Aircraft – Page 10 – Air Marshal's Perspective

July 4, 2024

PRACHAND: THE HIMALAYAN GRIFFIN

My Article published on the Chanakya Forum

In mid-June, news channels and strategic community circles were abuzz with the news that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an RFP for the procurement of 156 Light Combat Helicopters (90 for the Indian Army and 66 for the Indian Air Force). LCH is the first indigenous Multi-Role Combat Helicopter designed and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). “Prachand” (which means “fierce” in Hindi), the name given to India’s LCH, reflects the helicopter’s aggressive and powerful capabilities. It stands out with its ground attack and aerial combat capability, setting it apart from other helicopters in the market. Other attack helicopters and armed helicopters (held in the Indian armed forces inventory) are severely limited in operating at high altitudes and are best suited for operations in lower terrains.

HAL has thus far manufactured 15 limited-series Prachand helicopters (10 for the IAF and 5 for the IA), already in service from 2021 onwards. The new procurement order will enhance the operational capability of the Indian defence forces and further boost India’s drive for self-reliance. Reviewing the aircraft (features, performance, capabilities, and roles) and the project (development, production capabilities, Indigenous content, etc.) will be worthwhile.

Development Project. The need for such a helicopter was felt by the Indian armed forces during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when they were required to dislodge intruding Pakistani forces entrenched at altitudes around 18,000 feet. HAL started developing the LCH in the early 2000s, unveiling its plan to build the LCH in 2006. The Indian government sanctioned the project in the same year. The first flight on a prototype on 29 March 2010 was followed by an extensive test programme on four prototypes. The LCH became the first attack helicopter to land in Siachen at altitudes as high as 15,800 feet (4,815 metres). The LCH received a certificate of basic configuration in October 2015 and achieved initial operational clearance in August 2017.

Induction. The LCH was developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. In August 2017, limited-series production began for 15 aircraft. In January 2019, after completing all weapon integration tests, HAL declared the LCH ready for operational induction. On November 19, 2021, the LCH was formally handed over to IAF, starting the process of full-scale induction. On October 03, 2022, the LCH was formally inducted into the IAF and was officially named ‘Prachand’. By November 2022, the IA had begun receiving its LCH. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now given preliminary approval to acquire 156 more Light Combat Helicopters.

Features. The LCH, an attack helicopter derived from a weaponised version of the HAL-manufactured Dhruv helicopter ‘Rudra’, is a light and agile machine with a unique feature that sets it apart from any other combat helicopter in the world: its ability to operate at high altitudes. This is a significant advantage, as it allows the LCH to operate effectively in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas, a crucial area for India’s defence strategy. The helicopter possesses modern stealth characteristics, robust armour protection, advanced weapon systems, and electronic warfare systems. Its performance characteristics and features are as follows, showcasing its unique and impressive capabilities:

- Performance. The LCH is designed for high-altitude operations, with a service ceiling of about 6,500 meters (21,300 feet), the highest among all attack helicopters worldwide. It has a maximum Take-off Weight of around 5,800 kg and can carry 700 kg of payload. The helicopter can cruise at 260km/h and achieve a maximum speed of 268km/h. With a range of 550 km with weapons, it can fly for about 3 hours, showcasing its impressive performance capabilities.

- Armament. The LCH has a chin-mounted and twin-barrel M621 20mm cannon on a Nexter THL-20 turret, integrated with the Helmet Mounted Sighting System. Its modular design allows it to be armed with various weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, rocket pods, iron bombs, cluster bombs, and grenade launchers. This versatility in carrying different weapons makes the LCH suitable for various missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack. It has four hardpoints capable of carrying a combination of multiple weapons. It is also equipped with a Forges de Zeebrugge-built FZ231 rocket launcher capable of carrying 70mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation missiles, and Helina anti-tank guided missiles (Dhruvastra).

- Engine: The helicopter is powered by two HAL/Turbomeca Shakti turboshaft engines, each of which can generate approximately 1000kW and has a Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system (FADEC). The French Turbomeca and HAL jointly developed the Shakti engine, which was also fitted on the Dhruv and Rudra helicopters.

- Advanced Technology (Sensors and Avionics): The helicopter features a glass cockpit, a composite airframe structure, and a state-of-the-art sensor suite, enhancing operational efficiency and durability. The glass cockpit accommodates two crew members in tandem. It has an Integrated Avionics Display System (IADS), multi-function displays, a target acquisition and designation system (TADS) with FLIR (laser range finder and a designator), a helmet-mounted sight and a digital video recorder to capture battlefield footage for debriefing. The sensors fitted on the helicopter include a charge-coupled device camera, a forward-looking infrared camera and a laser designator. The two cameras capture the enemy’s location and position. The targeting system features an electro-optical pod, helmet-mounted sight display (HMSD), and a laser range finder and designator for precise targeting and engagement. The LCH is also equipped with a data link for network-centric operations.

- Survivability: The helicopter has numerous features to increase its survivability, including stealth features to reduce radar and infrared signatures. It has systems like Radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warning systems, laser warning systems, and chaff and flare dispensers for self-protection. The helicopter also has engine exhaust Infra-Red Suppression Systems (IRSS). The IRSS enhances aircraft resilience against IR-guided missiles by diminishing the missile lock-on distance and facilitating the superior functioning of IR jammers and flares. It has several other protection features, such as armour protection, self-sealing fuel tanks, a digital camouflage system, and crashworthy landing gear to enhance its survivability in hostile environments. The pressurised cabin of the helicopter offers protection from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.

- Versatility and Agility: The features above allow LCH to perform numerous roles under all weather and day-night conditions. Its narrow fuselage and advanced aerodynamics provide high agility, making it difficult to detect and target. The specially designed hinge-less rotor makes it highly agile due to its immediate response to flight control commands.

Roles and Tasks. The LCH meets the requirements of modern warfare and has the capability parameters to operate under varied conditions. Equipped with advanced systems and various weapons, it can perform multiple combat and support roles. In attack roles, it can undertake missions like the destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD), anti-tank warfare, battlefield air support, interdiction, and counter-surface force operations. It is capable of battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. It can also be used to escort convoys and provide aerial coverage. The LCH can track and attack slow-moving aerial targets and remotely piloted aircraft. It is also effective in counter-insurgency operations in jungle and urban environments.

Capability Enhancement. The LCH’s versatility and offensive potential are at par or better than most attack helicopters operating globally. Its presence itself deters adversaries. The induction of the Light Combat Helicopter adds unique capability to India’s combat potential. The LCH is noted for its capability to operate at high altitudes up to 6,500 meters, making it particularly suitable for operations in mountainous regions like the Himalayas along India’s northern and northeastern borders. This versatility, along with advanced avionics and weaponry, makes the LCH a force multiplier, significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of the Indian armed forces. It is a potent platform with day and night ground attack and aerial combat capability. It is a game changer, reflecting its multiple capabilities and strategic importance. It offers strategic flexibility through rapid deployment, allowing quick responses to emerging threats. The helicopter’s data link will mesh into the IAF’s networked environment.

Self-reliance and Challenges. Being an Indigenous platform developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the LCH reduces reliance on foreign military technology and supports India’s defence industry. With the Indian thrust on indigenisation, the LCH is being developed under a public-private partnership model, with the active participation of the private sector. There is still much left to be achieved regarding self-reliance. The LCH reportedly has an indigenous content of 45% by value, which is likely to progressively increase to more than 55%. The development of indigenous engines is the foremost challenge. Developing an aircraft engine is tough and expensive; it requires considerable investment in R&D and sustained effort over many years. These helicopters are on one of the government’s positive indigenisation lists. The list bans importing weapons, systems, and ammunition. Integration of Indigenous Anti-Tank Guided Missiles is another challenge. Helina/Dhruvastra, a helicopter version of the Nag missile, has already been tested on ALH (Rudra) and is in the process of integration with LCH. Next on the list is the challenge of production rate. The new order of 156 LCH aircraft will likely take 5 to 6 years to complete.

The induction of an additional 156 LCH is a significant development. The LCH’s high-altitude operational capability, advanced avionics, versatile armament, and Indigenous development make it a crucial asset for India’s defence forces. Its ability to operate in challenging terrains and perform multiple combat roles effectively positions it as a game changer in modern warfare, particularly in India’s unique geographic and strategic challenges.

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

Link to the article on Chanakya website: -https://chanakyaforum.com/prachand-the-himalayan-griffin/

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

Air Chief Marshal Fali H Major (retd), “Why India’s Light Combat Helicopter could be a game changer”, DailyO, 28 Feb 2020.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Rotary Wing Platforms: India’s Great Indigenisation Story”, Indian Defence Review, Issue Vol. 38.1, Jan-Mar 2023, 13 Apr 2023.

“Ten reasons why indigenously-built Light Combat Helicopter is a game changer for the Indian Air Force”, India News Network, 04 Apr 2022.

Rahul Singh, “Govt to buy 156 light combat helicopters from HAL at ₹50k-cr”, Hindustan Times, 18 Jun 2024.

D Raghunandan, “India’s Combat Helicopter: Re-discovering Self-reliance?”, NEWSclick, 14 Oct 2022.

Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, “Induction of ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopter: Impact on Operations At High Altitudes”, Bharat Shakti, 13 Jan 2024.

“HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)”, Air Force Technology, 18 Apr 2024.

Ministry of Defence, “Indigenously Designed and Developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) inducted into Indian Air Force”, Press Release, 03 OCT 2022.

Gordon Arthur, “India advances light attack helicopter program with large tender”, Air Warfare, 21 Jun 2024.

Huma Siddiqui, “MoD Issues RFP for 156 Prachand Helicopters to HAL for IAF and Army”, Financial Express, 20 Jun 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

June 26, 2024

COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD

My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.

“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”

– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.

Continue reading “COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD”

June 11, 2024

RELEVANCE OF JOHN WARDEN’S THOUGHTS ON AIR POWER APPLICATION AND AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

John Warden. John Warden was born in Texas in 1943. He earned a master’s degree in political science from Texas Tech University, was appointed to the Air Force Academy from Pennsylvania, and graduated in the class of 1965. He conducted a combat tour in OV-10s with the First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam and a tour in F-4Ds. While at the National War College, Warden wrote a thesis on air operations planning at the theatre level of war. After that, he was assigned as F-15 wing commander at Bitburg, Germany. He remained in that grade when he returned to the Pentagon to head CHECKMATE, an office serving under the Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and operations concerned with long-range planning. Warden was serving in that capacity at the onset of the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Colonel Warden was transferred to Maxwell Air Force Base, where he became the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) commandant. He stirred up that institution greatly, reorienting its study to focus on the operational strategy level of war and air planning at that level. Warden retired from the USAF in 1995. Warden wrote the book “The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat”, which focused on a European war. He seemed to be much more concerned with airpower than with flying aeroplanes.

Core Ideas and Beliefs. John Warden’s core ideas and beliefs, the bedrock of his airpower strategy, continue to reverberate in the field of airpower strategy. His belief in the vital role of air campaign planning, once air superiority is assured, has shaped the way airpower is used in support of other arms or independently to achieve decisive effects. His profound assumptions and beliefs, encapsulated in the following statements, have left an indelible mark on the discourse in the field of airpower strategy:-

- Human behaviour is complex and unpredictable, whereas material effects of military action are more predictable.

- Victory is and always has been achieved in the mind of the enemy commander—everything must be directed toward that end.

- John Warden’s belief in the potency of the offensive in air war is a testament to his strategic mindset. He firmly believed that the offensive is the more potent form of air war, a belief that continues to resonate in airpower strategy.

Theories & Views

Five Ring Theory. According to Warden, the centres of gravity are arranged in five rings. At the centre are leadership targets, followed by means of production, infrastructure, population, and field forces in the outer perimeter. Fewer centers of gravity (COG) exist in the middle than on the periphery, but they tend to be much more decisive than those on the outer rings. In general, it is preferable to attack the rings from the centre and then move outwards. However, attacking COG in the outer rings can yield a more immediate impact than an attack on the ones at the centre. He advocated that targeting the objectives in all the rings in parallel, rather than sequentially, tends to be even more decisive than attacking only one ring or starting with the outer ring and proceeding inward through each ring in turn.

Targeting. According to Warden, the enemy’s capability should be prioritised because human behaviour and material damage are unpredictable. Warden believed that targeting the enemy’s physical capability (as opposed to his psychological objectives) should be done considering that the military objectives must serve the political objectives.

Joint Operations. Warden’s views on joint operations, an essential aspect of his airpower strategy, instil confidence. He suggests that jointness does not necessarily mean equal portions of the action for all services. He asserts that sometimes airpower should be applied to support the land and sea forces, sometimes it should be supported by them, and sometimes it can be decisive if used independently. He explicitly asserts that single-service operations have been and will continue to be practical sometimes. To him, the other armed forces can function in either a supporting or a supported role, depending on the circumstances. Warden sees occasions when they conceivably will be irrelevant because airpower alone can win some campaigns, a testament to the practicality and effectiveness of his strategy.

Air Superiority. As with the other air power theorists, command of the air remains the Warden’s priority for all operations in the air or on the surface, though it sometimes may be achieved in parallel attacks rather than sequential. In his book “The Air Campaign”, Warden admits that sometimes only a local or temporary air superiority may be possible—and sufficient. Like Douhet, Warden believed the least efficient place for achieving air dominance was in the air. Sometimes, an air attack can serve more than one role. For example, destroying finished petroleum supplies can advance an air superiority campaign as it aids the interdiction effort.

Air Campaigns. Colonel Warden repeatedly suggests that simultaneous operations against all the varieties of target sets can offer significant benefits. The warden’s preference for the offensive largely depends on denying the enemy the ability to react. That denial depends on the size and character of the force and the ability to do so early in the campaign. Like most preceding airmen, John Warden argues that air interdiction by any other name is still preferable to close air support because it allows more targets to be killed at less cost.

Force Structure. Warden adheres to the traditional ideal that airpower should be organised under the centralised command of an airman. The airman should report only to the CINC.

Technology. Warden shows a particular fondness for high-tech solutions. Fundamental to his appeal for the parallel attack is the assumption that the coming of precision-guided munitions (PGM) and stealth make possible the fulfilment of many of the older theorists’ claims that the destruction of a given target required a far smaller strike force than previously, and with stealth no supporting aircraft is needed. At least for now, the stealth bombers can get through with acceptable losses. Now bombers with PGM can get results as fast as Douhet had dreamed. A target can be removed with far fewer bombs than in earlier eras. PGM makes strategic attacks all the more feasible and even makes parallel attacks possible. It grants a modification of the principle of mass, for it allows sending far fewer attackers to a given target and permits the attack of many more targets.

Relevant Excerpts from his book “The Air Campaign”

Levels of War. War is the most complex human endeavour. It is baffling and intriguing. It is also demanding and requires careful thought and excellent execution. The commander’s compelling task is to translate national war objectives into tactical plans at the operational level. The four levels of war are grand, strategic, operational, and tactical. The ambiguity increases as you go up the ladder. Mastery of the operational level strategy is a key to winning wars. It is an art to identify the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (COG – a point where the enemy is vulnerable and where the application of force is most decisive). An air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter.

Offensive / Defensive Approach. An offensive approach has many advantages. It retains the initiative while putting pressure on the enemy by taking the war in the enemy’s territory. In this approach, all the assets are used, yielding positive results if successful. On the other hand, in the defensive approach, the initiative is with the enemy, some of the assets may lie idle and at best, it yields neutral results. Adopting the approach depends upon factors like political will, objectives, doctrinal guidance, own vis-à-vis enemy capability, and the force disparity (numerical and qualitative superiority are significant factors). Enemy SWOT analysis and intelligence analysis are essential to deciding on the approach (Consider factors like Aircraft numbers and quality, weapons, training, network, combat support platforms, sensors, ability to absorb losses, vulnerabilities, etc.). A periodic review is required to decide on continuing the adopted approach.

Air Superiority. Air superiority is necessary because air and ground campaigns cannot succeed unless a certain degree of air superiority is achieved. One way to achieve it is by destroying enemy aircraft. Destroying enemy aircraft in the air is the most complex and costly approach (it is easier to destroy them on the ground). However, destroying the enemy aircraft is not the only way to achieve it; it can also be achieved by attacking the enemy bases, fuel and human resources (crew and pilots), production houses and supply chains, and enemy command and control centres. Repeated heavyweight attacks are required to achieve it.

Interdiction / Battlefield Strikes. Interdiction is as old and essential as war—airpower has added a new dimension. It is a powerful, essential, and effective tool for commanders and planners. Airpower should not be seen as airborne artillery. It should generally be used for targets beyond the range of ground weapons. Art is to decide what to and where to interdict between the source and the destination. Distant Interdiction is most decisive but effective with a time lag, intermediate Interdiction is effective with a lesser time lag, and close Interdiction is effective immediately and generally necessary during crises.

Relevant Air Power Application and Air Campaign Planning Principles.

- Anticipate and predict enemy reactions and plans. Study and categorise the enemy psyche (rational, irrational, fanatic, rigid, flexible, independent, innovative, and determined).

- Audacity does not always lead to positive results—avoid the tendency to plunge into any and every fray. If enemy AD is strong – avoid it till you can punch holes in it and create blind zones. If air combat capability is better than draw the enemy out.

- It is difficult to predict the duration and intensity of war. The intensity of war generally depends on the value and interest of the side in what they are fighting for. War effort comes in surges and spurts. Accordingly, the approach could be to continuously engage in a war of attrition or to hit unexpectedly and wait.

- Air assets are always scarce—it is not possible to defend everything. Scarce air resources are optimally utilised when shared and not kept idle on the ground—the under-command tendency should be avoided. Scarce air resources cannot be everywhere or precede every surface operation.

- An asset not used is an asset wasted – a sortie not flown is a sortie wasted. At the same time, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly flown. The loss ratio is a function of the force ratio.

- Air operations are conducted over larger spaces and at a faster pace than surface operations. Air power should not be considered subordinate (supporting arm) to surface operations. The air element of surface forces should be used according to the tenets of surface operations. Unambiguous and thorough doctrinal understanding is essential.

- Operational commanders should avoid tactical decisions – have faith in executors, and concentrate on operational orchestration.

- Concentration of forces, mass, numbers, weight of attack and force structure are essential for inflicting prohibitive damage to the enemy. The choice of platform depends on the degree of air control and enemy air defence capability and weapons. In contested airspace, fixed-wing combat support aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned platforms (Drones) are highly vulnerable.

- Airpower can carry out parallel operations (campaigns). The percentage of effort allotted to each campaign must be decided and dynamically reviewed periodically, depending on the changing situation.

- Bad weather can be a spoilsport—choose the campaign/operational window carefully (the same is true for the enemy). Fog of war, uncertainty in war and friction of war are realities to be dealt with.

- Deception (mystify and mislead) is very important to achieve surprise.

In conclusion, Warden’s air power theories represent a transformative approach to military strategy, emphasising the strategic use of air power to achieve decisive and rapid results. Warden’s theories underscore the importance of targeting the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. His conceptual framework, most notably articulated through the Five Rings model, identifies critical enemy systems—leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded military forces—as critical targets to disrupt the enemy’s capacity to wage war effectively. Warden’s emphasis on strategic targeting has influenced contemporary military doctrines and operational planning, as seen in conflicts such as the Gulf War and subsequent operations where air power played a pivotal role. Overall, Warden’s air power theories provide a robust framework for understanding and applying air power in modern military operations, highlighting the strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions of employing air forces effectively to achieve national security objectives. The principles he advocated continue to shape the evolution of air strategy, underscoring the evolving nature of warfare in the 21st century.

Link to the Article:-

Relevance of John Warden’s Thoughts on Air Power Application and Air Campaign Planning, by Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd)