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, etc., will give it surveillance and precision strike capability with lightning speeds.

 

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action.  The Indian Air Force (IAF), like air power in the last century, has evolved to reflect changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. However, it must continuously adapt to the existing and changing environment to build focused capabilities. The IAF will have to create deterrence and be able to dominate the air. The IAF must remain adaptive and agile to win wars in a network-centric battlefield with conflicts varying across the complete threat spectrum. Identifying focus areas and developing assets, platforms, facilitators, and infrastructure is essential. While several issues are vital requirements, the main pillars are trained manpower, combat leadership, combat sustenance resources, and sound strategy. The IAF must focus on capability building and adopt a multidisciplinary and integrated war-fighting approach.

 

 

The IAF should expand its investments in advanced munitions, combat support aircraft, electronic warfare, and physical infrastructure. Boosting the IAF’s fighter force strength should be a top priority, maintaining a balance between quantity and quality. An adequate number of combat support platforms should follow. Air Defence has evolved from point defence to offensive defence, with the spectrum expanding to cater for sub-conventional threats to long-range hypersonic weapons. Appropriate weapons, systems, and networks need to be added. The weapon list should provide various options, including high-tech, long-range smart weapon systems with increased accuracy and assurance. Air combat support and protective infrastructure are essential. The IAF’s networking capability has evolved well and is applied to air defence, air ops planning, maintenance, and logistics functions. However, there is still room for further progress and integration of new inductions.

 

The Indian Air Force, as a technology-intensive service, must continuously incorporate modern, cutting-edge equipment and technology. Technology’s profound influence on air strategy is a significant driver of innovation and evolution. Investing in emerging technologies is necessary and exciting, opening up new possibilities. Future technologies impacting the air war, such as Quantum computing, Hypersonic weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, Nanotechnology, Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology, and Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems, are on the horizon. Impetus is also required for some of the existing aviation-related programs like fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers,  stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems and long-range vectors.

 

A strategic focus is required for a medium-term and long-term technology plan supported by adequate budget allocation. A suitable ecosystem needs to be developed to harness these dual-use technologies. IAF must define a defence science and technology strategy with a vision to harness technology and convert it into decisive capability. The following focus areas are advocated, with a particular emphasis on Indigenous defence production capability:-

 

    • Situational Awareness & Decision Making. One effect of advanced technology on air warfare is the increased pace and intensity of air operations. In such a scenario, the decision-making process must quickly keep up with the OODA cycle. The three most important contributing factors are high situational awareness, a robust and fast network system for information sharing, and AI-based decision-support systems.

 

    • Space-Based Capabilities. The term airpower has changed to aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. The involvement of space-based equipment and systems is even more significant in Grey zone warfare. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly crucial in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for crucial offensive and defensive operations.

 

    • Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to impact air strategy significantly. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required to withstand these weapons’ destructive power.

 

    • Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their use is spread across the entire spectrum of threats, ranging from sub-conventional and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

    • Sixth Generation Aircraft. Sixth-generation aircraft are still in the development phase; however, based on current trends in air technology, sixth-generation aircraft will likely have several key features that will shape air strategy in the future. They are likely to have increased automation with advanced AI and machine learning algorithms that will enable autonomous decision-making and allow them to adapt to changing situations quickly. They would also have enhanced stealth capabilities, making them virtually invisible to radar and other detection systems. Integrated sensor systems in these aircraft will provide comprehensive situational awareness and the ability to engage targets with great precision. Sixth-generation aircraft are expected to significantly impact air strategy in the future, with their advanced capabilities enabling air forces to operate with greater autonomy and strike enemy targets with unprecedented precision and speed. However, as with any new technology, challenges may be associated with introducing sixth-generation aircraft, including developing new tactics, training programs, and support infrastructure to realise their full potential.

 

    • Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both piloted and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the benefits of both and develop networked systems wherein both can work in an integrated manner. Research is being done in many countries on the “loyal wingman” concept.

 

Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability, and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an essential role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The critical thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance, the minimum level of deterrence capability must always be maintained.

 

 

Perceived threats and challenges to national security, calling for immediate and substantial measures to enhance IAF’s war-fighting capacity and capability. Capability building entails a long gestation period. The IAF should continue prioritising modernisation efforts, including acquiring advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct various operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. Operational preparedness includes reviewing doctrines, strategy and tactics, organisational structures, human resource adaptation, training, and maintenance and logistics concepts.

 

IAF must think differently to tackle various asymmetric and non-traditional security threats. This would require more innovative, out-of-the-box solutions that leverage the prevalent technology. Overall, the IAF should strive to balance traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to defend India’s air space and national security interests while contributing to the broader role of nation-building, regional stability and humanitarian assistance.

 

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References

  1. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Air Power Transformational Challenges India”, Air Power Asia.
  2. Basic Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  3. Ashley J Tellis, “Troubles They Come In Battalion”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
  4. Air Mshl Anil Chopra (Retd), “IAF modernisation challenges ahead”, South Asia defence and strategic review.
  5. Vivek Kapur, “IAF Equipment & Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats, 2032”, MPIDSA, 2014.
  6. “Interview with CAS and articles in IAF”, IAF anniversary issue of Chanakya Aerospace, defence and maritime review, 2018.
  7. Gp Capt AK Sachdeva(Retd), “Rebuilding the IAF fighter fleet”, SP’s Aviation issue 2, 2019.
  8. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “Indian Air Force at 86: options and challenges”, Vayu V/2018.
  9. Gp Capt J Noronha (Retd), “Strength lies in numbers: Rebuilding the combat fleet of IAF”, Indian Defence Review Oct-Dec 18.
  10. Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja, “IAF 2020 and beyond”, Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 17.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.