Category: Pakistan

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INDIAN AIR FORCE CHALLENGES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORY

 

 

My Article published in the News Analytics Journal Jul 2024.

 

 

India faces two nuclear-powered inimical neighbours. China is emerging as a major regional power with the aspiration to be a global power, and her desire to dominate Asia and, finally, the world has implications for India. India’s relations with China have changed from cooperative to competitive to combative. China sees India as a competitor and would like to keep India off-balance. On the other hand, Pakistan remains a security threat and continues to use non-state actors to maintain a situation of unrest. Asymmetric warfare will remain an instrument of its state policy. These two countries have a close and longstanding strategic partnership that includes cooperation even in areas of defence and security. Pakistan openly boasts of collusive support from China in case of a war with India. Due to its unique geographical location and geopolitical environment, India faces a collusive threat with significant chances of military conflict. Therefore, her national interest dictates that the country be able to deter her inimical neighbours from any military misadventure, either singly or collusively.

 

China’s warfare strategy focuses on developing a modern and capable force to support its national security interests and regional/global ambitions. The Chinese forces are undergoing significant modernisation and expansion at a rapid pace, with particular emphasis on developing advanced technologies and capabilities. China’s investment and progress in space-based systems, quantum technology, unmanned platforms, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, etc., will give it surveillance and precision strike capability with lightning speeds.

 

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action.  The Indian Air Force (IAF), like air power in the last century, has evolved to reflect changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. However, it must continuously adapt to the existing and changing environment to build focused capabilities. The IAF will have to create deterrence and be able to dominate the air. The IAF must remain adaptive and agile to win wars in a network-centric battlefield with conflicts varying across the complete threat spectrum. Identifying focus areas and developing assets, platforms, facilitators, and infrastructure is essential. While several issues are vital requirements, the main pillars are trained manpower, combat leadership, combat sustenance resources, and sound strategy. The IAF must focus on capability building and adopt a multidisciplinary and integrated war-fighting approach.

 

 

The IAF should expand its investments in advanced munitions, combat support aircraft, electronic warfare, and physical infrastructure. Boosting the IAF’s fighter force strength should be a top priority, maintaining a balance between quantity and quality. An adequate number of combat support platforms should follow. Air Defence has evolved from point defence to offensive defence, with the spectrum expanding to cater for sub-conventional threats to long-range hypersonic weapons. Appropriate weapons, systems, and networks need to be added. The weapon list should provide various options, including high-tech, long-range smart weapon systems with increased accuracy and assurance. Air combat support and protective infrastructure are essential. The IAF’s networking capability has evolved well and is applied to air defence, air ops planning, maintenance, and logistics functions. However, there is still room for further progress and integration of new inductions.

 

The Indian Air Force, as a technology-intensive service, must continuously incorporate modern, cutting-edge equipment and technology. Technology’s profound influence on air strategy is a significant driver of innovation and evolution. Investing in emerging technologies is necessary and exciting, opening up new possibilities. Future technologies impacting the air war, such as Quantum computing, Hypersonic weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, Nanotechnology, Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology, and Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems, are on the horizon. Impetus is also required for some of the existing aviation-related programs like fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers,  stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems and long-range vectors.

 

A strategic focus is required for a medium-term and long-term technology plan supported by adequate budget allocation. A suitable ecosystem needs to be developed to harness these dual-use technologies. IAF must define a defence science and technology strategy with a vision to harness technology and convert it into decisive capability. The following focus areas are advocated, with a particular emphasis on Indigenous defence production capability:-

 

    • Situational Awareness & Decision Making. One effect of advanced technology on air warfare is the increased pace and intensity of air operations. In such a scenario, the decision-making process must quickly keep up with the OODA cycle. The three most important contributing factors are high situational awareness, a robust and fast network system for information sharing, and AI-based decision-support systems.

 

    • Space-Based Capabilities. The term airpower has changed to aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. The involvement of space-based equipment and systems is even more significant in Grey zone warfare. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly crucial in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for crucial offensive and defensive operations.

 

    • Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to impact air strategy significantly. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required to withstand these weapons’ destructive power.

 

    • Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their use is spread across the entire spectrum of threats, ranging from sub-conventional and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

    • Sixth Generation Aircraft. Sixth-generation aircraft are still in the development phase; however, based on current trends in air technology, sixth-generation aircraft will likely have several key features that will shape air strategy in the future. They are likely to have increased automation with advanced AI and machine learning algorithms that will enable autonomous decision-making and allow them to adapt to changing situations quickly. They would also have enhanced stealth capabilities, making them virtually invisible to radar and other detection systems. Integrated sensor systems in these aircraft will provide comprehensive situational awareness and the ability to engage targets with great precision. Sixth-generation aircraft are expected to significantly impact air strategy in the future, with their advanced capabilities enabling air forces to operate with greater autonomy and strike enemy targets with unprecedented precision and speed. However, as with any new technology, challenges may be associated with introducing sixth-generation aircraft, including developing new tactics, training programs, and support infrastructure to realise their full potential.

 

    • Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both piloted and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the benefits of both and develop networked systems wherein both can work in an integrated manner. Research is being done in many countries on the “loyal wingman” concept.

 

Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability, and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an essential role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The critical thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance, the minimum level of deterrence capability must always be maintained.

 

 

Perceived threats and challenges to national security, calling for immediate and substantial measures to enhance IAF’s war-fighting capacity and capability. Capability building entails a long gestation period. The IAF should continue prioritising modernisation efforts, including acquiring advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct various operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. Operational preparedness includes reviewing doctrines, strategy and tactics, organisational structures, human resource adaptation, training, and maintenance and logistics concepts.

 

IAF must think differently to tackle various asymmetric and non-traditional security threats. This would require more innovative, out-of-the-box solutions that leverage the prevalent technology. Overall, the IAF should strive to balance traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to defend India’s air space and national security interests while contributing to the broader role of nation-building, regional stability and humanitarian assistance.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References

  1. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Air Power Transformational Challenges India”, Air Power Asia.
  2. Basic Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  3. Ashley J Tellis, “Troubles They Come In Battalion”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
  4. Air Mshl Anil Chopra (Retd), “IAF modernisation challenges ahead”, South Asia defence and strategic review.
  5. Vivek Kapur, “IAF Equipment & Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats, 2032”, MPIDSA, 2014.
  6. “Interview with CAS and articles in IAF”, IAF anniversary issue of Chanakya Aerospace, defence and maritime review, 2018.
  7. Gp Capt AK Sachdeva(Retd), “Rebuilding the IAF fighter fleet”, SP’s Aviation issue 2, 2019.
  8. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “Indian Air Force at 86: options and challenges”, Vayu V/2018.
  9. Gp Capt J Noronha (Retd), “Strength lies in numbers: Rebuilding the combat fleet of IAF”, Indian Defence Review Oct-Dec 18.
  10. Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja, “IAF 2020 and beyond”, Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 17.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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Ritu’s Column: When Eagles Kept Falcons at Bay

 

 

 

Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.  

 

Her article on Kargil Operations (Op Safed Sagar)  was published on 01 Jun 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.

 

(Besides the two quotes, the views of the author are her own)

 

When Eagles Kept Falcons At Bay – How IAF’s MiG-29 Fighters Triumphed Pakistan’s F-16s At 18,000 Feet

 

By Ritu Sharma – 01 Jun 2024

 

On May 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which saw the deployment of air power at 18,000 feet. As the intruders, backed by the Pakistan Army, entrenched themselves on the treacherous heights of the Kargil sector, the IAF deployed its entire fleet, and the pounding continued for the next 60 days.

 

On May 21, the IAF launched a Canberra PR57 to conduct a reconnaissance of the Kargil area to assess the extent of intrusion. The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet, just two miles from the LoC, and was just 4,000 feet above the highest Himalayan points. The Canberra sustained a hit on its right engine by what was later determined to have been a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. This called for a change in tactics by the IAF.

 

The Indian government had given the green light for the use of air power, albeit with one caveat – the Indian fighter jets were not allowed to cross the border with Pakistan. India began the air bombing on May 26 with MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fighters carrying out six attacks against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes.

 

On the second day, the force lost two fighter jets—a MiG-27 and a MiG-21. The Pakistan-backed insurgents were using Stinger, a Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) that operates as an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM). The IAF MiG-21 piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, tasked with photo reconnaissance during the Kargil conflict, was shot down by ground-fired missiles over Batalik along the Line of Control in Ladakh. He ejected in time but parachuted down into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was later executed by the Pakistan forces in contravention of the Geneva Convention. On the third day of air operations, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed again by an enemy shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile while conducting a low-level attack. After this, the IAF stopped using all slow-moving air assets in the conflict.

 

India had pressed its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000s into the attack of the enemy positions within a small target area of just 5-12 km from the Line of Control (LoC). These fighters flew at 30,000 feet to avoid Pakistan missiles. The Pakistan and Indian Air Forces did not have dogfights. But, the Indian MiG-29s called ‘Baaz’ (or Eagle) did have whoever blinks first games with Pakistan’s F-16 ‘Falcons.’

 

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR Air-to-Air missiles could lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps,” a Strategy Page report said in the aftermath of the conflict. During the Kargil War, the PAF’s director of operations later reported isolated instances of IAF and PAF fighters locking on to each other with their onboard fire control radars.

 

The IAF pilots carried out 6,500 sorties, including strikes, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation, and logistic support. In a 2012 report by Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled “Airpower at 18,000 feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War” explained how the IAF pummelled the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were underway in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role.”

 

The result was that PAF F-16s maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the border. The report quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence on mounting CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that we were ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.” Then IAF Chief AY Tipnis later recalled that he had “authorised the escorting fighter pilots to chase away Pakistani aircraft further back across the LoC.”

 

 

Talking to the EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) said: “Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.” “The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike,” Khosla added.

 

MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter jets had to manually dive to bomb the targets as they lacked modern equipment to locate them. However, this tactic did not work well in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. Hence, the IAF introduced the French Mirage 2000H equipped with day—and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods. On June 24, the IAF’s two Mirage 2000Hs dropped the first-ever laser-guided bombs of the force in a combat mission and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.

 

 

 

Air Marshal Khosla said: “Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).” However, he adds, “helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in confined and contested air space”. This holds even in today’s battleground. Air Marshal Khosla underscores that airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges during the Kargil conflict were manifold, including the high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, and self-imposed restrictions like not crossing the border.

 

The IAF’s MiG-21s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots navigated with handheld GPS gadgets. The Indian Air Force integrated the 1000-kg bombs with laser-guided weapon pods. The IAF selected weapon impact points that would snowball into landslides or avalanches.

 

The IAF also deployed its ‘Super Spy’ MiG-25 Foxbat for reconnaissance missions. With an operational flight of over 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, the fighter jet had regularly flown reconnaissance missions. Such was the clarity of the camera fitted in the belly of the aircraft, which allowed it to click photos of humans on a Pakistani tarmac. The Foxbat would create a sonic boom and escape before PAF could scramble its interceptors. In 1999, however, its mission parameters were different—it was to fly low and slow to map the targets on the Pakistani side for the Mirage-2000s bombing. The aircraft flew at a lower height, which was never envisaged, and there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) laid down. Also, it needed to maintain a velocity and height ratio for the camera to click clear photographs. At the given height, the aircraft was well beyond the range of the surface-to-air missiles, but the only threat was from aerial interception. To overcome that, the aircraft was escorted by Mirage-2000s during the mission.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome. 

 

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Land Back ASAP

 

It was a clear and sunny morning. I was flying at  a low level over the sea, deep inside on the eastern seaboard. Suddenly, the R/T silence was broken (a rare phenomenon) by the Navy ships in the area. The message was, “Dragon Leader, land back ASAP (as soon as possible).”

 

This was my third tenure in the squadron, and I had just taken over the command of the squadron. I had barely completed my revalidation and had taken the squadron to participate in a maritime exercise.

 

The exercise was aborted, and I led my formation back to the operating Navy base, wondering about possible reasons. On contacting the base on R/T, I was told that the Station Commander would like to see you in his office immediately. Thousand of thoughts crossed the mind as to what could be the reason of such an unusual and urgent recall.

 

Station Commander was straight to the point and very cryptic “Orders have been received to for you to take the squadron back to the parent base”.  I could not get any more information out of him. The exercise was called off and the fighters ferried back to base that evening. Technical manpower and the ground equipment was left behind awaiting airlift back.

 

On reaching the base, we came to know that something was cooking on the northern front. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) told us to ferry out the very next day to our Op Location (location earmarked for operations during hostilities. Next day we moved to the op location and were deployed there for the next  60 days.

 

This was for the Kargil war – Operation Safed Sagar.

 

Memories of those 60 days is still vividly clear even after 25 years. They came flooding back on being asked to provide inputs about the events.

 

Queries and brief Inputs

 

  1. What was the thought process in deploying Airpower in the Kargil War?

 

    • Initially, the Army wanted attack/armed helicopters from IAF to be used against the infiltrators. However, the IAF, recognising the gravity of the situation, insisted on a more strategic approach.

 

    • The IAF, fully committed to the cause, went on operational alert and initiated reconnaissance missions and support to the army for mobility and sustenance.

 

    • The then Air Chief (Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis) insisted on political authorisation for combat airpower employment. Some wrongly perceived this as the IAF’s reluctance to support the Army.

 

    • Reasons/Thought Process:- Attack helicopters (Mi-35) could not operate at those heights, and armed helicopters (Mi-17) with unguided rockets would be highly vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft weapons (a Lesson again reiterated by the Russia-Ukraine war). The IAF would need to be much more holistically involved. A political authorisation is necessary to apply combat airpower due to potential consequences arising from employment on our territory, chances of collateral damage, and escalation potential.

 

    • The Cabinet Committee on Security substantiated the IAF’s rightness of thought process. It initially (18 May 99) denied the use of offensive airpower.

 

    • The final clearance came later, on 24-25 May 99, as the magnitude of intrusion became clearer. The clearance for combat airpower application was granted with the restriction of not crossing the LoC.

 

  1. Was the Air Force able to achieve its laid-down objectives?

 

    • The IAF, showcasing its adaptability and readiness, rapidly adapted to the air campaign’s unique operational challenges and flew day and night during Operation “Safed Sagar.”

 

    • The use of air power made an enormous difference in ground operations. The effective application of air power saved our casualties and compressed the time frame needed to achieve our objective of regaining control of our territory.

 

    • The Indian Air Force achieved its primary objective of degrading the enemy’s offensive capabilities, softening its defence and denying essential supplies.

 

    • In the words of Gen VP Malik, the then Army Chief:-

“The success in the war could not have been achieved but for the IAF having jointly performed with valour and commitment in complete coordination. Use of the IAF altered the dynamics of the war in our favour.”

 

  1. Which all aircraft took part in the deployment?

 

    • The entire Indian Air Force was activated and placed on operational alert within a few hours, and offensive air operations were offered to commence within six hours of authorisation.

 

    • Canberra and Mig-25 aircraft were used for aerial reconnaissance. Mig-23, Mig-27, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000 aircraft undertook offensive strike operations. Mig-21 and Mig-29 aircraft undertook air defence and dominance missions.

 

    • Fixed-wing transport and helicopters were used for large-scale troop movement, sustenance, supply missions, casualty evacuations, etc.

 

  1. The Mig series aircraft, especially Mig-29s, have received praise for keeping PAF’s F-16s at bay. Could you talk about it?

 

    • Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.

 

    • The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike.

 

  1. What were the important lessons for the IAF from the Kargil War?

 

    • Using air power quickens the process of achieving objectives while reducing costs due to a reduction in men and material casualties.

 

    • Restrictions (Not to cross LoC) on airpower application reduce its effectiveness.

 

    • Airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges included high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, self-imposed restrictions, etc.

 

    • IAF needs to improve its high-altitude area fighting capability (It has come a long way since then).

 

    • Stand-off and precision capabilities are essential.

 

    • Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).

 

    • Helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in contested air space.

 

Lessons learnt from the operation Safed Sagar were valuable and helped in charting the future trajectory of the IAF capability building. IAF has come a long way, but still has a long way to go, considering the prevailing threat situation

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.