WHAT IS COOKING IN THE DRAGON’S MILITARY CAULDRON

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet (Freepik)

 

The Purge

 

The PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) underwent a reshuffle in 2022 following the 20th National Party Congress, and a new cabinet and defence minister were appointed in early 2023 at the 14th National People’s Congress in Beijing. A number of these officials, hand-picked by President Xi Jinping for their positions in the CMC, have since been implicated in an anti-corruption investigation in China.

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLARF oversees China’s land-based nuclear missiles and the Equipment Development Department. PLARF’s commander and its political commissar were replaced in August 2023. Vice Admiral Wang Houbin (PLAN) replaced the PLARF commander and General Xu Xisheng (former deputy political commissar of the Southern Theatre Command) replaced the PLARF political commissar. Both replacements were drawn from outside the PLARF.

 

Defence Minister. Defence Minister Li Shangfu was ousted from his role. General Li previously served as the head of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department. The Equipment Development Department stated on its social media account that it was investigating corruption allegations related to procurement bids and the formation of private cliques within the armed forces at high levels that resulted in cronyism and a lack of focus on the core task of building combat readiness. Former defence minister Wei Fenghe (formerly commanded the PLARF) also disappeared from public view, reportedly under investigation.

 

Comments.

 

    • Corruption alone is an unlikely explanation for the removal by Xi of top military officials that he had appointed just months earlier, raising the possibility that intelligence leaks may have triggered the action.

 

    • The leadership changes also suggest that despite Xi’s calls for absolute loyalty and a zero-tolerance approach to corruption, problems within the PLA persist.

 

 

PLA Army.

 

PLA Army is studying and analysing the lessons emerging out of the Ukraine war. Some of the areas, being looked into are as follows:-

 

    • The heavy use of UAVs by both Russia and Ukraine is likely behind the higher prominence accorded to the discussion of the concept of ‘low altitude control and dominance’ by the PLA Army.

 

    • The protracted nature of the fighting in Ukraine is likely to drive the PLA Army to re-examine operational plans for long-term industrial and logistic sustainment, as well as for casualty evacuation and treatment.

 

    • Review of the recruitment process, and policies related to conscription and reservists. In 2023, the PLA revised its existing regulations covering the recruitment of civilian and military personnel, including conscripts.

 

    • Russia’s struggles to mobilise personnel for service in Ukraine would influence the CMC’s ability to conduct wartime mobilisation.

 

    • In 2023, the PLA continued to roll out new armour, artillery and air-defence platforms to its combined arms units, and the re-equipment of combined arms regiments in Xinjiang Military District now appears to be nearing completion.

 

    • PLA is continuing the re-equipment of aviation brigades with the Z-20 medium helicopter, with priority to PLA Army’s air assault formations assigned to the Eastern and Western theatre commands, as well as the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts.

 

Comments

 

    • Given the scale of a 2017 army reorganisation, a new round of major force-structure changes within the regular service is unlikely in the short term.

 

    • The PLA Reserve Force may attract greater attention.

 

    • A review of the recruitment process seems to be aimed at the goal of enlisting and retaining greater numbers of high-quality recruits, particularly college graduates and those with key scientific and engineering skill sets.

 

    • Significant changes to the army’s re-equipment plan are unlikely before the start of the next five-year plan in 2026.

 

PLA Navy.

 

Assertiveness. China’s naval and maritime security arms became increasingly assertive in their activities. China’s navy increased operations in the waters around Taiwan, while the Chinese coast guard undertook activities that bordered on aggressiveness. Beijing’s maritime militia assets, which purport to be part of its fishing fleet, conducted operations in the waters disputed with the Philippines around the Spratly Islands and in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

 

Force Development.

 

    • Surface Ships. The PLAN in 2023 added the eighth Type-055 (Renhai) cruiser to its operational fleet along with additional Type-054A frigates. It also launched its new Type-054B frigate, which appears to be larger and considerably more capable. The new frigate promises to be a major addition to the PLAN’s blue-water fleet as a component of future task-group deployments.

 

    • Aircraft Carrier. China is progressing with its third indigenous aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Type-003). It is claimed to be more potent and capable than the existing Liaoning (Type-001) and the Shandong (Type-002) aircraft carriers. The new carrier is expected to be commissioned in 2025.

 

    • Submarines. PLAN’s focus has increased towards developing sub-surface forces. Those efforts include the development of the new-generation Type-095 nuclear-powered attack submarine and Type-096 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. It is assessed that the PLAN has equipped its Type-094 ballistic missile boats with a longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20). That would represent a significant step up in capability.

 

    • Amphibious Capability. PLA Navy appears to be strengthening its LHD forces. It launched the fourth Type-075 Yushenclass LHD in December. The navy has also added at least two new Zubr-class air-cushion landing craft to its inventory, as well as other landing craft.

 

Force Deployment. PLAN is expanding its pattern of long-range deployments.

 

    • The PLA Navy continued to develop its bluewater deployment capabilities, including with more significant formations. Units led by Type-075 (Yushen) amphibious assault ships (LHDs) made two forays into the Western Pacific, including waters near Japan.

 

    • PLA Navy also gradually pushed carrier operations further out with the Liaoning and Shandong sailing out towards Guam and undertaking more intense air operations. The PLAN, in September 2023, carried out a further large-scale carrier exercise in the Western Pacific.

 

    • The PLAN carried out exercises with Russia and Iran and with Russia and South Africa, port visits in the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, and a rare foray to Africa’s Atlantic coast with a port visit to Nigeria. Another set of manoeuvres with Russia off Alaska in August 2023 further underscored that the.

 

 

Comments.

 

    • The PLAN is now regularly and widely hyped as ‘the world’s largest navy’.

 

    • While the PLAN’s fleet has evolved to be more modern, it still lags behind the US Navy in terms of total tonnage and capability. The gap seems to be narrowing.

 

    • PLAN, despite its increasing emergence in the world’s oceans, is still significantly concentrated in waters closer to home.

 

PLA Air Force

 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) received considerable numbers of combat aircraft in 2023, in part from an unexpected source. Along with the new-build Chengdu J-10C Firebird, Shenyang J-16 Flanker N and Chengdu J-20 multi-role fighter aircraft, the service received upward of 200 tactical combat aircraft from the PLAN. Many of the transferred aircraft are unlikely to be retained in the medium term. The initial version of the Xi’an JH-7, the JH-7 Flounder A, as well as the even older Shenyang J-8 Finback, may be retired.

 

Maritime Air. The PLAN appears to be divesting itself of almost all its land-based multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, bomber aircraft and numerous air bases. The PLAAF appears to be taking on the roles of the transferred formations. The PLA Air Force would, therefore, be responsible for land-based maritime strike tasks, requiring considerable coordination with the PLAN. The addition of the PLAN aircraft will bolster the PLAAF’s inventory of modern aircraft types.

 

J-20 Aircraft.  The J-20 heavy multi-role fighter is the premier combat aircraft in PLAAF service, introduced in 2017–18. China had built around 200 J-20s by the fourth quarter of the year and operates six operational brigades equipped with it.  An upgraded J-20 is undergoing flight tests. The aircraft’s forward fuselage has been modified with a revised cockpit profile and a raised fuselage section to the rear of the cockpit. The aircraft may have been fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 afterburning turbofan engine. The WS-15 offers more power than the previously used Shenyang WS-10.

 

Other Aircraft.

 

    • The PLAAF continued to induct Shenyang’s two-seat J-16 Flanker aircraft, enhancing its long-range surface-attack capability. As an air-to-air platform, it is likely to carry under development PL-17 (CH-AA-X-12) very long-range air-to-air missile.

 

    • PLAAF’s low-observable bomber, the Xi’an H-20 continues to be under development.

 

    • The roles of the PLAAF bomber force continued to expand. The Xi’an H-6 carries the air-launched Mach 3+ WZ-8 reconnaissance UAV that, post-release, climbs to an altitude of up to 100,000 feet to fly its mission profile. The WZ-8 has now entered service.

 

Comments

    • There is an important lesson to be learnt (Indivisibility of airpower) from China’s reorganisation and placing all the air assets and roles under the PLAAF.

 

    • China’s aviation industry is well established.

 

    • PLAAF is expanding rapidly in numerical strength.

 

    • Doubts still exist about the stated and claimed capabilities of its aircraft.

 

PLA Rocket Force

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has been enhancing and expanding its capabilities across all ranges, at varying qualitative and quantitative paces. The PLARF’s capabilities are evolving most rapidly through the introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to replace some medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that are being retired.

 

DF-26 with Swappable Warheads. Variants of the DF-21 (CH-SS-5) MRBM, including the nuclear-armed DF-21A (CH-SS-5 Mod 2) and conventional DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4), are being swiftly replaced by the longer-range DF-26 (CH-SS- 18) IRBM. The DF-26 is designed to allow crews to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and to conduct precision strikes against land and maritime targets up to the second island chain.

 

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). The PLARF is also developing and inducting an IRBM armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that appears to be similar to the DF-26 and is known as the DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24).  The PLARF is re-equipping some of its brigades (in eastern China) with the DF-17 (CH-SS-22) medium-range missile carrying an HGV. The DF-17’s HGV is more manoeuvrable and therefore more capable of evading adversary missile defences than traditional ballistic missiles of similar ranges. Its features suggest the weapon was developed to strike high-value targets such as air and missile defences at the outset of a conflict, opening the way for less manoeuvrable systems to reach their objective with a lower probability of being intercepted.

 

ICBMs with MIRV. China continues to modernise its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. The DF-41 (CH-SS-20) is the PLARF’s newest ICBM and is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thereby providing China with a higher number of warheads with a smaller force. The DF-41 brigades will be equipped with fewer launchers than with the DF-31.

 

Enhancement of Survivability and Responsiveness. PLARF is upgrading the DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2) to the more mobile and responsive DF-31AG configuration with an integrated transport erector launcher that is off-road capable. The PLARF is also expanding a small number of silos for the older DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM at several locations. A 2021 report also revealed that China was building three large ICBM silo fields (in the. western part of the country), to enhance survivability and responsiveness.

 

Comments.

 

    • The DF-26’s so-called hot-swappable warhead would introduce a potential escalation dilemma, adversaries targeted with the weapon may be unsure if they are under nuclear or conventional attack before the warhead detonates.

 

    • Hypersonic weapons and MIRV capability will change the dynamics of warfare and start a new arms race.

 

    • China may be moving from a stated policy of nuclear no-first-use and a minimum credible deterrent to a launch-on-warning posture.

 

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References and credits

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2024”.

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

References:-

The International Institute for Strategic studies, “The Military Balance 2024”.

RITU’S COLUMN: Joint IAF & IN Operation at High Sea

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.  

 

Her article on recent Joint IAF and IN operation at high sea  was published on 18 Jan 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.

 

(Besides the quotes, the views of the author are her own)

 

No Propaganda-Laced Video! Filipino Expert Mocks China, Says Indian AF-Navy Ops Show ‘Who Is The Boss’

 

By Ritu Sharma -March 18, 2024

 

While the Chinese PLA Navy, despite its increasing size, is still working towards becoming a true blue-water navy capable of operating much beyond its shores, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force pooled their resources to paradrop marine commandos from Boeing C-17 Globemaster to rescue a hijacked merchant vessel 1400 nautical miles from the Indian shores.

 

The message was loud and clear that India is the ‘First Responder in the Indian Ocean Region.’

 

It was the first insertion of marine commandos through airdrop on high seas. A rescue right out of Hollywood flick Captain Phillips, the Indian forces executed the anti-piracy operation on the high seas that unfolded for over 40 hours.

 

Indian Navy’s stealth-guided missile destroyer INS Kolkata intercepted a merchant vessel, MV Ruen, which was hijacked by Somali pirates on December 13, 2023. The pirates had sailed in the ship to conduct more acts of piracy when they were stopped by the INS Kolkata.

 

The emboldened pirates opened fire at INS Kolkata and, in the reckless hostile act, shot down a drone launched from the destroyer. This set in motion a high-voltage anti-piracy mission that underscored that the Indian Navy is not to be trifled with.

 

INS Subhadra patrol vessel, maritime patrol aircraft P-8I, and a high-altitude long-endurance drone joined the mission, while an IAF’s C-17 took off from India with the elite marine commandos (Marcos) of the Indian Navy. It flew for 10 hours and carried out a precision airborne drop of two Combat Rubberised Raiding Craft boats along with the Indian Navy Marcos trained in paradrop.

 

The paradrop is difficult in the best of circumstances. However, it becomes extremely challenging on high seas because sea and air conditions impact accuracy. The hazard of parachuting into water is always present.

 

The Indian marine commandos undergo regular training for para jumps with the Air Force; however, this is the first time they have been para-dropped so far away from the Indian coast.

 

The Marine Commandos boarded the bulk carrier MV Ruen and successfully disarmed the 35 pirates on the ship to successfully rescue 17 crew members on board.

 

The operation, in addition to underscoring the Indian Navy’s capability to defend maritime laws in its area of dominance from the Gulf of Aden in the West to the Malacca Straits in the East, also highlighted the growing cohesiveness of the Indian Armed Forces to carry out joint operations with finesse.

 

“IAF works closely not only with surface forces (Army and Navy) but also other agencies like NDMA (National Disaster Management Agency) and NSG (National Security Guards) etc, for induction and insertion of troops and special forces. Depending on the type of load (men and material), distance from the launch base, and method of induction/insertion (landed, para drop, or slithering), the appropriate aircraft is decided. A detailed planning has to be done for such operations,” former IAF Vice Chief Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) elaborated to the EurAsian Times.

 

“Prevailing ground environment is a very important factor. The airspace around the drop zone or landing area needs to be sanitized to rule out any anti-aircraft threat. These types of joint operations have been done in the past and will be carried out in the future as and when needed,” Air Marshal Khosla added.

 

The Indian Navy’s anti-piracy operations have earned accolades from across the globe. Although it has yet to confront Houthi rebels, it has been one of the first responders to multiple merchant vessels that have been impacted.

 

The incident has been widely covered in regional countries. A maritime security expert from the Philippines, Collin Koh, said obliquely, referring to China: “A net security provider shows its mettle with air force-navy integration in a real-life security contingency. It beats somebody else who only loves to publish flashy, propaganda-laced videos.”

 

Comparison To The Green-Water PLA Navy

 

When the Indian Navy is compared to the PLA Navy, the number of warships in the Chinese Armada is discussed. However, the Indian Navy’s blue water capabilities are only reflected in the Chinese Navy’s blue water ambitions.

 

Despite having the world’s biggest naval fleet, over 340 warships, the PLA Navy has been regarded as a green-water navy, operating mostly near the country’s shores. However, by augmenting its ship-building capability, it is expected to bloom into a true-blue-water navy by 2050.

 

China’s “Defence White Paper 2019” mentioned that the PLA is speeding up its transition to “Far-Seas Protection” as its maritime interests are growing. Hence, securing strategic sea lines of communication is becoming imperative for Chinese interests.

 

This has also seen the PLA-Navy increasing its footprints westwards. China is aware of the Indian Navy’s prowess and the advantage that India’s geographical location provides it. This is why China has not provoked India at sea, as it lacks the capability.

 

However, China is increasing its reach by building an overseas base. Besides Djibouti and Ream naval base in Cambodia, it is actively scouting for potential locations for military outposts. China’s foothold in Maldives, in the Indian backyard, is therefore concerning for New Delhi.

 

India has sought to counter this loss by building a naval air base in the Lakshadweep Islands group. The Indian Isles, located in the Arabian Sea, is just 507 kilometers from the Maldives and is seen as an alternative to the Maldives. The ramping up of facilities on the island will mean that soon, the Indian frontline fighter jets will roar in the Western part of the Indian Ocean.

 

India has already set on the path of developing the military assets on the archipelago of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which sits on the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, a gateway to the South China Sea and a significant choke point for the Chinese Navy.

 

The northernmost point of the 572 islands is only 22 nautical miles away from Myanmar, and its southernmost point is a mere 90 nautical miles from Indonesia. The islands control the Bay of Bengal, the Six Degree, and the Ten Degree channels, which over 60,000 commercial vessels use.

 

While mid-air refueling has increased the Indian forces’ reach, the need for more supporting bases cannot be negated. “Earlier ferries to faraway places used to take many days with lots of halts en route. Now, aircraft reach much faster with mid-air refueling. But for sustained operations away from the mainland, supporting bases would be required,” Air Marshal Khosla added.

 

In 2018, India also gained access to the strategically located port of Duqm on Oman’s southern coast. Sitting on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean, Duqm provides the Indian Navy easy access into the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden, helping the Indian Navy sustain long-term operations in the Western Indian Ocean.

 

Link to the article:-

No Propaganda-Laced Video! Filipino Expert Mocks China, Says Indian AF-Navy Ops Show ‘Who Is The Boss’

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References and credits

The EurAsian Times: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/no-propaganda-video-pilipino-expert-mocks-china/

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS (2019-2023)

Pics Courtesy Internet

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), recently published its fact sheet about trends in international arms transfer covering the last five-year period i.e. 2014-23 and compared it with data from the previous five years of 2014-18. The gist of it is as follows:-

 

The global volume of international arms transfers decreased marginally, by 3.3 per cent.

 

Imports of major arms by states in Europe increased by 94 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

There were overall decreases in arms transfers to all other regions, but states in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East continued to import arms in much larger volumes than those in Europe.

 

Nine of the 10 biggest arms importers in 2019–23, including the top 3 of India, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were in Asia and Oceania or the Middle East.

 

Ukraine became the fourth biggest arms importer globally after it received transfers of major arms from over 30 states in 2022–23.

 

Arms exports by the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, rose by 17 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while those by Russia fell by more than half (–53 per cent).

 

France’s arms exports grew by 47 per cent and it moved just ahead of Russia to become the world’s second-largest arms supplier.

 

 

THE EXPORTERS (2019–23)

 

SIPRI has identified 66 states as exporters of major arms in 2019–23.

 

The five largest exporters of arms during that period—the USA, France, Russia, China and Germany—accounted for 75 per cent of all arms exports.

 

US and French arms exports rose between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while Russian, Chinese and German arms exports fell.

 

The USA and states in Western Europe together accounted for 72 per cent of all arms exports in 2019–23, compared with 62 per cent in 2014–18.

 

USA

 

The USA’s arms exports grew by 17 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and its share of total global arms exports rose from 34 per cent to 42 per cent.

 

The USA delivered major arms to 107 states in 2019–23, which was more than the next two biggest exporters combined.

 

The volume of arms exported by the USA in 2019–23 was 282 per cent higher than that of France, the second biggest arms exporter globally.

 

In 2019–23 the largest share of US arms exports went to states in the Middle East (38 per cent).

 

US arms exports to states in Asia and Oceania increased by 14 per cent overall between 2014–18 and 2019–23, with the region account- ing for 31 per cent of all US arms exports in 2019–23.

 

Three states in the region were among the 10 largest recipients of US arms in 2019–23: Japan accounted for 9.5 per cent of all US arms exports, Australia for 7.1 per cent and South Korea for 5.3 per cent.

 

A total of 28 per cent of US arms exports went to states in Europe in 2019–23, which was up from 11 per cent in 2014–18. US arms exports to the region increased by just over 200 per cent between the two periods. Ukraine accounted for 4.7 per cent of all US arms exports and 17 per cent of those to Europe.

 

Deliveries of combat aircraft typically make up a significant part of the USA’s total arms exports. It delivered 420 combat aircraft in 2019–23. Of these, 249 were advanced F-35 aircraft, which were delivered to a total of 10 states and accounted for 24 per cent of all US arms exports. The USA has many pending arms export deliveries, including a total of 1071 combat aircraft, of which 785 are F-35s.

 

France

 

France narrowly overtook Russia to become the world’s second largest exporter of major arms in 2019–23.

 

France delivered major arms to 64 states in 2019–23, but India was by far the largest recipient, accounting for 29 per cent of French arms exports.

 

The bulk of France’s arms exports in 2019–23 went to states in Asia and Oceania (42 per cent of arms exports) and the Middle East (34 per cent).

 

France has been trying to expand its arms sales to other European states for many years; however, its exports to European states in 2019–23 accounted for only 9.1 per cent of its total arms exports. More than half of its European arms exports (53 per cent) went to Greece, mostly made up of transfers of 17 Rafale combat aircraft.

 

A sharp rise in deliveries of Rafale combat aircraft accounted for most of the growth in French arms exports in 2019–23. France exported 23 Rafales in 2014–18. This increased to 94 in 2019–23, representing just under one third (31 per cent) of French arms exports in the period. A further 193 Rafales were on order for export as at the end of 2023. However, most of the aircraft France has already delivered (96 out of 117) and those on order (178 out of 193) are for states outside Europe—Egypt, India, Indonesia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

 

This highlights the challenge France still faces in selling its major arms to European states, especially in the context of the strong competition from the USA. Notably, 8 out of the 10 European states that preselected or ordered combat aircraft in 2019–23 opted for US F-16s or F-35s, with only Croatia and Greece opting for the Rafale.

 

Russia

 

Russia’s arms exports fell by 53 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and it accounted for 11 per cent of total global arms exports. It delivered major arms to 41 states in 2019–23.

 

In 2019 the annual volume of Russian arms exports was at a similar level to that in each of the preceding 20 years. However, the export volumes in 2020, 2021 and 2022 were at much lower levels than in 2019, and in 2023 the volume was 52 per cent lower than in 2022. Another indication of the decline of Russia as a global supplier of arms is that whereas 31 states received major arms from Russia in 2019, only 14 did in 2022 and that number fell to 12 in 2023.

 

States in Asia and Oceania received 68 per cent of total Russian arms exports in 2019–23, while Middle Eastern and African states received 13 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

 

Just under two-thirds of Russian arms exports went to three states in 2019–23: India (34 per cent), China (21 per cent) and Egypt (7.5 per cent).

 

India was also the largest recipient of Russian arms in 2014–18, but exports to India decreased by 34 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while exports to China decreased by 39 per cent and to Egypt by 54 per cent.

 

Algeria and Vietnam were the third and fourth largest recipients of Russian arms in 2014–18; however, exports to Algeria (–83 per cent) and Vietnam (–91 per cent) dropped significantly between the two periods.

 

The low volume of pending deliveries of major arms from Russia suggests that Russian arms exports are likely to remain well below the level reached in 2014–18, for at least the short term.

 

China

 

China accounted for 5.8 per cent of total global arms exports in 2019–23. Its arms exports decreased by 5.3 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

The bulk of Chinese arms exports (85 per cent) went to states in Asia and Oceania, followed by states in Africa (9.9 per cent). China delivered major arms to 40 states in 2019–23, but well over half of its arms exports (61 per cent) went to just one state—Pakistan.

 

Others

      • Germany. Arms exports by Germany made up 5.6 per cent of the global total in 2019–23. They were 14 per cent lower than in 2014–18. States in the Middle East received the largest share of all German arms exports in 2019–23 (39 per cent), followed by states in Asia and Oceania (28 per cent) and Europe (25 per cent).

 

      • Italy accounted for 4.3 per cent of the world’s arms exports in 2019–23. Its arms exports were 86 per cent higher in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. A total of 71 per cent of Italian arms exports went to the Middle East.

 

      • The 4 other suppliers making up the top 10 arms exporters in 2019–23 were the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel and South Korea. Arms exports by the UK (–14 per cent), Spain (–3.3 per cent) and Israel (–25 per cent) all decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while arms exports by South Korea increased by 12 per cent.

 

THE IMPORTERS (2019–23)

 

 

SIPRI has identified 170 states as importers of major arms in 2019–23. The top five arms importers—India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine and Pakistan— received 35 per cent of all arms imports in the period.

 

States in Asia and Oceania accounted for 37 per cent of all arms imports in 2019–23, followed by states in the Middle East (30 per cent), Europe (21 per cent), the Americas (5.7 per cent) and Africa (4.3 per cent).

 

Asia and Oceania

 

Arms imports by states in Asia and Oceania decreased by 12 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, mainly because of a sharp drop in Chinese arms imports.

 

However, it remained the region with the highest volume of arms imports and 6 of the world’s 10 largest arms importers in 2019–23 were in Asia and Oceania: India, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, South Korea and China.

 

The main suppliers to the region were the USA, with a 34 per cent share of regional imports, Russia (19 per cent) and China (13 per cent).

 

India

 

India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its arms imports.

 

India’s arms imports increased by 4.7 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8 per cent share of all arms imports.

 

Russia remained India’s main supplier, but its share of Indian arms imports has shrunk from 76 per cent in 2009–13 to 58 per cent in 2014–18 and then to 36 per cent in 2019–23.

 

India has instead looked to Western suppliers, most notably France and the USA, and its own arms industry to meet its demand for major arms. This shift is also visible in India’s new orders, many of which are placed with Western suppliers, and its arms procurement plans, which seemingly do not include any Russian options.

 

Pakistan. Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 43 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and accounted for 4.3 per cent of the world total, making it the fifth largest arms importer globally. Pakistan continued to strengthen its arms procurement relations with China: 82 per cent of its arms imports came from China in 2019–23, as against 69 per cent in 2014–18, and 51 per cent in 2009–13.

 

Africa

 

Imports of major arms by African states fell by 52 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, which was mainly due to decreases in the arms imports of the two largest importers in the region, Algeria (–77 per cent) and Morocco (–46 per cent).

 

The main suppliers to Africa in 2019–23 were Russia, accounting for 24 per cent of African imports of major arms, the USA (16 per cent), China (13 per cent) and France (10 per cent).

 

East Asia, Oceania and South East Asia

 

Arms imports by states in East Asia (–6.1 per cent), Oceania (–10 per cent) and South East Asia (–43 per cent) decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

China.  China’s arms imports fell by 44 per cent and accounted for 2.9 per cent of the global total in 2019–23. Most Chinese arms imports (77 per cent) came from Russia. The drop in Chinese imports is due to China’s growing ability to design and produce its own major arms. Its arms imports will probably decrease further as it develops this capacity.

 

Japan and South Korea are expanding their military capabilities, mainly because of tensions with China and North Korea. Japan (+155 per cent) and South Korea (+6.5 per cent) increased their arms imports between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The USA is the main supplier to both states, accounting for 97 per cent of Japan’s arms imports and 72 per cent of South Korea’s. The two states are investing heavily in long-range strike capabilities. The USA supplied 29 combat aircraft to Japan and 34 to South Korea in 2019–23. Japan also ordered 400 long-range land-attack missiles from the USA in 2023 (see box 2). These will, for the first time, give Japan the capability to reach targets deep inside China or North Korea.

 

Taiwan’s arms imports dropped by 69 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 despite heightened tensions with China. However, major deliveries are planned to take place over the next five years, including deliveries of 66 combat aircraft, 108 tanks and 460 anti-ship missiles. All these planned deliveries are from the USA, which supplied over 99 per cent of Taiwanese arms imports in 2019–23.

 

Australia was the eighth largest arms importer in 2019–23 after its arms imports dropped by 21 per cent. However, in 2023 it reached an agreement with the UK and the USA to import at least six nuclear-powered submarines.

 

Arms imports by South East Asian states fell by 43 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. However, tensions, mainly with China, continue to drive arms acquisitions by many states in the subregion. For example, arms imports by the Philippines (+105 per cent) and by Singapore (+17 per cent) increased between the two periods. In addition, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

 

Europe

 

Arms imports by states in Europe were 94 per cent higher in 2019–23 than in 2014–18.

 

Ukraine received 23 per cent of the region’s arms imports in 2019–23. It was, by far, the largest arms importer in Europe and the fourth largest in the world.

 

The UK, which accounted for 11 per cent of European arms imports, and the Netherlands (9.0 per cent) were the next biggest arms importers in the region.

 

A total of 55 per cent of European arms imports came from the USA in 2019–23, compared with 35 per cent in 2014–18. The next largest suppliers to the region were Germany and France, which accounted for 6.4 per cent and 4.6 per cent of European arms imports respectively.

 

West and Central European States. Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 increased the demand for arms in West and Central European states. For example, by the end of 2023, these states had a total of 791 combat aircraft and combat helicopters on order for import. After it launched the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia began a campaign of missile attacks against Ukraine. In response, many West and Central European states supplied air defence systems to Ukraine and several placed new import orders for them or accelerated existing procurement processes. In 2023 Poland ordered 12 air defence systems from the USA, and Germany ordered a single but particularly high-value system from Israel. In 2022–23 Austria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia ordered air defence systems from Germany, while Finland and Slovakia ordered Israeli systems, and Lithuania and the Netherlands ordered Norwegian systems. In addition, some states ordered missiles for domestically produced systems or to arm newly acquired imports or their existing systems. For example, in 2023 Poland and Norway ordered missiles from the UK and the USA, respectively, for their new systems, while Germany ordered 500 missiles and Romania 200, all from the USA, for their existing systems.

 

The Middle East. Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 12 per cent lower in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. Three of the top 10 arms importers in 2019–23 were in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The USA accounted for 52 per cent of Middle Eastern arms imports. The next biggest suppliers were France (12 per cent), Italy (10 per cent) and Germany (7.1 per cent).

 

The Gulf Region. Saudi Arabia was the world’s second-largest arms importer in 2019–23, with an 8.4 per cent share of all arms imports. Its arms imports fell by 28 per cent after peaking at their highest point ever in 2014–18. The USA supplied 75 per cent of Saudi Arabian arms imports in 2019–23, which included the delivery of 67 combat aircraft and hundreds of land-attack missiles.

 

Qatar was the third largest arms importer in the world, with a global share of 7.6 per cent, as its arms imports increased by 396 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. Its main suppliers in 2019–23 were the USA, which accounted for 45 per cent of Qatari arms imports, France (25 per cent) and Italy (15 per cent). Qatar’s arms imports in the period included 36 combat aircraft from France, 36 from the USA and 25 from the UK, as well as 4 frigates from Italy. Iran’s arms imports have been at a very low level relative to those of other arms importers in the Gulf region since around 1993. In 2023 Iran placed by far its largest import order for major arms in 20 years, for 24 combat aircraft from Russia.

 

IsraelBetween 2014–18 and 2019–23, arms imports by Israel rose marginally (+5.1 per cent). The USA accounted for 69 per cent and Germany for 30 per cent of Israeli arms imports. Imported weapons, in particular combat aircraft received from the USA over several decades, have played a major role in Israel’s military actions against Hamas and Hezbollah. At the end of 2023 the USA rapidly delivered thousands of guided bombs and missiles to Israel, but the total volume of Israeli arms imports from the USA in 2023 was almost the same as in 2022. By the end of 2023, pending deliveries of major arms to Israel included 61 combat aircraft from the USA and 4 submarines from Germany.

 

Arms imports and the war in Ukraine

 

At least 30 states supplied major arms to Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, mostly as military aid, meaning that Ukraine was by some distance the world’s largest arms importer in the year 2023.

 

The USA supplied 39 per cent of Ukrainian arms imports in 2019–23, followed by Germany (14 per cent) and Poland (13 per cent).

 

To broaden Ukraine’s military capabilities, suppliers began to deliver long-range systems in 2023. For example, Poland and Slovakia donated 27 surplus combat aircraft, and France and the UK supplied missiles with a range of 300 kilometres. During the year, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway also started to prepare for the delivery of over 50 surplus combat aircraft.

 

Russia relies primarily on its industry for its major arms. However, in 2022–23 it imported flying bombs from Iran and ballistic missiles from North Korea, the latter in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on North Korea.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.