My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.
“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”
– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh
Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.
Article published in the inaugural issue of the News Analytics Journal
Introduction
The Russia–Ukraine war, now in its third year with no end in sight, has had a profound and complex impact on every aspect of warfare and international engagement. It has brought issues related to the new emerging world order, multilateralism, collective security, nuclear deterrence, economic sanctions, information warfare, and food and energy security to the forefront. Understanding the intricate implications of this war on international relations and military operations is of utmost importance.
Several questions are intriguing to the strategic community and military analysts. For instance, there is a debate over whether Russia has deployed its full military might and failed, as the West has criticised it for its lack of capabilities. Alternatively, is Russia adopting a more nuanced approach to using force and the resulting destruction? The war, which is still fiercely ongoing, has reached a phase of engagement with long-range vectors and drones, with Ukraine’s retaliation and Russian punitive action. There seems to be no end in sight for the conflict. Despite these debates, an analysis of geopolitical aspects, international reactions, and the conduct of military operations can yield valuable insights.
Genesis
On the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum. Russian President Boris Yeltsin accepted the vote, and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In December 1994, after the end of the Cold War, Ukraine, Russia, the UK, and the US agreed to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders in exchange for Ukraine abandoning the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a friendship treaty. It settled a fundamental disagreement and allowed Russia to retain ownership of most ships in the Black Sea fleet (based in Ukraine’s Crimea) in exchange for Moscow paying Kyiv a modest rent to use the port of Sebastopol. Moscow also remained Kyiv’s most important commercial partner, with Ukraine dependent on Russian oil and gas.
Ukraine, perceiving the CIS as a potential tool for Moscow’s influence, maintained a cautious stance and showed an apparent inclination towards the West, actively seeking ties with the US-led NATO military alliance. This oscillation between the Eastern and Western blocs was an essential characteristic of Ukraine’s foreign policy. In 2005, Ukraine reiterated its desire to join the EU, along with NATO. In 2008, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agreed that Ukraine had a future in the alliance, sparking Moscow’s ire. In 2014, Russia sent its Special Forces to take control of strategic sites on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. In March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty absorbing Crimea into Russia. The annexation provoked the worst diplomatic crisis between the West and Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. In April 2014, a pro-Russian rebellion erupted in Ukraine’s industrial eastern areas. Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk declare their regions to be independent. Ukraine and its Western allies accused Russia of instigating the uprising and pouring in arms and troops to bolster the self-proclaimed republics. The clashes became a full-blown conflict in May 2014.
Perspective: Relevant Aspects of Present Conflict
On 24 Feb 22, Russia invaded Ukraine, calling it an extraordinary military operation. The Russian narrative is that “The US-led West (the USA, NATO and EU) is the aggressor, using Ukraine against it as a pawn, not honouring its commitment and expanding the NATO westwards, bringing it to the Russian doorstep, and compelling Russia into taking this drastic action”. On the other hand, the Western narrative is that “Russia is the aggressor, trying to rebuild its lost empire, with Ukraine being the victim, and the West is supporting the democratic rights of the victim country”.
Russian Objectives. Officially, Russia stated its objectives of the “special military operation” as “demilitarisation, denazification and assurance about the neutral status of Ukraine (i.e., not joining NATO).” This operation, also known as the ‘Russian-Ukrainian War ‘, was justified by Russia citing a call for help from the Donbas region for its liberation from Ukraine. An undeclared objective is also to consolidate the Russian hold on Crimea.
Military Power Comparison. There is a significant disparity between the strength of Russia’s and Ukraine’s defence forces. Russia is the number two military power globally. The Russian Air Force is ranked second, whereas the Ukrainian Air Force is ranked 27th globally. Numerically, the Russian Air Force is about 8 – 10 times the size of the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian army is 3 to 6 times that of the Ukrainian military compared to the army’s strength and equipment.
Orchestration of Operations. The operations were initiated by Russia with hybrid warfare using disruption (cyber-attacks) and destruction (using surface-to-surface and air-delivered long-range vectors). A fair amount of air superiority was achieved in the initial stages. The surface operations were three-pronged, with attacks from North, East and South. In the North, the advance was towards Kyiv and Kharkiv, intending for regime change at the capital. In the east, advances towards Donbas, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol were obviously to liberate the Donbas area and create a Russia-friendly corridor. In the south, addressing Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Snake Island was to consolidate hold on Crimea and deny sea access to Ukraine.
Phase I of The War. In this phase, the Russian intention was to take over the capital with swift action and bring in a regime change. Surface forces advanced towards Kyiv on two axes, with the third axis being by the air domain. The Russian Special Forces took over the Hostomel airport (25 Km from Kyiv) to pump in combatants, equipment and supplies. However, the helicopters and the heavy-lift transport aircraft could not land due to vulnerability from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, failing the overall plan.
Phase II of the War. The Russian forces reorganised a few weeks into the war, and concentration shifted from northern to eastern and southern areas. The operations in this phase were like urban guerrilla warfare, with Russian forces surrounding the cities and Ukrainian forces employing defensive, hit-and-run tactics. What stands out in the entire operation is that the Russians did not utilise the full potential of the airpower despite the significant disparity between the forces of the two countries.
Russian Referendum. In late September 2022, Russia held referendums in four areas of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On 30 September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the takeover of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament. As far as Russia is concerned, this marked the completion of its special operations in Ukraine.
Achievement of Objectives. So far, Russia has been able to create a ‘friendly corridor’ in its eastern region, a term used to describe the areas under Russian control that serve as a buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine. The Russians have considerably reduced the Ukrainian combat potential by destroying most of its military bases and selective defence industry. Russia has also consolidated its hold on Crimea, ending its water and power blockade. In addition, it has stalled the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO for the time being.
Application of Military Power. The Russians followed a delicate approach and did not use the full potential of their military power. The Western media criticise them for their poor planning, tactics, and training, poor performance of weapons and equipment and the lack of synergy between defence forces. One of the reasons for the self-imposed restraint could be to avoid too much destruction and collateral damage, keeping in mind the public opinion (domestic and worldwide) and long-term problems of insurgency, revolution, and resistance. For the same reason, Russia has not jumped into information warfare. The second reason could be to conserve its military power for a more significant threat in the future.
Western Aid to Ukraine: Gradually Enhancing its Offensive Capability.
Defence and security links between Ukraine, NATO members and other allies and partners started soon after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. They intensified when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 but primarily took the form of training and the bilateral provision of non-lethal military equipment. After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022, bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up, with many allies supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. In addition to massive funds, the West gave Ukraine equipment to defend itself. These included anti-tank missiles and drones to stem Russian ground advances. Much more important were the Air Defence systems that prevented the Russian Air Force from using Ukrainian skies with immunity.
During the initial part of the war, the U.S. and Western allies were hesitant to provide long-range offensive and more sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine over fears of an escalation of the war. Either Russia would see it as an escalation from NATO, or Ukraine itself could escalate the conflict by striking targets within Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so have the types of weaponry being provided.
While maintaining the high priority of air defence and the supply of ammunition, the West has gradually enhanced Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Ukraine has been pleading for weapons that can strike more profoundly and deeper behind the front lines. Initial aid packages had limited-range howitzers for use at the frontline. Later, the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS—with 77km range rockets) was added to the package. This was a significant boost for the Ukrainian military, allowing it to target Russian forward area ammunition dumps and weapons storage facilities. After that, a 150 km range Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) was included. It put within reach all of Russia’s supply lines in the east of the country as well as part of Russian-occupied Crimea. Late last year, the U.S. began to supply Ukraine with the older medium-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) armed with wide-spreading cluster munitions that can travel up to 160 Km. Now, the U.S. is leaning toward sending the longer-range version of the missile with a 300 km range.
These weapons, along with drones, provide Ukraine with the capabilities to strike deep farther inside the Russian-held territory. Kyiv has already embarked on a drone attack on oil and energy facilities inside mainland Russia and an attack on a Russian military airfield in Crimea. It also struck the province of Tatarstan earlier, marking Ukraine’s most profound attack inside Russia so far. It has also continued its attack on Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea. Russian punitive strikes with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons follow these attacks.
Current Phase and the Future Prospects of the War.
Overall, the pace of the war has slowed down with periodic fluctuations. Russia is trying to hold onto the so-called liberated territories, while Ukraine is trying counteroffensives. Ukraine cannot sustain the war on its own and needs economic and military aid from the West. Both countries, besides economic suffering, have suffered losses of men, materials and equipment in the two-plus-year-long war. However, they cannot accept backtracking now. Acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian territory would be seen as a defeat for the US-led West (including NATO and EU countries). Loss of occupied territory back to Ukraine would be considered a defeat for Russia. So, the stalemate continues, and there is no honourable exit possibility for either.
The prevailing domestic situation in both countries is an aversion to further loss of human life. The West is encouraging Ukraine to continue and is enhancing its offensive capabilities with stand-off weapons. Russia is responding to the Ukrainian counter-offensive attacks with punitive strikes using long-range weapons and missiles. This engagement phase with long-range stand-off weapons, drones, and missiles will be long-drawn. The war is, in the broader sense, between the Eastern and Western blocs. So far, due consideration has been given to the escalation control. However, a miss calculation by either side could be catastrophic for the involved countries, the region, and the world.
Claire Mills, “Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion”, Research Briefing, House of Commons Library, 2 May 2024.
Mike Stone and Max Hunder, “Ukraine’s new weapon will force a Russian shift”, Reuters, February 2, 2023.
Courtney Kube, “Biden administration is leaning toward supplying Ukraine with long-range missiles”, NBC News, Feb. 19, 2024.
“Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine”, US Department of Defence, Press Release, April 24, 2024.
Sean Boynton, “U.S. is sending Ukraine longer-range weapons with new aid why it Matters”, Global News, April 24, 2024.
Brent M. Eastwood, “Why Hasn’t Russia Unleashed Its Air Power over Ukraine?” Published May 10, 2022.
Tim Robinson, “Air War over Ukraine – the first days”, Royal Aeronautical Society, 2 March 2022.
Davis Winkie, “Ukraine receives more armed drones amid Russian invasion”, Military Times, 04 Mar 2022.
“Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian war: a guide”, from the War on the Rocks Site.
Stephen Crowley, “After a ceasefire, would Russia simply fight again?” commentary, War on the Rocks, Dec 21, 2023.
Disclaimer:
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
John Warden. John Warden was born in Texas in 1943. He earned a master’s degree in political science from Texas Tech University, was appointed to the Air Force Academy from Pennsylvania, and graduated in the class of 1965. He conducted a combat tour in OV-10s with the First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam and a tour in F-4Ds. While at the National War College, Warden wrote a thesis on air operations planning at the theatre level of war. After that, he was assigned as F-15 wing commander at Bitburg, Germany. He remained in that grade when he returned to the Pentagon to head CHECKMATE, an office serving under the Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and operations concerned with long-range planning. Warden was serving in that capacity at the onset of the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Colonel Warden was transferred to Maxwell Air Force Base, where he became the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) commandant. He stirred up that institution greatly, reorienting its study to focus on the operational strategy level of war and air planning at that level. Warden retired from the USAF in 1995. Warden wrote the book “The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat”, which focused on a European war. He seemed to be much more concerned with airpower than with flying aeroplanes.
Core Ideas and Beliefs. John Warden’s core ideas and beliefs, the bedrock of his airpower strategy, continue to reverberate in the field of airpower strategy. His belief in the vital role of air campaign planning, once air superiority is assured, has shaped the way airpower is used in support of other arms or independently to achieve decisive effects. His profound assumptions and beliefs, encapsulated in the following statements, have left an indelible mark on the discourse in the field of airpower strategy:-
Human behaviour is complex and unpredictable, whereas material effects of military action are more predictable.
Victory is and always has been achieved in the mind of the enemy commander—everything must be directed toward that end.
John Warden’s belief in the potency of the offensive in air war is a testament to his strategic mindset. He firmly believed that the offensive is the more potent form of air war, a belief that continues to resonate in airpower strategy.
Theories & Views
Five Ring Theory. According to Warden, the centres of gravity are arranged in five rings. At the centre are leadership targets, followed by means of production, infrastructure, population, and field forces in the outer perimeter. Fewer centers of gravity (COG) exist in the middle than on the periphery, but they tend to be much more decisive than those on the outer rings. In general, it is preferable to attack the rings from the centre and then move outwards. However, attacking COG in the outer rings can yield a more immediate impact than an attack on the ones at the centre. He advocated that targeting the objectives in all the rings in parallel, rather than sequentially, tends to be even more decisive than attacking only one ring or starting with the outer ring and proceeding inward through each ring in turn.
Targeting. According to Warden, the enemy’s capability should be prioritised because human behaviour and material damage are unpredictable. Warden believed that targeting the enemy’s physical capability (as opposed to his psychological objectives) should be done considering that the military objectives must serve the political objectives.
Joint Operations. Warden’s views on joint operations, an essential aspect of his airpower strategy, instil confidence. He suggests that jointness does not necessarily mean equal portions of the action for all services. He asserts that sometimes airpower should be applied to support the land and sea forces, sometimes it should be supported by them, and sometimes it can be decisive if used independently. He explicitly asserts that single-service operations have been and will continue to be practical sometimes. To him, the other armed forces can function in either a supporting or a supported role, depending on the circumstances. Warden sees occasions when they conceivably will be irrelevant because airpower alone can win some campaigns, a testament to the practicality and effectiveness of his strategy.
Air Superiority. As with the other air power theorists, command of the air remains the Warden’s priority for all operations in the air or on the surface, though it sometimes may be achieved in parallel attacks rather than sequential. In his book “The Air Campaign”, Warden admits that sometimes only a local or temporary air superiority may be possible—and sufficient. Like Douhet, Warden believed the least efficient place for achieving air dominance was in the air. Sometimes, an air attack can serve more than one role. For example, destroying finished petroleum supplies can advance an air superiority campaign as it aids the interdiction effort.
Air Campaigns. Colonel Warden repeatedly suggests that simultaneous operations against all the varieties of target sets can offer significant benefits. The warden’s preference for the offensive largely depends on denying the enemy the ability to react. That denial depends on the size and character of the force and the ability to do so early in the campaign. Like most preceding airmen, John Warden argues that air interdiction by any other name is still preferable to close air support because it allows more targets to be killed at less cost.
Force Structure. Warden adheres to the traditional ideal that airpower should be organised under the centralised command of an airman. The airman should report only to the CINC.
Technology. Warden shows a particular fondness for high-tech solutions. Fundamental to his appeal for the parallel attack is the assumption that the coming of precision-guided munitions (PGM) and stealth make possible the fulfilment of many of the older theorists’ claims that the destruction of a given target required a far smaller strike force than previously, and with stealth no supporting aircraft is needed. At least for now, the stealth bombers can get through with acceptable losses. Now bombers with PGM can get results as fast as Douhet had dreamed. A target can be removed with far fewer bombs than in earlier eras. PGM makes strategic attacks all the more feasible and even makes parallel attacks possible. It grants a modification of the principle of mass, for it allows sending far fewer attackers to a given target and permits the attack of many more targets.
Relevant Excerpts from his book “The Air Campaign”
Levels of War. War is the most complex human endeavour. It is baffling and intriguing. It is also demanding and requires careful thought and excellent execution. The commander’s compelling task is to translate national war objectives into tactical plans at the operational level. The four levels of war are grand, strategic, operational, and tactical. The ambiguity increases as you go up the ladder. Mastery of the operational level strategy is a key to winning wars. It is an art to identify the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (COG – a point where the enemy is vulnerable and where the application of force is most decisive). An air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter.
Offensive / Defensive Approach. An offensive approach has many advantages. It retains the initiative while putting pressure on the enemy by taking the war in the enemy’s territory. In this approach, all the assets are used, yielding positive results if successful. On the other hand, in the defensive approach, the initiative is with the enemy, some of the assets may lie idle and at best, it yields neutral results. Adopting the approach depends upon factors like political will, objectives, doctrinal guidance, own vis-à-vis enemy capability, and the force disparity (numerical and qualitative superiority are significant factors). Enemy SWOT analysis and intelligence analysis are essential to deciding on the approach (Consider factors like Aircraft numbers and quality, weapons, training, network, combat support platforms, sensors, ability to absorb losses, vulnerabilities, etc.). A periodic review is required to decide on continuing the adopted approach.
Air Superiority. Air superiority is necessary because air and ground campaigns cannot succeed unless a certain degree of air superiority is achieved. One way to achieve it is by destroying enemy aircraft. Destroying enemy aircraft in the air is the most complex and costly approach (it is easier to destroy them on the ground). However, destroying the enemy aircraft is not the only way to achieve it; it can also be achieved by attacking the enemy bases, fuel and human resources (crew and pilots), production houses and supply chains, and enemy command and control centres. Repeated heavyweight attacks are required to achieve it.
Interdiction / Battlefield Strikes. Interdiction is as old and essential as war—airpower has added a new dimension. It is a powerful, essential, and effective tool for commanders and planners. Airpower should not be seen as airborne artillery. It should generally be used for targets beyond the range of ground weapons. Art is to decide what to and where to interdict between the source and the destination. Distant Interdiction is most decisive but effective with a time lag, intermediate Interdiction is effective with a lesser time lag, and close Interdiction is effective immediately and generally necessary during crises.
Relevant Air Power Application and Air Campaign Planning Principles.
Anticipate and predict enemy reactions and plans. Study and categorise the enemy psyche (rational, irrational, fanatic, rigid, flexible, independent, innovative, and determined).
Audacity does not always lead to positive results—avoid the tendency to plunge into any and every fray. If enemy AD is strong – avoid it till you can punch holes in it and create blind zones. If air combat capability is better than draw the enemy out.
It is difficult to predict the duration and intensity of war. The intensity of war generally depends on the value and interest of the side in what they are fighting for. War effort comes in surges and spurts. Accordingly, the approach could be to continuously engage in a war of attrition or to hit unexpectedly and wait.
Air assets are always scarce—it is not possible to defend everything. Scarce air resources are optimally utilised when shared and not kept idle on the ground—the under-command tendency should be avoided. Scarce air resources cannot be everywhere or precede every surface operation.
An asset not used is an asset wasted – a sortie not flown is a sortie wasted. At the same time, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly flown. The loss ratio is a function of the force ratio.
Air operations are conducted over larger spaces and at a faster pace than surface operations. Air power should not be considered subordinate (supporting arm) to surface operations. The air element of surface forces should be used according to the tenets of surface operations. Unambiguous and thorough doctrinal understanding is essential.
Operational commanders should avoid tactical decisions – have faith in executors, and concentrate on operational orchestration.
Concentration of forces, mass, numbers, weight of attack and force structure are essential for inflicting prohibitive damage to the enemy. The choice of platform depends on the degree of air control and enemy air defence capability and weapons. In contested airspace, fixed-wing combat support aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned platforms (Drones) are highly vulnerable.
Airpower can carry out parallel operations (campaigns). The percentage of effort allotted to each campaign must be decided and dynamically reviewed periodically, depending on the changing situation.
Bad weather can be a spoilsport—choose the campaign/operational window carefully (the same is true for the enemy). Fog of war, uncertainty in war and friction of war are realities to be dealt with.
Deception (mystify and mislead) is very important to achieve surprise.
In conclusion, Warden’s air power theories represent a transformative approach to military strategy, emphasising the strategic use of air power to achieve decisive and rapid results. Warden’s theories underscore the importance of targeting the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. His conceptual framework, most notably articulated through the Five Rings model, identifies critical enemy systems—leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded military forces—as critical targets to disrupt the enemy’s capacity to wage war effectively. Warden’s emphasis on strategic targeting has influenced contemporary military doctrines and operational planning, as seen in conflicts such as the Gulf War and subsequent operations where air power played a pivotal role. Overall, Warden’s air power theories provide a robust framework for understanding and applying air power in modern military operations, highlighting the strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions of employing air forces effectively to achieve national security objectives. The principles he advocated continue to shape the evolution of air strategy, underscoring the evolving nature of warfare in the 21st century.
MAJOR Brian P. O’Neill, “The Four Forces Airpower Theory” A Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2011.
David R. Mets, “The Air Campaign John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists”, Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1999.
David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis”, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, February 1995.
Warden, John A III, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 40–55.
Disclaimer:
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
