483: Ritu’s Column: When Eagles Kept Falcons at Bay

 

 

 

Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.  

 

Her article on Kargil Operations (Op Safed Sagar)  was published on 01 Jun 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.

 

(Besides the two quotes, the views of the author are her own)

 

When Eagles Kept Falcons At Bay – How IAF’s MiG-29 Fighters Triumphed Pakistan’s F-16s At 18,000 Feet

 

By Ritu Sharma – 01 Jun 2024

 

On May 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which saw the deployment of air power at 18,000 feet. As the intruders, backed by the Pakistan Army, entrenched themselves on the treacherous heights of the Kargil sector, the IAF deployed its entire fleet, and the pounding continued for the next 60 days.

 

On May 21, the IAF launched a Canberra PR57 to conduct a reconnaissance of the Kargil area to assess the extent of intrusion. The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet, just two miles from the LoC, and was just 4,000 feet above the highest Himalayan points. The Canberra sustained a hit on its right engine by what was later determined to have been a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. This called for a change in tactics by the IAF.

 

The Indian government had given the green light for the use of air power, albeit with one caveat – the Indian fighter jets were not allowed to cross the border with Pakistan. India began the air bombing on May 26 with MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fighters carrying out six attacks against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes.

 

On the second day, the force lost two fighter jets—a MiG-27 and a MiG-21. The Pakistan-backed insurgents were using Stinger, a Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) that operates as an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM). The IAF MiG-21 piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, tasked with photo reconnaissance during the Kargil conflict, was shot down by ground-fired missiles over Batalik along the Line of Control in Ladakh. He ejected in time but parachuted down into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was later executed by the Pakistan forces in contravention of the Geneva Convention. On the third day of air operations, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed again by an enemy shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile while conducting a low-level attack. After this, the IAF stopped using all slow-moving air assets in the conflict.

 

India had pressed its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000s into the attack of the enemy positions within a small target area of just 5-12 km from the Line of Control (LoC). These fighters flew at 30,000 feet to avoid Pakistan missiles. The Pakistan and Indian Air Forces did not have dogfights. But, the Indian MiG-29s called ‘Baaz’ (or Eagle) did have whoever blinks first games with Pakistan’s F-16 ‘Falcons.’

 

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR Air-to-Air missiles could lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps,” a Strategy Page report said in the aftermath of the conflict. During the Kargil War, the PAF’s director of operations later reported isolated instances of IAF and PAF fighters locking on to each other with their onboard fire control radars.

 

The IAF pilots carried out 6,500 sorties, including strikes, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation, and logistic support. In a 2012 report by Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled “Airpower at 18,000 feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War” explained how the IAF pummelled the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were underway in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role.”

 

The result was that PAF F-16s maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the border. The report quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence on mounting CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that we were ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.” Then IAF Chief AY Tipnis later recalled that he had “authorised the escorting fighter pilots to chase away Pakistani aircraft further back across the LoC.”

 

 

Talking to the EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) said: “Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.” “The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike,” Khosla added.

 

MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter jets had to manually dive to bomb the targets as they lacked modern equipment to locate them. However, this tactic did not work well in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. Hence, the IAF introduced the French Mirage 2000H equipped with day—and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods. On June 24, the IAF’s two Mirage 2000Hs dropped the first-ever laser-guided bombs of the force in a combat mission and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.

 

 

 

Air Marshal Khosla said: “Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).” However, he adds, “helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in confined and contested air space”. This holds even in today’s battleground. Air Marshal Khosla underscores that airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges during the Kargil conflict were manifold, including the high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, and self-imposed restrictions like not crossing the border.

 

The IAF’s MiG-21s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots navigated with handheld GPS gadgets. The Indian Air Force integrated the 1000-kg bombs with laser-guided weapon pods. The IAF selected weapon impact points that would snowball into landslides or avalanches.

 

The IAF also deployed its ‘Super Spy’ MiG-25 Foxbat for reconnaissance missions. With an operational flight of over 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, the fighter jet had regularly flown reconnaissance missions. Such was the clarity of the camera fitted in the belly of the aircraft, which allowed it to click photos of humans on a Pakistani tarmac. The Foxbat would create a sonic boom and escape before PAF could scramble its interceptors. In 1999, however, its mission parameters were different—it was to fly low and slow to map the targets on the Pakistani side for the Mirage-2000s bombing. The aircraft flew at a lower height, which was never envisaged, and there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) laid down. Also, it needed to maintain a velocity and height ratio for the camera to click clear photographs. At the given height, the aircraft was well beyond the range of the surface-to-air missiles, but the only threat was from aerial interception. To overcome that, the aircraft was escorted by Mirage-2000s during the mission.

 

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482: Land Back ASAP

 

It was a clear and sunny morning. I was flying at  a low level over the sea, deep inside on the eastern seaboard. Suddenly, the R/T silence was broken (a rare phenomenon) by the Navy ships in the area. The message was, “Dragon Leader, land back ASAP (as soon as possible).”

 

This was my third tenure in the squadron, and I had just taken over the command of the squadron. I had barely completed my revalidation and had taken the squadron to participate in a maritime exercise.

 

The exercise was aborted, and I led my formation back to the operating Navy base, wondering about possible reasons. On contacting the base on R/T, I was told that the Station Commander would like to see you in his office immediately. Thousand of thoughts crossed the mind as to what could be the reason of such an unusual and urgent recall.

 

Station Commander was straight to the point and very cryptic “Orders have been received to for you to take the squadron back to the parent base”.  I could not get any more information out of him. The exercise was called off and the fighters ferried back to base that evening. Technical manpower and the ground equipment was left behind awaiting airlift back.

 

On reaching the base, we came to know that something was cooking on the northern front. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) told us to ferry out the very next day to our Op Location (location earmarked for operations during hostilities. Next day we moved to the op location and were deployed there for the next  60 days.

 

This was for the Kargil war – Operation Safed Sagar.

 

Memories of those 60 days is still vividly clear even after 25 years. They came flooding back on being asked to provide inputs about the events.

 

Queries and brief Inputs

 

  1. What was the thought process in deploying Airpower in the Kargil War?

 

    • Initially, the Army wanted attack/armed helicopters from IAF to be used against the infiltrators. However, the IAF, recognising the gravity of the situation, insisted on a more strategic approach.

 

    • The IAF, fully committed to the cause, went on operational alert and initiated reconnaissance missions and support to the army for mobility and sustenance.

 

    • The then Air Chief (Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis) insisted on political authorisation for combat airpower employment. Some wrongly perceived this as the IAF’s reluctance to support the Army.

 

    • Reasons/Thought Process:- Attack helicopters (Mi-35) could not operate at those heights, and armed helicopters (Mi-17) with unguided rockets would be highly vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft weapons (a Lesson again reiterated by the Russia-Ukraine war). The IAF would need to be much more holistically involved. A political authorisation is necessary to apply combat airpower due to potential consequences arising from employment on our territory, chances of collateral damage, and escalation potential.

 

    • The Cabinet Committee on Security substantiated the IAF’s rightness of thought process. It initially (18 May 99) denied the use of offensive airpower.

 

    • The final clearance came later, on 24-25 May 99, as the magnitude of intrusion became clearer. The clearance for combat airpower application was granted with the restriction of not crossing the LoC.

 

  1. Was the Air Force able to achieve its laid-down objectives?

 

    • The IAF, showcasing its adaptability and readiness, rapidly adapted to the air campaign’s unique operational challenges and flew day and night during Operation “Safed Sagar.”

 

    • The use of air power made an enormous difference in ground operations. The effective application of air power saved our casualties and compressed the time frame needed to achieve our objective of regaining control of our territory.

 

    • The Indian Air Force achieved its primary objective of degrading the enemy’s offensive capabilities, softening its defence and denying essential supplies.

 

    • In the words of Gen VP Malik, the then Army Chief:-

“The success in the war could not have been achieved but for the IAF having jointly performed with valour and commitment in complete coordination. Use of the IAF altered the dynamics of the war in our favour.”

 

  1. Which all aircraft took part in the deployment?

 

    • The entire Indian Air Force was activated and placed on operational alert within a few hours, and offensive air operations were offered to commence within six hours of authorisation.

 

    • Canberra and Mig-25 aircraft were used for aerial reconnaissance. Mig-23, Mig-27, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000 aircraft undertook offensive strike operations. Mig-21 and Mig-29 aircraft undertook air defence and dominance missions.

 

    • Fixed-wing transport and helicopters were used for large-scale troop movement, sustenance, supply missions, casualty evacuations, etc.

 

  1. The Mig series aircraft, especially Mig-29s, have received praise for keeping PAF’s F-16s at bay. Could you talk about it?

 

    • Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.

 

    • The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike.

 

  1. What were the important lessons for the IAF from the Kargil War?

 

    • Using air power quickens the process of achieving objectives while reducing costs due to a reduction in men and material casualties.

 

    • Restrictions (Not to cross LoC) on airpower application reduce its effectiveness.

 

    • Airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges included high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, self-imposed restrictions, etc.

 

    • IAF needs to improve its high-altitude area fighting capability (It has come a long way since then).

 

    • Stand-off and precision capabilities are essential.

 

    • Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).

 

    • Helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in contested air space.

 

Lessons learnt from the operation Safed Sagar were valuable and helped in charting the future trajectory of the IAF capability building. IAF has come a long way, but still has a long way to go, considering the prevailing threat situation

 

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471: AIRPOWER IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Article Published in “Destination India” May 2024

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Airpower is a decisive factor and a game-changer in the art of warfare. The application of airpower, although it looks simple is a complex process. During a war, the major roles of airpower include shaping the environment, offensive force application, and synergising operations with surface forces. It also plays a vital role during peace and the transition from peace to war. Airpower in the Indian context has evolved since its genesis, reflecting changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. Some key aspects of the evolutionary process including the past, present and future are deliberated in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

Genesis & Early Years. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force of the Royal Air Force on 8 Oct 1932, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The then Royal IAF (RIAF) grew in size during World War II to ten squadrons. In the early years of the IAF, the primary focus was on providing air support to British and Commonwealth ground forces. During World War II, the IAF played a significant role in the Burma campaign in halting the advance of the Japanese army, by providing air cover and support for ground troops. IAF evolved initially in a tactical role primarily to support surface and maritime wars. Indian Air Force (IAF) of independent India came into being with meagre resources of seven squadrons (six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron).

 

Participation in the Wars. Post-Independence Four wars took place in the first two and half decades. Almost immediately after Independence, India, and Pakistan clashed over the future of Kashmir. IAF carried out air operations including airlift of troops and supplies, photo-reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and interdiction. The air power usage was tactical and reactionary to the emerging situations. In the 1962 War with China, despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the Indian Air Force was not used. There was a general reluctance to use offensive air power due to the perceived fear of escalation of conflict. In the 1965 war with Pakistan, air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. IAF gave a good account in the skies and in support of surface forces, to help them stop the Pakistani offensive. In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, IAF actively engaged the enemy air force achieving complete air superiority over the eastern wing of Pakistan. IAF carried out all air campaigns in parallel, including close air support and air cover to the Indian Army, attacks against Pakistani Air Force bases, assistance to the Indian Navy in maritime operations, offensive attacks on enemy armour, and strategic bombing. IAF played a pivotal role in the victory, leading to the liberation of Bangladesh. Kargil Operations in 1999, demonstrated once again the impact of air power in achieving objectives. Air power was employed in a very innovative way at high altitudes. A game-changer shift took place on 26 February 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out deep strikes against terrorist targets in Pakistan, beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The myth about the use of air power being escalatory in nature was broken.

 

Power Projection Abroad. During 1987-90 IAF was involved with operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives. IAF established an “air bridge” between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Although combat aircraft were not used, IAF helicopters provided fire support for the army. In 1988, IAF undertook Operation Cactus, wherein, it flew at least a battalion of paratroopers, more than 1000 Miles away to Maldives when rebels attempted to overthrow the government. In these operations, the IAF demonstrated its ability to project forces on short notice.

 

Growth, Modernisation and Expansion. The decade of the 1950s saw the induction of aircraft and support systems, both in quantity and quality, into the IAF.  During this period, the IAF acquired its first jet fighters and transport aircraft and India began to develop its own indigenous aircraft and weapons systems. IAF shifted its focus to defending India’s borders and air space, and its capabilities started developing beyond the limited scope of the support role. In the period from 1980 to 2000, the IAF modernised itself with advanced aircraft, weapons, and sensors, and expanded its capabilities to include strategic airlift.

 

Current Modernisation. The present decade is witnessing an all-around capability development of IAF with new platforms, weapons and systems. This is being spurred by the combination of rapid capability enhancement and the belligerent attitude of our adversaries. A Multi-pronged approach is being adopted to deal with the current and future challenges. Self-reliance is being encouraged and supported while maintaining the minimum deterrence value, by procurement from abroad. The inventory is also being diversified with inductions from the USA, France and Israel, besides Russia. India has become the largest defence market for the USA with the recent inductions of C-17 aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft, P-8i maritime recce aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, and Chinook heavy lift aircraft, UAVs and weapons. Besides these other two major inductions are the S-400 AD system from Russia and the Rafale fighter aircraft from France.

 

Strategic Transformation. Originally the IAF had formed purely for the requirements of the British interests of its Empire, its roles and responsibilities were limited to tactical applications of air power. Post-independence also the application of air power continued to remain tactical. It was only in 1971 that the IAF carried out strategic effect-based operations with air campaigns in parallel. In the first decade of this century, the IAF inducted airborne early warning, and aerial refuelling capability leading to an increase in strategic reach along with conventional deterrence. The IAF started transforming from a tactical air power to a strategic one to become a multi-spectrum air force. The capability development is being matched with doctrinal adaptation.

 

Doctrinal Adaptation. IAF formally formulated and published its first doctrine in 1995. This was the basic doctrine covering characteristics of air power, assets, tasks, and campaigns, the role of technology, combat support operations, force multipliers and the importance of a network-centric environment. The doctrine was reviewed in 2012, and this version went on to establish a connection between airpower and national security. It brought out the greater role of air power in the full spectrum of nation-building, national security, and aerial diplomacy. IT included contribution to sub-conventional operations, the enabling characteristics of air power such as air mobility, helicopter support for Special Forces operations, casualty evacuation, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) etc. The latest version published in 2022, proposes a larger regional role for IAF, beyond territorial defence. It elucidates a peacetime strategy constituting sovereignty protection, deterrence, air diplomacy, and nation-building, and a No War, No Peace (NWNP) strategy, based on kinetic as well as non-kinetic responses. It advocates the shift from air power to aerospace power and stresses greater space exploitation for the achievement of national objectives. The doctrine also elaborates on multi-domain operations, and the importance of battle-space transparency, combat networking, cyber and information warfare, electronic warfare, techno-logistics, administration and human resource management, and training.

 

Future Focus / Trajectory

 

Investment in Technology.  Air Force is a technology-intensive service and converting technology into capability is a time-consuming process. To stay on top of the challenges, there is a need to invest in emerging technologies and ideate about their utilisation in warfare. Some of the future technologies that are impacting the air war include Quantum computing, Hypersonic weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence., Robotics, Nanotechnology, Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology, Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems etc.

 

Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their utilisation is spread across the entire spectrum of threats ranging from sub-conventional, and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in drones and anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both man and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the advantages of both and develop networked systems, wherein, both can work in an integrated manner. Research is going on in many countries on the “Loyal wingman” concept. HAL in India is also working on the CATS (Combat Air Team System) program on similar lines.

 

Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to have a significant impact on air strategy. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required which can withstand the destructive power of these weapons.

 

New Domains of Warfare. The domains like cyber, space, electronics and information are coming into the influence of warfare. China’s formation of a Joint Strategic Support Force (JSSF) as a separate service, with defensive and offensive capabilities, in above mentioned four domains, indicates future challenges, that require reorientation to deal with them.

 

Grey Zone Operations.  Grey zone operations are operations in the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.  These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both the adversaries of India are resorting to these operations regularly. Air power besides offensive use can also be effectively utilised in many ways, in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Various aspects of grey zone operations need to be deliberated from the point of view of airpower involvement. A certain amount of reorientation would be required in the application of airpower in these grey zone situations supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

 

Space-Based Capabilities.  The term airpower has changed to aerospace power with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the domain of space. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. In Grey zone warfare the involvement of space-based equipment and systems is on an even larger scale. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly important in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for offensive and defensive operations.

 

Self-Reliance, Indigenisation and Make in India. Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an important role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and also aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The important thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance the minimum level of deterrence capability needs to be maintained at all times. Also, the balance between quality and quantity needs to be ensured.

 

The IAF should continue to prioritise modernisation efforts, including the acquisition of advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct a wide range of operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. The IAF should work closely with the surface forces to develop joint operations capabilities, with emphasis on joint conceptualisation, planning, command and control systems, and integrated training exercises. The IAF should continue to be proactive in its role of providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both domestically and internationally. Overall, the IAF should strive to maintain a balance between traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to meet its primary mission of defending India’s air space and national security interests, while also contributing to the broader role of nation-building, regional stability and humanitarian assistance.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

  1. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/closing-gap-doctrinal-capability-appraisal-iaf-plaaf/
  2. https://airpowerasia.com/2020/06/15/air-power-transformational-challenges-india/
  3. Aerospace strategy: An idea whose time has come. By Air Mshl D Choudhury, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd).
  4. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-01_Issue-1/04-F-Goulter-Pant.pdf
  5. https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf
  6. Basic Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  7. https://theprint.in/opinion/iaf-doctrine-leverages-air-power-it-also-has-the-first-no-war-no-peace-strategy/1379156/
  8. https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Bhashyam-Kasturi.pdf
  9. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

 

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