Indo Russia Relations

 

My answers to the questionnaire on the above subject

 

Published in the latest journal (Jun 21) of FPRC (Foreign Policy Research Centre)

 

Q1. Does Russia continue to be a “time-tested partner of India”? If this is not so, what does it need to correct the ‘perceptions’, and re-strengthen the link?

 

Indo – Russian Relations. Geography and Geopolitics have been binding Russia and India together in the past. However, in the world politics there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests and these also change with time. The deep, traditional and even “time-tested relations” shared for decades cannot be taken for granted. The premise of indo-Russia relationship has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. The strategic bond that existed between India and the Soviet Union is not the same as that with Russia and has been considerably diluted. Every country places its national interests above anything else, so does Russia. Russia may not be a partner at the earlier level and perhaps we should not expect it either. From the “special and privileged strategic partnership,” we appear to be moving towards a transactional relationship.

Continue reading “Indo Russia Relations”

CHIP WAR

Chips

We are a chip based society. Chips are tiny pieces of silicon with intricate circuits on them and they are the lifeblood of today’s economy. These clever semiconductors make our internet-connected world go round. In addition to iPhones and PlayStations, they underpin key national infrastructure and sophisticated weaponry. Chips are a foundational aspect of the future of artificial intelligence.

Semiconductors made from silicon wafers mounted with billions of microscopic transistors are the basic component of modern digital life and the building blocks of innovation for the future. They are arguably one of the world’s most important industries.

Controlling advanced chip manufacturing in the 21st century may well prove to be like controlling the oil supply in the 20th. The country that controls this manufacturing can throttle the military and economic power of others.

 

Chip Production

There are two types of semiconductor manufacturing companies in the chip industry. Some (like Intel, Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron) design and make their own products in factories that they own. There are also foundries, which fabricate chips designed by consumer and military customers.

 

In sheer manufacturing capacity, Taiwan is number one followed by South Korea and U.S. in third place, with China gaining quickly. World’s top two chip companies are Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) of Taiwan and Samsung Electronics of South Korea.

 

The chips that TSMC makes are found in almost everything: smartphones, high-performance computing platforms, PCs, tablets, servers, base stations, game consoles, internet-connected devices like smart wearables, digital consumer electronics, cars, and almost every weapon system built in the 21st century. About 60 percent of the chips TSMC makes are for American companies.

 

Shortage. The severity of the global chip shortage has gone up a notch in recent times. The shortage is likely to last to last till 2022 or possible 2023. The reasons for the ongoing global chip shortage are complex and multifaceted.

 

Chip Wars

This was sort of expected. As the U.S.-China confrontation takes root, the ability to craft chips for everything from artificial intelligence and data centers to autonomous cars and smartphones has become an issue of national security, injecting government into business decisions over where to manufacture chips and to whom to sell them.

 

USA. A global semiconductor shortage and tensions with China have bolstered U.S. scrutiny of the supply chain and created a drive for it to regain leadership. The United States recently attacked China in trade war, by limiting Huawei’s ability to outsource its in-house chip designs for manufacture by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a Taiwanese chip foundry.

China. China uses 61 percent of the world’s chips in products for both its domestic and export markets. China recognized that its inability to manufacture the most advanced chips was a strategic Achilles heel. China devised two plans to solve these problems. The first one being  made in China 2025 plan of the country’s roadmap to update China’s manufacturing base from making low-tech products to rapidly developing ten high-tech industries, including electric cars, next-generation computing, telecommunications, robotics, artificial intelligence, and advanced chips. China’s second plan is the National Integrated Circuit Plan, a roadmap for building an indigenous semiconductor industry and accelerating chip manufacturing. The goal is to meet its local chip demand by 2030.

 

Taiwan. TSMC of Taiwan has established a R&D team to find a feasible path for development of semiconductors below 1-nanometer (nm). TSMC will also be expanding capacity as in places like Japan. About 20 Japanese companies, will work with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) to develop chip manufacturing technology in Japan.

 

South Korea. South Korea’s strategy in the future of chips is more impressive than the U.S.  Through the so-called “K-Semiconductor Strategy,” the South Korean government said it will support the industry by offering tax breaks, finance, and infrastructure. South Korea has a commanding lead in memory chips with a 65% share, largely thanks to Samsung. South Korea’s investment is being led by two of its biggest chip firms: Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. Samsung Electronics meanwhile is planning to invest 171 trillion won through 2030, raising its previous investment target of 133 trillion won, which was announced in 2019.

 

Future

Scientists have for a long time looked towards the potential of thin two-dimensional semiconductors in realizing high-performance electronic devices. However, there have been two significant problems to migrating semiconductor production to use this new tech. Firstly the materials had an inherent property of high contact resistance, and secondly they had poor current delivery capabilities. These issues seem to have been resolved. These are exciting times in the future of technology. Advances in chip technology and quantum computing would determine how global innovation moves forward.

 

There is much more to it than meets the eye: more coming up soon

 

value additions and comments are most welcome

For regular updates please register here –

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/subscribe/

References

1. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/the-chip-wars-of-the-21st-century/

2.http://www.obela.org/system/files/The_importance_of_chips_in_commercial_warfare.pdf

3. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3102518/us-china-tech-war-battle-over-semiconductors-taiwan-stokes

4. https://theprint.in/world/why-the-us-china-conflict-over-chips-is-about-to-get-even-uglier/529373/

Understanding China Better

 

PLA’s Strategy Textbook: Science of Military Strategy (SMS)

China has two premier institutes – the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and National Defence University (NDU). Over the last three decades, they have produced several editions of the publication titled Science of Military Strategy (SMS). SMS is the core textbook for senior PLA officers on how wars should be planned and conducted at the strategic level. The publication is considered to be a doctrinal teaching material and it provides a glimpse into the Chinese military thinking.

 

In August 2020, the latest version of SMS, influenced by structural military reforms adopted under Xi was published. The 2020 version as compared to the previous one of 2017 has some new additions. These include wartime political work, “intelligentisation” concepts, China’s military strategic guidelines, major war operations, joint logistics and the People’s Armed Police. The changes have been justified as necessity in order to “better adapt to the major trend in the form of warfare shifting from informationisation to intelligentisation.

 

The SMS is a 450 page document, divided into three parts with 24 chapters. The first part consists of general abstractions on strategic theory, planning, evaluation, and related topics. The second part covers special topics on strategic warfare, including crisis management and prevention, deterrence, war control, and operational guidance; it also includes chapters on military operations other than war and overseas operations. The third focuses on force development for each of the traditional services (army, navy, air force and rocket force), as well as space and cyber forces, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and reserve forces.

Key Changes in the 2020 Version

 

Continue reading “Understanding China Better”