639: STEALTH VS. COUNTER-STEALTH: THE EVOLVING BATTLE IN SIXTH-GENERATION AIR WARFARE

 

My Article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 04 Apr 25.

 

In March 2025, Boeing’s F-47, the U.S. Air Force’s highly secretive Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter, was unveiled. It showcased advanced stealth capabilities and the ability to collaborate with drones. ​Simultaneously, the U.S. Navy is on the verge of selecting a contractor for its next-generation carrier-based stealth fighter program, the F/A-XX, which could potentially shift the global military balance.

In December 2024, China unveiled the J-36, a tailless, sixth-generation fighter jet characterised by its ultra-stealth capabilities. This design enhances stealth and aerodynamic efficiency for long-range missions, signifying a significant shift in aerial dominance towards China. ​

China has also demonstrated significant progress in counter-stealth technologies. Satellite imagery from late 2024 indicates China is constructing a counter-stealth radar system on Triton Island in the South China Sea. This system is expected to enhance China’s surveillance capabilities, potentially challenging the operational effectiveness of stealth aircraft in the region. ​

Reportedly, Chinese military scientists have developed a novel stealth material capable of defeating anti-stealth radars. Laboratory tests reveal that this ultra-thin coating can effectively absorb low-frequency electromagnetic waves from multiple angles, a feat previously considered unattainable.

These developments underscore a global emphasis on advancing stealth capabilities and counter-stealth measures, reflecting the urgent and competitive nature of modern military technology.

Stealth technology has transformed air warfare, enabling aircraft to evade detection by radar, infrared, and other sensors, thus allowing them to operate deep within contested airspace. Since its introduction, stealth has provided a significant tactical advantage, reshaping military strategies and doctrines. However, this advantage has not gone unchallenged. Counter-stealth technologies have emerged to detect and neutralise stealth aircraft, creating a dynamic, ongoing competition. With the advent of sixth-generation air warfare, this battle is poised to escalate, driven by cutting-edge innovations on both sides.

 

Evolution of Stealth Technology.

Stealth technology, often termed “low observable technology,” minimises an aircraft’s detectability by reducing its radar cross-section (RCS), infrared signature, and acoustic emissions. Its origins trace back to World War II with rudimentary efforts like camouflage, but it gained prominence in the late 20th century. The Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk marked a breakthrough. Its angular, faceted design scattered radar waves, while radar-absorbent materials (RAM) absorbed them, significantly reducing its RCS. The F-117’s success during the 1991 Gulf War underscored stealth’s potential, penetrating Iraqi defences undetected to deliver precision strikes.

Subsequent advancements refined stealth capabilities. The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, a flying wing design, eliminated sharp edges and incorporated advanced RAM, achieving an even smaller RCS. By the early 2000s, fifth-generation fighters like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II integrated stealth with combat versatility. The F-22 features a sleek, aerodynamic shape, internal weapon bays to avoid protrusions, and coatings that dampen radar returns. The F-35 enhances this with sensor fusion, networking capabilities, and reduced infrared signatures through engine design. These aircraft exemplify stealth’s evolution from a specialised feature to a core attribute of modern fighters, blending low observability with supercruise, advanced avionics, and multirole functionality.

The technology hinges on several principles: shaping to deflect radar waves, materials like RAM or composites to absorb energy, and electronic countermeasures to mask emissions. However, stealth is not invisibility; its effectiveness depends on the opponent’s detection capabilities, setting the stage for counter-stealth advancements.

 

Current Counter-Stealth Measures

As stealth technology matured, adversaries developed methods to detect these elusive aircraft, exploiting their residual signatures. One prominent approach is using low-frequency radars like VHF or UHF bands. Unlike the high-frequency radars (X-band) that stealth designs counter, low-frequency systems detect larger structural shapes, bypassing some stealth optimisations. Russia’s Nebo-M radar, for instance, operates in these bands, potentially spotting stealth aircraft at longer ranges. However, their lower resolution limits targeting accuracy, requiring integration with other systems.

Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems offer another countermeasure, detecting heat signatures from engines or airframe friction. Modern fighters like Russia’s Su-35 employ IRST to track stealth aircraft, especially during afterburner use when infrared emissions spike. Stealth designs mitigate this with exhaust shielding and cooling, but complete suppression remains challenging.

Passive radar systems represent a third avenue. These use ambient electromagnetic signals to detect disturbances caused by an aircraft’s passage. Systems like China’s DWL002 exploit this principle, offering a stealth-resistant, hard-to-jam alternative to active radar. Networked sensors enhance this capability, combining data from multiple sources to pinpoint anomalies.

Despite these advances, counter-stealth faces hurdles. Low-frequency radars struggle with clutter and precision, IRST is range-limited and weather-dependent, and passive systems require sophisticated processing to filter noise. For now, false positives and integration challenges further complicate their deployment, ensuring that stealth retains an edge.

 

The Stealth vs. Counter-Stealth Dynamics

Sixth-generation fighters, currently under development, promise to elevate this contest. Programs like the U.S. Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), Europe’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS), and the UK’s Tempest aim to redefine air warfare with advanced stealth and counter-stealth innovations.

Stealth Advancements. Sixth-generation stealth may transcend current designs. Metamaterials, engineered structures with unique electromagnetic properties, could dynamically adapt to incoming radar waves, reducing RCS beyond what static RAM achieves. Research into adaptive camouflage might minimise visual and acoustic signatures, blending aircraft into their surroundings. Enhanced infrared suppression, possibly through novel cooling systems or exhaust shaping, could further mask heat emissions.

Integration with Other Technologies.  Other emerging technologies amplify stealth’s role. Optionally manned or unmanned configurations, as envisioned in NGAD, allow riskier missions without pilot exposure. “Loyal wingman” drones, networked with manned fighters, could extend sensor reach or act as decoys, preserving stealth by misdirecting detection efforts. Directed energy weapons, like lasers, might replace traditional munitions, reducing protrusions and maintaining a low profile. These advancements aim to keep stealth aircraft ahead of evolving threats.

Counter-Stealth Advancements. Counter-stealth technologies are equally ambitious. Quantum radar, leveraging quantum entanglement, could detect stealth aircraft by analysing subtle disturbances unreadable by conventional systems. Though experimental, its theoretical range and precision threaten current stealth paradigms. Using dispersed transmitters and receivers, multi-static radar networks exploit reflections that monostatic radars miss, challenging shape-based stealth designs. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning enhance detection by analysing vast sensor data, radar, infrared, and acoustic signals to identify patterns indicative of stealth aircraft. China’s advancements in networked sensors, integrating space-based platforms and ground systems, exemplify this approach. High-altitude drones or satellites could also monitor large areas, reducing the stealth’s ability to hide in clutter. These developments suggest a future where no aircraft remains truly undetectable.

Strategic Dynamic in Context. Specific programs illustrate this duality. The U.S. NGAD emphasises stealth supremacy, pairing manned fighters with autonomous drones. Europe’s FCAS prioritises system-of-systems integration, potentially balancing stealth with counter-detection capabilities. China’s approach hints at advanced stealth and quantum-based counters, reflecting a dual-track strategy. This global race ensures that sixth-generation warfare will hinge on the stealth-counter-stealth balance.

 

Strategic Implications and Future Trends

The interplay between stealth and counter-stealth reshapes military strategy. If counter-stealth gains parity, stealth’s cost, billions per aircraft, may outweigh its benefits, prompting a pivot to speed, electronic warfare, or expendable drones. The F-35, costing over $100 million per unit, exemplifies this investment; effective detection could render such platforms vulnerable, shifting budgets toward countermeasures or alternative systems.

Tactically, a robust counter-stealth environment might force reliance on stand-off weapons, beyond-visual-range engagements, or networked operations with unmanned assets. Electronic warfare, jamming enemy sensors, could complement stealth, maintaining an edge even as detection improves. Conversely, if stealth outpaces counters, air superiority will favour nations with advanced fighters, reinforcing doctrines built around penetration and surprise.

Geopolitically, the U.S. seeks to preserve stealth dominance, while China and Russia invest in counter-stealth to challenge it. This rivalry drives innovation but risks escalation, as each side counters the other’s advances. Future trends may see cyber warfare targeting stealth and counter-stealth systems, exploiting their reliance on software. Space-based sensors could tilt the balance toward detection, while AI-driven autonomy might redefine engagement rules. The battlefield will grow more complex, with stealth and counter-stealth as pivotal elements in a networked, multi-domain conflict.

 

Conclusion

The contest between stealth and counter-stealth is a cornerstone of air warfare’s evolution. From the F-117’s debut to the sixth-generation horizon, stealth has driven tactical innovation, countered by increasingly sophisticated detection methods. As programs like NGAD and FCAS take flight, this battle will intensify, blending advanced materials, AI, and quantum technologies. Its outcome will dictate air combat’s future, shaping strategies, budgets, and global power. Neither side will claim absolute victory soon; their mutual advancement ensures a perpetual race, defining sixth-generation warfare and beyond.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Kopp, Carlo. “Evolving Radar Technologies and Their Impact on Stealth.” Air Power Australia Analysis, 2010.
  1. Trager, Jason. “Stealth Fighter Evolution: Signature Reduction vs. Sensor Improvements.” MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report, 2019.
  1. Raska, Michael. “The Sixth-Generation Air Combat System: Stealth, AI, and Network-Centric Warfare.” RSIS Working Paper Series, 2022.
  1. Goure, Daniel. “Penetrating Counter-Air: The Future of Air Superiority.” Lexington Institute Report, 2021.
  1. Sukhankin, Sergey. “Russian Advances in Radar and Electronic Warfare: A Challenge to Western Stealth?” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2020.
  1. Axe, David. “Stealth Is Dying—And the U.S. Military Knows It.” Forbes, 2023.
  1. Tirpak, John A. “Next-Gen Air Dominance: The Road to 2035.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 2021.
  1. The War Zone. “USAF’s Secretive Sixth-Generation Fighter Could Render Current Stealth Fighters Obsolete.” The Drive, 2022.
  1. RUSI (Royal United Services Institute). “The Future of Stealth: Counter-Stealth Threats and Military Balances.” RUSI Analysis Report, 2023.
  1. U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Fighter Aircraft Development: Trends in Stealth and Counter-Stealth.” CRS Report R46953, 2022.
  1. Chinese Academy of Military Science. “The Future of Air Combat: 2030-2050.” Beijing, 2023.
  1. NATO Science & Technology Organization. “Emerging Radar Technologies and Their Impact on Air Superiority.” STO-TR-AVT-321, 2023.

637: THE GEOPOLITICS OF FIGHTER EXPORTS AND JOINT VENTURES

 

My Article was published on the Indus International Research Foundation Website on 02 April 25.

 

Fighter aircraft exports and development are more than commercial transactions or technological endeavours. Fighter exports and joint ventures serve as key instruments of statecraft, influencing alliances, shaping military doctrines, and reinforcing spheres of influence. Beyond economic interests, fighter exports often signal political alignment, with buyers and sellers engaging in long-term defence cooperation that extends beyond individual transactions. Complex negotiations usually accompany the sale of advanced fighter jets, offset agreements, and technology transfer arrangements, which carry significant diplomatic and security implications. The United States, Russia, China, and European powers dominate this space, but emerging players like India, South Korea, and Turkey increasingly assert themselves. There is a need to explore the multifaceted dimensions of fighter exports and joint ventures, analysing their impact on global security, economic interests, and diplomatic manoeuvring.

 

The Strategic Significance of Fighter Aircraft Development Programs

Fighter aircraft represent the apex of military aviation, integrating state-of-the-art engineering, advanced technology, and substantial financial investment. These platforms are key instruments in modern warfare, providing air superiority, precision ground attack capabilities, and deterrence. The strategic significance of fighter jets extends well beyond their battlefield utility, influencing geopolitical alignments, economic landscapes, and technological advancements.

 

Power Projection. The export and co-development of fighter aircraft significantly enhance a nation’s ability to project power beyond its borders. Supplying fighter jets to allies, an exporting nation extends its strategic reach, ensuring its influence in key regions. Nations with advanced fighter capabilities can assert dominance over contested airspace, deter potential adversaries, and support allied operations with force projection.

 

Alliance Building. Defence agreements involving fighter jets are instrumental in solidifying alliances. The procurement of these aircraft often necessitates long-term agreements that go beyond a simple arms transaction. Training programs, maintenance support, and logistical cooperation ensure sustained engagement between supplier and recipient nations. For instance, the U.S. sale of F-35 fighters to NATO allies strengthens collective defence, while India’s collaboration with France on the Rafale program deepens bilateral ties.

 

Economic Impact. Fighter aircraft programs play a crucial role in economic development for exporting and recipient nations. Manufacturing these sophisticated platforms generates high-skilled jobs, fosters technological innovation, and stimulates the defence industry. For importing nations, participation in joint ventures or localised production can help build a domestic aerospace sector, reducing long-term dependence on foreign suppliers and fostering economic self-reliance.

 

Technological Sharing. Collaborative fighter programs provide an avenue for technological transfer, enabling recipient nations to develop indigenous capabilities. By engaging in co-development projects, such as India’s involvement with Russia on the Su-30MKI or Japan’s partnership with the U.K. and Italy on the next-generation fighter program, nations acquire critical knowledge in avionics, stealth technology, and aerospace engineering. This reduces reliance on foreign manufacturers and strengthens national security.

 

Geopolitical Dimensions of Fighter Exports

Fighter aircraft exports are deeply intertwined with the geopolitical strategies of major military powers. Beyond economic gains, these transactions serve as instruments of influence, shaping alliances, regional security dynamics, and global power structures. Exporting fighters enables nations to strengthen partnerships, enforce strategic conditions, and maintain regional balances of power.

 

Exporting Influence. Fighter aircraft exports are often tied to the exporting nation’s broader geopolitical objectives. The U.S. dominates global fighter exports, offering aircraft such as the F-16, F-15, and F-35. These sales typically include conditions that align recipient nations with U.S. strategic goals, such as interoperability with NATO forces and adherence to U.S.-led arms control policies. For example, selling F-35 fighters to NATO allies and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states strengthens collective security frameworks and reinforces U.S. influence in these regions. On the other hand, Russian fighter exports, including the Su-30, Su-35, and MiG-29, play a crucial role in Moscow’s foreign policy. Russia leverages these sales to sustain its geopolitical clout in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. India’s long-standing acquisition of Su-30MKI fighters exemplifies this strategic relationship, ensuring continued defence cooperation between the two nations. China is emerging as a formidable player in the fighter export market. The JF-17 Thunder, co-developed with Pakistan, exemplifies Beijing’s ambitions to challenge U.S. and Russian dominance. With its affordability and modularity, the JF-17 has gained traction among developing nations seeking capable yet cost-effective fighter platforms.

 

Export Restrictions and Conditionality. Exporting nations often impose restrictions to safeguard their strategic interests and limit the recipient’s operational autonomy. Exporting nations usually restrict access to critical fighter technologies to prevent potential adversaries from gaining sensitive capabilities. This limitation affects recipient nations that seek to develop indigenous aerospace industries but must navigate restrictions on advanced avionics, stealth technology, and weapon systems. The U.S. enforces strict end-user agreements to regulate how exported fighters are used and resold. For instance, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program following its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defence system underscores the geopolitical stakes of such agreements.

 

Regional Balance of Power. Fighter aircraft exports significantly influence regional security landscapes. Exporting nations frequently calibrate their sales to maintain a delicate balance and prevent regional destabilisation. The U.S. sells advanced fighters like the F-15 and F-35 to Saudi Arabia and Israel. While supporting GCC states against Iran, Washington ensures that Israel retains a qualitative military edge through exclusive access to superior variants and additional defence systems. Russia’s fighter sales to India and China highlight its efforts to balance relationships with two regional powers with a complex strategic rivalry. By equipping both nations with advanced aircraft, Moscow maintains leverage while preventing either from becoming overly dependent on Western defence suppliers.

 

Joint Ventures: A Collaborative Approach.

Joint ventures in fighter aircraft development represent a strategic approach to balancing technological advancement, economic efficiency, and national security interests. Participating nations can foster technological independence by sharing costs, risks, and expertise while strengthening geopolitical alliances. These collaborations play a crucial role in shaping the global defence landscape.

 

Technology Sharing and Sovereignty. Joint fighter development programs enable nations to develop cutting-edge aircraft while enhancing domestic aerospace capabilities. Notable examples include. A collaboration between Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain, the Eurofighter Typhoon exemplifies how nations can pool resources to produce a world-class multirole fighter. The program has enhanced European defence capabilities and reinforced industrial cooperation among partner nations. A joint project between Pakistan and China, the JF-17 Thunder allowed Pakistan to develop an affordable and capable fighter while gaining valuable experience in aircraft manufacturing. This partnership has strengthened Pakistan’s aerospace industry, reducing reliance on Western suppliers.

 

Geopolitical Complications. Despite their advantages, joint ventures are often complex and fraught with challenges. Competing interests among partner nations can lead to inefficiencies, delays, and disputes over work share. For instance, the Eurofighter program experienced significant delays due to disagreements over each partner’s production priorities and technological contributions. Nations involved in joint ventures may have differing operational requirements or export policies, leading to complications in decision-making. Varying national security interests can hinder smooth cooperation and affect the program’s long-term success.

 

Emerging Collaborations. New joint ventures reflect the evolving nature of global defence partnerships and the push for technological superiority. A Franco-German-Spanish initiative aimed at developing a 6th-generation fighter, FCAS underscores Europe’s desire for strategic autonomy in military aviation. The program will integrate next-generation technologies such as AI, stealth, and advanced networking capabilities. Led by the UK in collaboration with Italy and Japan, the Tempest program highlights the growing trend of non-U.S. defence collaborations. This initiative aims to develop a highly advanced fighter with state-of-the-art avionics, weaponry, and data fusion technologies, demonstrating a shift in defence cooperation beyond traditional alliances.

 

Challenges in Fighter Exports and Joint Ventures

Exporting fighter aircraft and international joint ventures in military aviation face significant challenges. These range from economic constraints and technological dependencies to political risks and intense competition. Each of these factors shapes the global fighter aircraft market and influences the success of such programs.

 

Economic Constraints. Modern fighter jets are prohibitively expensive, limiting their affordability for many nations. A single advanced multirole fighter can cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, not including operational and maintenance expenses. Exporters often offer financing options, leasing arrangements, or government-backed subsidies to mitigate this. However, these financial mechanisms can strain national budgets and face domestic political scrutiny. For instance, India’s procurement of Dassault Rafale jets from France was marred by alleged controversy over pricing, alleged favouritism, and offset agreements. Such economic considerations can delay or cancel deals, affecting both export and importers.

 

Technological Dependencies. Fighter aircraft exports often create long-term dependencies on the supplying nation for maintenance, spare parts, and upgrades. This dependence extends to software updates, weapons integration, and operational training. The geopolitical implications of such dependencies can be significant, as the exporter retains leverage over the recipient. For example, many nations operating American-made fighters must seek U.S. approval for upgrades or modifications, restricting their operational autonomy. Similarly, India’s reliance on Russian aircraft like the Su-30MKI has led to logistical challenges due to The Russia-Ukraine war and Western sanctions on Russia, disrupting the supply of critical components.

 

Political Risks. Defence cooperation and fighter exports are susceptible to shifts in political leadership and international alliances. Changes in foreign policy or diplomatic disputes can abruptly halt ongoing programs. The United States’ decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400 missile system exemplifies how political disagreements impact military collaboration. Such disruptions affect the purchasing nation and have economic and strategic consequences for the supplier.

 

Export Competition. The global fighter jet market is fiercely competitive, with the U.S., Russia, China, and France among the key players. Nations engage in aggressive marketing, offering attractive offset deals, technology transfers, and financing packages to secure contracts. The competition is further intensified by geopolitical alignments, with countries often choosing suppliers based on broader strategic partnerships rather than purely technical or economic factors. Fighter exports are highly competitive, with nations like the U.S., Russia, China, and France vying for market dominance. This competition can lead to aggressive marketing tactics and the provision of offset deals to sweeten contracts.

 

The Future of Fighter Exports and Joint Ventures

The landscape of fighter exports and joint ventures is set to evolve significantly, driven by technological advancements, the rise of new defence players, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

 

Sixth-Generation Fighters. The development of sixth-generation fighters will reshape the geopolitics of fighter exports. Nations investing in advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, stealth, and directed-energy weapons will dominate future markets. Programs like NGAD (U.S.), FCAS (Europe), Tempest (UK-Japan-Italy), and the HAL CATS Program highlight the race to define the next generation of air power. These aircraft will demand extensive collaboration and significant financial investments, potentially altering traditional supplier-recipient relationships.

 

Regional Players. Emerging defence producers like South Korea (KF-21 Boramae) and India (Tejas MK2, AMCA) are entering the global market, challenging established exporters. These nations aim to reduce reliance on imports while expanding their geopolitical influence through exports. Their ability to offer cost-effective alternatives and localised production incentives could shift market dynamics and disrupt the dominance of traditional suppliers like the U.S., Russia, and France.

 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). The growing adoption of UCAVs presents a parallel trend in fighter exports. Nations like Turkey (Bayraktar TB2) and Israel (Heron, Harop) have already established themselves as leaders in this field, with significant geopolitical implications. As unmanned systems become more capable and cost-effective, they may replace or complement traditional manned fighters, leading to a worldwide shift in defence procurement strategies.

 

Realignments. As global power shifts, fighter exports and joint ventures reflect new alliances and rivalries. The U.S.-China competition, the rise of multipolarity, and regional conflicts will shape the market’s future dynamics. Countries will increasingly seek defence partnerships that align with their strategic interests, making flexibility and technology-sharing critical for successful export programs.

 

Conclusion

The geopolitics of fighter exports and joint ventures is a multifaceted domain where technology, economics, and strategy converge. As nations pursue advanced capabilities and seek to bolster their influence, fighter programs will continue to serve as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and power projection. The interplay of competition and collaboration in this field will shape the future of airpower and the broader contours of international relations.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Bitzinger, R. A. (2008). “The Global Arms Trade: The Shifting Strategic Landscape.” Survival, 50(2), 55-68.
  1. Eriksson, M. (2021). “The Mirage of European Defence Autonomy: Fighter Jet Collaboration and Transatlantic Tensions.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(5), 767-789.
  1. Gilli, A., & Gilli, M. (2019). “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.” International Security, 43(3), 141-189.
  1. Taylor, T. (2013). “Offsets, Technology Transfer, and Defense Industrialization: The Case of India’s Fighter Jet Programs.” Defense & Peace Economics, 24(5), 453-472.
  1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2024). Trends in International Arms Transfers.
  1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). (2023). The Future of European Fighter Jet Collaboration: FCAS vs. Tempest.
  1. Indian Ministry of Defence. (2023). Defence Production and Export Policy 2023.
  1. China’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). (2023). China’s Defense Industrial Reforms and Export Strategies.
  1. The Diplomat. (2023). “China’s Fighter Jet Exports: How JF-17 and FC-31 Are Changing the Market.”
  1. Hartley, K. (2014). The Economics of Defence Policy: A New Perspective. Routledge.
  1. Bitzinger, R. A. (2017). Arming Asia: Technonationalism and the Dynamics of Defence Industrialization. Routledge.
  1. Sapolsky, H. M., Gholz, E., & Kaufman, A. (2009). US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy. Routledge.

636: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

My Article was published in the News Analytics Journal of Mar 25.

 

 

Psychological warfare (psywar) aims to influence perceptions, morale, and decision-making, often targeting adversaries and domestic populations. In the context of the Russia- Ukraine conflict, Russia’s psywar likely seeks to demoralise Ukrainians, fracture their resistance, sow distrust in their leadership, and bolster domestic support within Russia for the war effort. An evaluation of Russia’s psychological warfare (psywar) in Ukraine would need an assessment of its objectives, tactics, and measurable impacts based on available evidence and recent developments.  This paper argues that while Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded in shaping domestic narratives and straining Western unity, it has failed to break Ukrainian resistance or achieve a decisive strategic victory.

 

Historical Perspective of Russian Psychological Warfare

Russian psychological warfare (psywar) has a rich and intricate history, deeply ingrained in the nation’s strategic culture. From the Tsarist era to modern hybrid warfare, Russia has consistently employed psychological operations to manipulate perception, control narratives, and weaken adversaries. The roots of Russian psywar can be traced back to the early 20th century when the Bolsheviks effectively used propaganda to consolidate power during and after the Russian Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky understood that controlling information was just as crucial as military victories, leading to the institutionalisation of propaganda through organisations like Agitprop, which shaped Soviet political messaging.

During the early Soviet period, psywar techniques were used not only to suppress internal dissent but also to influence communist movements worldwide. The concept of “reflexive control,” developed in Soviet military thought, became a key element of Russian psywar, aiming to manipulate opponents into making decisions that ultimately benefit Russian interests. By the time of World War II, Soviet psychological operations had evolved into large-scale deception campaigns, including the use of maskirovka (military deception) to mislead Nazi Germany. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union refined these methods, launching extensive “Active Measures” under the KGB to manage information and exploit societal divisions in Western nations.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under Vladimir Putin, revived and modernised its psychological warfare strategies, adapting them to the digital age. The contemporary Russian approach to psywar, often called “information confrontation”, integrates cyber operations, media manipulation, and social engineering to achieve strategic objectives.

 

Russian Psywar during the Ukraine War

Russian psychological warfare in the context of the Ukraine war has been a multifaceted effort aimed at shaping perceptions both domestically and internationally. The multi-layered strategy integrates military, political, and information operations to shape perceptions, demoralise opponents, and influence global narratives.  Psychological warfare has played a central role in Russia’s strategy throughout the Ukraine war, aiming to weaken Ukrainian resistance, shape international perceptions, and manipulate domestic narratives. Russia has employed a mix of cyber operations, information management campaigns, battlefield deception, and psychological intimidation to erode Ukrainian morale and divide Western support.

One of the key elements of Russia’s psychological warfare has been its use of information management. Russian state media and social media bots have employed online platforms with narratives that neo-Nazis run Ukraine to accusations that NATO is using Ukraine as a puppet to attack Russia. These narratives justify the war to the Russian population, confuse Ukrainian citizens, and create divisions within Western democracies by amplifying anti-war and isolationist sentiments. Russian narratives have also sought to exploit war fatigue in Western nations, emphasising that financial and military support for Ukraine is futile, expensive, or escalatory.

One prominent example of Russia’s psychological warfare tactics is the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign initiated in 2022 by the Russian IT firm Social Design Agency (SDA). This operation aimed to undermine support for Ukraine by manipulating public opinion in countries like Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The campaign involved creating news articles that presented a pro-Russian perspective on the conflict and deploying AI-powered bot networks to disseminate these narratives on social media platforms. These bots were programmed to engage with users, spreading Russian narratives and pro-Russian sentiments. The ‘Doppelganger’ campaign demonstrates how Russia uses digital platforms and AI to shape international perceptions and influence public opinion in its favour.

Cyber warfare has also been a critical psychological tool. Russian cyber groups have often launched cyber attacks on Ukrainian government institutions, banks, and critical infrastructure. Beyond disabling systems, these attacks serve a psychological function, creating uncertainty, fear, and the impression that Ukraine’s leadership cannot protect its citizens.  Russian cyber efforts extend beyond Ukraine, targeting Western institutions with cyber sabotage to weaken overall support for Kyiv.

 

All-Out or Restricted Psywar.

While Russia is undeniably engaged in psywar, it may not be pushing it to its fullest potential. A maximalist Russian psywar would have included massive global disinformation by flooding international media and social platforms with tailored narratives to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and erode Western support. It would have shut down Ukraine’s communication networks entirely (e.g., via cyber and electronic warfare) to prevent resistance messaging and sow chaos. Russia would have infiltrated Ukrainian society with agents or digital campaigns to fracture trust in leadership and incite internal dissent. Russia employed these tactics, but not at an all-out scale or intensity.

Russia isn’t indulging in a full-fledged war not because it’s unwilling but because strategy, resources, and context constrain it. The war’s hybrid nature means that psywar is a key component, but it’s subordinated to military and economic priorities rather than unleashed as a standalone juggernaut. Russia seems content with a steady, if not maximal, psychological pressure adequate to grind Ukraine down but not bold enough to gamble on total dominance.

Strategic Restraint or Compulsion.  A no-holds-barred psywar could provoke stronger NATO responses, like direct intervention or crippling sanctions beyond the current scope. Putin appears to calibrate efforts to avoid provoking direct NATO intervention strategically (e.g., nuclear rhetoric is loud but not yet acted upon). Escalating psywar abroad might require diverting resources from domestic propaganda, which keeps Putin’s regime intact. A complete external focus could weaken the internal control. A full-fledged psywar demands significant investment in cyberinfrastructure, media saturation, and personnel. Putin may believe conventional military gains suffice to force Ukraine into submission, reducing the need for an all-out psychological blitz.

 

Success or Failure

Despite relentless Russian strikes, Ukrainian resolve appears mixed. Reports from Kyiv indicate fatigue among civilians and soldiers, with some expressing doubts about a negotiated peace due to distrust in Russia. However, Ukraine’s counteroffensives and continued drone strikes on Russian territory demonstrate resilience and a refusal to capitulate. This suggests Russia has not fully broken Ukrainian will, though exhaustion is a growing factor after three years of war. It has partially succeeded in weakening civilian morale and straining resources but hasn’t achieved a decisive psychological collapse.

Russian psywar has aimed to undermine trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. While Ukraine faces internal challenges, such as ammunition shortages and delayed Western aid, there’s no clear evidence of widespread distrust or collapse in governance.  The psychological toll on Ukrainians is undeniable. Studies from 2023-2024 highlight high rates of PTSD, anxiety, and depression exacerbated by displacement and infrastructure attacks. Yet, it hasn’t translated into mass surrender or acceptance of Russian dominance.

 

Impact on Putin’s Image

While the Western narrative often portrays Putin as weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded mainly in projecting him as an even stronger leader, both domestically and among some international audiences.

Russia has effectively presented the Ukraine war as a fight for national survival against the West, rallying both elites and the public behind Putin. The Russian narrative frames the war not as an invasion of Ukraine but as a defensive struggle against NATO and Western aggression. This narrative positions Putin as the leader defending Russian sovereignty and traditions against Western imperialism, liberalism, and decadence. State media constantly refers to the war as the “Great Patriotic War 2.0,” drawing parallels with WWII to reinforce the idea of national struggle. The Kremlin has portrayed Putin as the last stronghold against Western cultural and moral decay. Messaging around traditional values, national pride, and resistance to globalisation strengthens his appeal among conservative Russians and foreign audiences in the Global South.  The War has allowed Putin to eliminate political threats, tighten control over society, and silence opposition, reinforcing his image as an unchallenged ruler.

Western leaders expected economic collapse from sanctions, but Russia’s economic resilience has strengthened Putin’s image as a leader who can outmanoeuvre Western pressure. Despite unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia avoided a total economic collapse. Trade was rerouted through China, India, Turkey, and the Middle East, showing Putin’s ability to adapt and counter Western strategies. State propaganda framed sanctions as proof of Russia’s global importance. Putin positioned himself as the leader who could make Russia self-sufficient, reducing its reliance on the West.

 

Influence on Europe.

Russia’s psychological warfare has significantly influenced Europe’s collective response to the war in Ukraine, exploiting political, economic, and social vulnerabilities to create divisions and slow decision-making. While the European Union (EU) has managed to maintain a generally pro-Ukraine stance, Russian psy ops have repeatedly tested and weakened European cohesion on military aid, sanctions, and strategic policy.

 Exploiting Political Divisions in Europe. Russia has effectively deepened political polarisation within and among European nations by amplifying opposing narratives across the political spectrum. Right-wing nationalist movements have been targeted with anti-Ukraine rhetoric, portraying the war as an unnecessary financial burden. Simultaneously, left-wing anti-interventionist factions have been influenced to frame NATO and Western military aid as imperialist warmongering. Additionally, Russian information campaigns have sown doubts about Ukraine’s governance, corruption, and war prospects, eroding the moral justification for sustained European support. For example, pro-Russian political factions in Hungary, Slovakia, and parts of Germany have advocated for diplomatic negotiations with Russia over continued military aid to Ukraine. This has complicated EU-wide decision-making, as unanimous support is often required for major foreign policy measures. Far-right and populist parties in Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy have leveraged Russian-aligned narratives to challenge the EU consensus. Hungary’s Orbán, for instance, has stalled EU sanction packages (e.g., the 13th package in late 2024) by citing “peace” over confrontation, aligning with Kremlin talking points and fracturing policy cohesion.

 Weakening European Resolve on Military Aid. Russia has employed psychological pressure to deter European military assistance to Ukraine. Moscow frequently warns that Western arms supplies could escalate the conflict into a direct NATO-Russia war. President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats have had a chilling effect, particularly in Germany, where concerns over escalation delayed the provision of Leopard 2 tanks and later raised hesitations about supplying long-range Taurus missiles. Public opinion has also been a battleground for Russian influence. Moscow-backed media and social media campaigns have exaggerated the economic hardships caused by military aid, fuelling war fatigue. In Germany and France, protests calling for peace talks have been driven by narratives echoing Russian disinformation. In countries like France, polls from early 2025 show that 66% support EU aid to Ukraine, but 78% oppose troop deployment unless it is part of a peace deal. In Germany, scepticism about prolonged support grows amid economic pressures, with some voters echoing Russian claims of “war fatigue” amplified online. These divisions weaken the political will for a unified, robust response.

Economic Warfare and the Energy Weapon. Russia’s historical leverage over Europe’s energy supply has been a key psychological tool. The 2022 energy crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s gas cutoffs, heightened European economic fears. Russian psywar further exaggerated the risks of economic collapse, intensifying divisions within the EU. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has been a prominent example of how Russian energy influence can weaken EU unity. Orbán has repeatedly blocked or diluted Russian oil and gas sanctions, citing economic concerns. Additionally, Russia has cultivated business relationships in Germany, Italy, and Hungary to lobby against stronger sanctions, delaying EU consensus on measures such as price caps on Russian energy exports.

Encouraging Fractures in NATO and the EU. Russia has sought to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States by portraying Washington as manipulating the war for its strategic benefit. This narrative has traction among European leaders who advocate for greater strategic autonomy. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has suggested that Europe develop a more independent security framework rather than relying solely on NATO. Russian psyops have also exacerbated differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Poland and the Baltic states have been staunch supporters of Ukraine, pushing for aggressive military aid and sanctions. In contrast, France, Germany, and Italy have sometimes been more hesitant, leading to internal EU friction. Russia amplifies these divisions to slow collective decision-making, delaying much-needed aid to Ukraine.

 

Conclusion

Russia’s psychological warfare in Ukraine has proven to be a sophisticated and adaptive strategy that not only targets Ukraine’s internal stability but also seeks to fracture the unity of its Western allies. By deploying a combination of information management, cyber-attacks, and strategic political manoeuvres, Russia has managed to unsettle a coherent European response by amplifying divisions, fostering hesitation, and exploiting vulnerabilities. It hasn’t derailed EU support for Ukraine but has slowed and fragmented it.

Russia’s psywar has reinforced Putin’s strongman image by shaping domestic narratives, exploiting Western vulnerabilities, and asserting global influence. While it hasn’t overturned the Western perspective entirely, it has created a parallel reality where Putin’s strength is maintained and enhanced, particularly among Russian and non-Western audiences. Whether this perception holds as the war evolves remains uncertain, but for now, Russia’s psywar has undeniably kept Putin’s strongman myth alive and potent.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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