May 2025 – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 3, 2025

666:GPS INTERFERENCE INCIDENT INVOLVING IAF AIRCRAFT OVER MYANMAR

My article was published in Issue 4 (May 25) of the SP Aviation journal.

On March 28, 2025, a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar, claiming over 3,649 lives and injuring more than 5,000 people. In response, India launched Operation Brahma, a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) mission, to deliver critical supplies, medical teams, and rescue personnel to the affected regions. The IAF deployed six military transport aircraft, including C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster, to ferry 625 metric tons of aid to cities such as Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, and Mandalay.

The Incident

The first reported incident of GPS spoofing occurred on March 29, when a C-130J aircraft, carrying 15 tons of relief material from Hindon Airbase to Yangon, experienced navigation anomalies in Myanmar’s airspace. Subsequent flights reported similar issues, with sources indicating that most of the six aircraft involved in the operation encountered GPS spoofing on multiple sorties. After the initial incident, IAF pilots were briefed to anticipate such challenges, enabling them to prepare for and mitigate the risks on subsequent flights.

The IAF later clarified that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by Mandalay International Airport highlighted the possibility of degraded GPS availability. The NOTAM warned of potential navigation issues in Myanmar’s airspace, and IAF crews were trained to operate under such conditions. Despite the disruptions, all missions were completed successfully, with no reported accidents or deviations from the planned routes. This underscores the professionalism and preparedness of the IAF pilots, providing reassurance about their capabilities in challenging situations.

GPS Spoofing

GPS spoofing is a form of electronic warfare where false signals are broadcast to deceive a receiver, causing it to calculate an incorrect position. Unlike GPS jamming, which blocks signals entirely, spoofing manipulates data to mislead navigation systems, potentially directing an aircraft off course. The technique exploits the weak signal strength of GPS satellites, which can be overpowered by stronger, fraudulent signals generated from ground-based or airborne platforms. GPS spoofing is increasingly common in conflict zones, where state and non-state actors deploy electronic warfare to disrupt adversaries.

Modern military aircraft, however, are equipped with additional navigation systems, such as INS, which uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to track position independently of external signals. The IAF’s prompt switch to INS ensured safe navigation, but the incident highlighted the vulnerability of GPS-dependent systems in contested environments.

Attributability

Myanmar’s complex political landscape provides critical context for the incident. Since the military coup in 2021, the country has been embroiled in civil conflict, with the junta facing resistance from ethnic insurgent groups and pro-democracy forces. The region is also a geopolitical flashpoint, with major powers like China, India, and the United States vying for influence. China, in particular, has made significant strategic inroads in Myanmar, including infrastructure and military cooperation investments.

Some reports speculated that the spoofing may have been linked to Chinese-enabled systems, given Beijing’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities and presence in the region. The proximity of the interference to the Coco Islands, where China is suspected of developing surveillance and electronic warfare facilities, fueled these suspicions. However, attributing responsibility is difficult due to a lack of definitive evidence.

Other potential actors include non-state militant groups or regional adversaries seeking to cause disruption as a geopolitical signal. Myanmar’s airspace, described as a conflict zone, is particularly susceptible to such interference, with GPS spoofing reported as a common tactic in similar environments globally. Investigating spoofing in foreign airspace is nearly impossible due to limited access and jurisdictional constraints. Myanmar’s junta’s lack of transparency, restricted internet access, and communication controls further complicate any efforts to investigate the incident.

IAF Response and Mitigation

The IAF’s response to the GPS spoofing incidents was swift and effective. The pilots’ training in handling navigation anomalies allowed them to transition seamlessly to INS, ensuring the safe completion of all missions. The pre-emptive NOTAM from Mandalay International Airport also played a crucial role, enabling crews to anticipate and prepare for degraded GPS availability. This response highlights the IAF’s operational resilience in such challenges.

On April 14, the IAF clarified that its crews were well-equipped to operate in environments with compromised GPS signals. The statement avoided directly referencing spoofing, focusing instead on the successful execution of Operation Brahma and the robustness of IAF protocols. This measured response likely aimed to avoid escalating tensions in an already volatile region while highlighting India’s operational resilience.

The incident has sparked discussions within India’s defence establishment about enhancing countermeasures and navigation redundancies. Recommendations include installing real-time interference detection systems, conducting regular audits of navigation vulnerabilities, and advocating for international standards to counter GPS spoofing. The urgent need for global cooperation against electronic warfare is also underscored.

Broader Global Implications

The Myanmar incident is part of a global surge in GPS interference, with similar cases reported near the India-Pakistan border, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Spoofing has affected civilian and military aircraft globally, with notable cases like the 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash linked to GPS disruption and widespread interference in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

For military operations, GPS spoofing poses risks beyond navigation errors, including compromised mission security and potential airspace violations. The Myanmar incident underscores the need for robust countermeasures, such as encrypted navigation systems and alternative positioning technologies like Galileo or India’s NavIC. This highlights the importance of preparedness in electronic warfare and the need for robust countermeasures.

Civilian aviation also faces growing risks, as commercial aircraft rely heavily on GPS for navigation, raising concerns about passenger safety. To enhance resilience, the aviation industry is exploring solutions like multi-constellation receivers, which integrate signals from multiple satellite systems, and ground-based navigation aids.

Geopolitically, the incident highlights the challenges of operating in contested regions. It underscores the need for diplomatic efforts to establish international norms against electronic warfare, though enforcement remains difficult in conflict zones.

Lessons Learned and Mitigation Measures

The Myanmar GPS spoofing incident offers several lessons for India and the global aviation community. First, it emphasises the importance of pilot training and redundant navigation systems, which proved critical in averting disaster. Second, it highlights the need for real-time intelligence sharing among allies to map and counter interference trends. Groups like OPSGROUP, which tracks aviation risks, could play a pivotal role in this effort.

Technologically, the incident underscores the urgency of developing spoofing-resistant navigation systems. Advances in quantum positioning, which relies on atomic clocks, and machine learning-based anomaly detection could reduce dependence on vulnerable GPS signals. India’s investment in NavIC, a regional navigation system, offers a potential alternative, though its coverage remains limited compared to GPS.

There is also a case for a global ban on GPS spoofing, similar to existing prohibitions on laser attacks against aircraft. While such measures face resistance from states with advanced electronic warfare programs, they could set a precedent for protecting peaceful humanitarian missions. Regional cooperation, particularly within ASEAN, could also address the region’s airspace vulnerabilities, though political instability poses challenges.

Conclusion

The GPS spoofing of IAF aircraft during Operation Brahma was a stark reminder of modern aviation’s evolving threats. While the IAF’s preparedness ensured the mission’s success, the incident exposed the fragility of GPS-dependent systems in conflict zones. As electronic warfare becomes more sophisticated, nations must invest in resilient technologies, robust training, and international collaboration to safeguard military and civilian operations. The incident reinforces India’s role as a responsible regional power capable of overcoming adversity to deliver aid. Still, it also signals the need for vigilance in an increasingly contested digital landscape.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

India Today. “Cyber-attack on IAF aircraft involved in Myanmar quake relief op, say defence sources.” April 13, 2025.

The Hindu. “Frequent GPS interference, including ‘spoofing’, near India’s border with Pakistan, Myanmar.” December 28, 2024.

The Print. “Operation Brahma: IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing.” April 14, 2025.

First post. “Indian Air Force aircraft faced massive cyber attacks in Myanmar airspace during aid mission: Report.” April 13, 2025.

India Sentinels. “What is ‘GPS spoofing’ that the Indian Air Force’s transport aircraft faced in Myanmar airspace?” April 14, 2025.

The Times of India. “IAF jet cyber-attack: IAF jet on Myanmar relief operation faced cyber-attack in the air.” April 14, 2025.

ANI News. “IAF issues clarification on GPS spoofing incident during Myanmar relief operations.” April 14, 2025.

Rediff.com. “IAF jets faced ‘GPS spoofing’ during Myanmar relief mission.” April 13, 2025.

The Economic Times. “IAF planes faced GPS spoofing in Myanmar’s airspace while carrying relief materials for quake victims: Sources.” April 13, 2025.

Mathrubhumi English. “IAF aircraft face GPS spoofing over Myanmar during quake relief mission.” April 13, 2025.

Eurasian Times. “U.S.-Supplied C-130J, C-17 Come ‘Under Attack’ Over Myanmar; What Happened With IAF Aircraft?” April 14, 2025.

May 2, 2025May 1, 2025

665: DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26 civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas. Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states. The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing. India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

May 1, 2025April 30, 2025

664: BALANCING COST AND COMBAT CAPABILITY IN FIGHTER JET PROCUREMENT

My article was published in the May edition of the “Life of Soldier” journal.

Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex and intellectually stimulating challenge in defence procurement. Modern fighter jets, with their advanced avionics, stealth technology, and weapons systems, are not just engineering marvels but also strategic assets that can dominate the air, land, and sea. However, these capabilities come at a steep cost, and governments must grapple with budgetary constraints while ensuring their air forces remain capable of addressing current and future threats. There is a need to explore the intricate trade-offs between affordability and capability, examine past successful and unsuccessful programs, and derive best practices for achieving an optimal balance.

Key Factors Influencing Fighter Acquisition Costs

Acquiring modern fighter aircraft is a complex and costly endeavour influenced by a myriad of factors, ranging from technological advancements to geopolitical considerations. Understanding these key factors is essential to comprehending the significant cost variations across different programs and nations.

Research and Development (R&D) Costs. One of the most significant cost drivers in fighter acquisition is R&D. Developing a new generation of aircraft requires extensive research, prototyping, and testing. Stealth technology, advanced avionics, and next-generation propulsion systems demand substantial investment.

Technology and Performance Requirements. The complexity of the technology integrated into a fighter jet directly influences its cost. High-end capabilities such as low observability (stealth), supercruise, advanced radar systems, and electronic warfare (EW) suites add to development and production expenses. The F-22 Raptor, known for its superior air dominance capabilities, became one of the most expensive fighters due to its cutting-edge technology.

Production Scale and Economies of Scale. The number of units produced significantly affects per-unit costs. Larger production runs allow for economies of scale, reducing the per-aircraft cost due to bulk purchasing of materials and more efficient manufacturing. For instance, the US fighter aircraft benefit from a large international procurement base, lowering their unit cost compared to limited-production fighters like the Eurofighter Typhoon or the Dassault Rafale.

Supply Chain and Material Costs. Raw materials, especially those used in composite structures and stealth coatings, impact the cost of fighter jets. Specialised alloys, titanium, and radar-absorbent materials are expensive and often difficult to source. Additionally, supply chain disruptions can inflate costs, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars.

Workforce and Manufacturing Expertise. Highly skilled labour is required to assemble sophisticated aircraft. Countries with a well-established aerospace industry, such as the United States, France, and Russia, have the necessary expertise, but labour costs can vary. As seen in the F-35 production process, advanced automation and AI-driven manufacturing techniques can help reduce labour expenses over time.

Customisation and Export Modifications. Export variants of fighter aircraft often undergo modifications to meet the specific needs of the purchasing nation. These modifications can increase costs, such as different avionics, weapons compatibility, or structural changes. The Rafale, for example, had many India-specific features, leading to increased costs.

Lifecycle and Maintenance Costs. Beyond the initial acquisition, the total cost of ownership includes maintenance, spare parts, and upgrades over the aircraft’s lifespan. High-maintenance aircraft like the F-22, which require specialised maintenance for stealth coatings, can have significant long-term costs. On the other hand, modular designs and open-system architectures aim to keep maintenance costs lower.

Geopolitical and Strategic Considerations. Strategic alliances and political considerations often influence defence procurement. Countries that purchase fighters from allies may receive discounts or financing assistance as part of broader defence agreements. Conversely, embargoes or restrictions on technology transfers can drive up costs if alternative solutions are required. This underscores the need for foresight and strategic planning in defence procurement.

Trade-Offs in Fighter Acquisition Programs

Managing the intricacies of fighter aircraft procurement is vital to defence planning. Military leaders and policymakers must meticulously weigh performance, cost, operational requirements, and strategic objectives to maximise capabilities while staying within budgetary limits.

Balancing Cost and Performance. Acquiring fighter aircraft requires a delicate balance between cost and capability. While advanced fifth-generation fighters provide unmatched performance, they have high acquisition and operational expenses. More affordable alternatives may lack cutting-edge features but offer viable options for air forces with budget constraints. Governments must determine whether to invest in cutting-edge technology or build a more extensive fleet with slightly reduced capabilities.

Multirole Efficiency vs. Specialised Superiority. Modern fighters like the F-35 and Rafale are designed as multirole platforms capable of handling air-to-air combat, ground attacks, and electronic warfare. This reduces fleet diversity but may lead to trade-offs in specialised missions. Decision-makers must evaluate whether a single versatile platform meets their operational needs or if specialised aircraft are necessary for optimal effectiveness.

Domestic Production vs. Foreign Procurement. Nations must choose between developing indigenous fighter programs and purchasing aircraft from foreign suppliers. Domestic programs, such as India’s Tejas and South Korea’s KF-21, foster self-reliance but require extensive research and industrial infrastructure investment. In contrast, buying foreign aircraft ensures immediate capability but may create dependency on external suppliers for maintenance and upgrades.

Short-Term Gains vs. Long-Term Development. Some countries prioritise acquiring ready-made fighter jets to achieve immediate operational capability, while others invest in long-term development programs. Purchasing off-the-shelf platforms minimises short-term risks but may lead to obsolescence. On the other hand, long-term investments in projects like the Tempest and NGAD aim to ensure future technological superiority, albeit with higher financial and developmental risks.

Expanding Fleet vs. Cutting-Edge Technology. Budgetary constraints force militaries to choose between maintaining a more extensive fleet of less advanced aircraft or acquiring fewer high-tech fighters. A more comprehensive fleet provides excellent operational coverage, while fewer advanced jets offer superior combat capabilities. Many air forces supplement their expensive stealth fighters with more affordable fourth-generation aircraft to maintain a balance between numbers and technology.

Quantity vs. Capability Trade-offs. Nations must decide between acquiring a limited number of highly advanced fighters or a more extensive fleet of less sophisticated aircraft. For example, the U.S. supplemented its elite F-22 fleet with the more affordable F-35, while countries like China and Russia prioritise quantity to ensure strategic depth. This decision impacts force projection and overall combat effectiveness.

Case Studies

Various nations have adopted different strategies to achieve balance, ensuring operational effectiveness while managing costs.

F-16 Fighting Falcon (USA): Cost-Effective Multirole Performance. The F-16, developed in the 1970s, exemplifies how an affordable fighter can remain relevant through continuous upgrades. Originally designed as a lightweight, cost-effective platform, the F-16 has evolved with advanced avionics, radar, and weapon systems. By leveraging modular upgrades, nations operating the F-16 have extended their service life and capability without incurring the costs of entirely new aircraft programs. Its global success—operated by over 25 countries—demonstrates the financial benefits of export-oriented design.

JAS 39 Gripen (Sweden): Affordability through Smart Design. Sweden’s Saab JAS 39 Gripen was designed with cost efficiency in mind. Unlike competitors, the Gripen integrates an open-architecture system that allows easy upgrades, reducing long-term costs. Its reliance on off-the-shelf components, including an American engine and European avionics, lowers development expenses while maintaining high performance. The Gripen’s ability to operate from austere airfields and use cost-efficient maintenance procedures further enhances affordability. Its export success in countries like Brazil and South Africa has helped distribute costs across multiple buyers.

Eurofighter Typhoon (Europe): Multinational Cost Sharing. The Eurofighter Typhoon demonstrates how multinational collaboration can spread development costs while delivering a high-performance aircraft. Shared investment among Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain allowed the Typhoon to integrate advanced capabilities while mitigating financial burdens on individual nations. Although initially expensive, its long-term sustainment plan ensures affordability through incremental modernisation.

Chengdu J-10 (China): Indigenous Development with Cost Control. China’s Chengdu J-10 was developed as an affordable, indigenous alternative to foreign fighters. China minimised costs by relying on domestic production and technology transfer from Russian sources while achieving a capable multirole aircraft. Continuous upgrades, including the J-10C variant with AESA radar and advanced avionics, have kept the platform competitive without excessive investment in entirely new designs.

Sukhoi Su-30 (Russia): Adaptability and Cost Efficiency. The Su-30 series is a prime example of how Russia balances affordability with performance. Initially derived from the Su-27, the Su-30 has been continuously upgraded to include advanced avionics, thrust-vectoring engines, and long-range strike capabilities. Its affordability and strong export potential have made it a staple in air forces worldwide, including India, Algeria, and Vietnam.

HAL Tejas (India): Indigenous Fighter Development for Cost-Effectiveness. India’s HAL Tejas was developed to reduce reliance on foreign fighters while maintaining affordability. Designed with modular upgrades in mind, the Tejas has gradually improved with better radar, weapons integration, and avionics. Despite delays in development, its affordability compared to Western counterparts has made it an attractive option for India’s long-term air power strategy.

KAI FA-50 (South Korea): Light Fighter for Affordability and Export Success. South Korea’s KAI FA-50, based on the T-50 trainer, is a cost-effective light fighter designed for domestic and export markets. With modern avionics and weapons compatibility, the FA-50 offers a budget-friendly solution for nations requiring a capable yet affordable jet. Its success in markets like the Philippines and Poland highlights its balance of affordability and capability.

Best Practices for Balancing Affordability and Capability

Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex but essential task for modern air forces. Governments must ensure that their aircraft provide operational effectiveness without exceeding budgetary constraints. The following best practices help achieve this balance.

Lifecycle Cost Management. The total cost of a fighter aircraft extends beyond its initial purchase price. Governments must factor in long-term expenses such as maintenance, upgrades, and eventual disposal. A comprehensive lifecycle cost analysis prevents budget overruns and ensures the financial sustainability of an air force over decades of service.

Continuous Modernisation Strategies. Modern fighter aircraft benefit from modular systems and open architectures that enable incremental upgrades. The F-16 Fighting Falcon, for instance, has remained operational since the 1970s due to continuous improvements in avionics, radar, and weapons. This strategy extends an aircraft’s service life while spreading costs over time, reducing the need for costly replacements.

Leveraging Partnerships. Multinational collaborations in fighter development and production help distribute costs among participating nations. Programs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the Eurofighter Typhoon demonstrate shared investment’s financial and technological benefits. By pooling resources, nations reduce individual financial burdens while gaining access to cutting-edge technology.

Maximising Multi-Role Capabilities. Multi-role fighters enhance operational flexibility by performing diverse missions within a single platform. The Dassault Rafale exemplifies this approach, excelling in air combat, ground attack, and reconnaissance. Such versatility allows air forces to reduce reliance on multiple aircraft types, simplify logistics, and lower maintenance costs.

Enhancing Export Potential. Designing fighters with exportability in mind helps amortise development costs and lower per-unit expenses. Countries that successfully market their fighter jets internationally can reinvest revenues into further technological advancements, strengthening their domestic defence industry.

Robust Program Management. Effective oversight and clear program objectives are crucial to avoiding cost overruns and scope creep. Strong governance, transparent communication, and disciplined financial management ensure that fighter programs stay within budget while meeting operational requirements. The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program has emphasised digital engineering to streamline development and prevent cost escalation.

Embracing Emerging Technologies. Advancements in technology are reshaping how air forces balance affordability and capability. The following innovations are improving cost efficiency while enhancing combat effectiveness.

The Role of Unmanned Systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and “loyal wingman” drones complement traditional fighter jets by undertaking high-risk missions at a lower cost. These systems enhance reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and combat operations, reducing pilot exposure to danger. Programs like the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat highlight the increasing integration of UAVs into modern air combat strategies.

Digital Engineering. Digital twins and model-based systems engineering accelerate fighter development and reduce costs. Digital prototypes allow designers to test and refine aircraft designs in virtual environments before physical production begins.

Additive Manufacturing. 3D printing, or additive manufacturing, streamlines the production of complex aircraft components, reducing material waste and manufacturing time. This technology enables rapid part replacement, minimising downtime and sustainment costs. Fighter manufacturers increasingly use 3D printing to enhance affordability without sacrificing performance.

AI-Driven Warfare. Artificial intelligence (AI) transforms modern fighter capabilities by improving decision-making, enhancing situational awareness, and reducing pilot workload. AI-powered mission planning and adaptive combat algorithms enable greater efficiency and operational effectiveness, potentially lowering training costs and increasing mission success rates.

Conclusion

Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex but essential endeavour. As nations face evolving threats and fiscal constraints, the ability to make strategic trade-offs will determine the effectiveness of their air power. By embracing innovative technologies, fostering international collaboration, and adopting robust program management practices, governments can achieve an optimal balance that ensures operational readiness and financial sustainability. The lessons from past programs and emerging trends guide navigating this challenging landscape.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

References:-

Arena, M. V., Blickstein, I., Younossi, O., & Grammich, C. (2008). Why Has the Cost of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Risen? RAND Corporation.

Lorell, M. A. (2003). Going Global? U.S. Government Policy and the Defence Aerospace Industry. RAND Corporation.

Tirpak, J. A. (2020). “How Much Should a Fighter Cost?” Air Force Magazine.

Trimble, S. (2018). “F-15EX vs. F-35A: The Debate Over Air Superiority Affordability.” FlightGlobal.

Shalal, A. (2021). “Cost vs. Capability: U.S. Air Force Considers Future Fighter Mix.” Reuters.

Majumdar, D. (2017). “Why Stealth Fighters Are So Expensive (And What Can Be Done About It).” The National Interest.
Laird, R. F., & Timperlake, E. (2013). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy. ABC-CLIO.

Heginbotham, E., Nixon, M., Morgan, F. E., Heim, J. L., Hagen, J., & Engstrom, J. (2015). The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. RAND Corporation.

Sweetman, B. (2014). The F-35 Lightning II: From Concept to Cockpit. Zenith Press.

Johnson, J. M. (2019). The Cost of Air Superiority: The Economics of the F-22 Raptor. Air & Space Power Journal.

European Defence Agency (EDA). (2022). European Combat Aircraft: Multinational Cooperation and Industrial Sustainability.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2020). The Cost of Replacing Today’s Air Force Fleet.

Kausal, V. (2003). Arming the Indian Arsenal: Challenges and Policy Options for India’s Defence Industrialisation. Routledge.