Month: April 2025

Posted on

649: INDIAN AIR FORCE PLANES FACE GPS SPOOFING OVER MYANMAR

 

My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 15 Apr 25.

 

During India’s humanitarian relief mission to Myanmar following the recent earthquake, Indian Air Force (IAF) transport aircraft encountered GPS spoofing within Myanmar’s airspace. The first incident occurred on March 29, 2025, when a C-130J Super Hercules aircraft carrying 15 tonnes of relief material from Hindon Airbase to Yangon experienced GPS interference. Subsequently, additional IAF aircraft, including C-17 Globemaster III transports, reported similar spoofing incidents during their missions.

Six military transport flights delivered aid, field hospitals, and rescue teams to Myanmar. ​To counteract the spoofing attacks, IAF pilots promptly switched to the aircraft’s inertial navigation systems (INS), which rely on internal sensors rather than external signals, ensuring the successful completion of their missions. ​

While the exact source of the GPS spoofing remains unidentified, such incidents are often associated with regions experiencing geopolitical tensions and are sometimes attributed to state or non-state actors. ​This incident underscores the growing challenges of threats in modern military operations, even during humanitarian missions, and highlights the importance of robust navigation systems and security measures for aircraft operating in contested environments.

 

GPS Spoofing

GPS spoofing involves broadcasting counterfeit signals to deceive receivers, causing them to miscalculate position, altitude, or time. Unlike jamming, which disrupts signals entirely, spoofing manipulates them to mislead systems into believing an aircraft is elsewhere. Attackers use software-defined radios or GPS simulators to overpower legitimate satellite signals with false ones. Sophisticated attacks gradually alter coordinates to evade detection, requiring precise timing and target tracking.

Spoofing disrupts navigation systems, autopilots, and even backups for aircraft that rely on GPS inputs. The result can be catastrophic—veering into restricted airspace or colliding with obstacles. The accessibility of spoofing technology, now available for as little as a few hundred dollars, amplifies its threat to military and civilian aviation.

 

Recent Spoofing Incidents: A Growing Concern. GPS spoofing is not unique to Myanmar. Recent incidents highlight its global spread:-

    • Middle East (2023-2024). Reportedly, More than 20 civilian aircraft in Iraq-Iran airspace faced spoofing, with one jet nearly violating Iranian airspace. Israel’s electronic warfare against Hezbollah inadvertently affected commercial aviation.
    • Eastern Europe (2024). Over 1,000 flights in the Baltic and Black Sea regions reported interference related to Russian tests of electronic warfare systems.
    • Azerbaijan Crash (December 2024). A tragic Embraer jet crash, killing 38, was tied to GPS disruption, allegedly from Russian defences countering drones.
    • India- Pakistan Border (2023-2025). Several civilian flights have reported spoofing cases near the Amritsar and Jammu areas.

These incidents reveal severe implications: safety risks from navigational errors, geopolitical tensions from airspace violations, economic losses from flight disruptions, and exposed military vulnerabilities in GPS-dependent systems.

 

Potential Perpetrators, Possible Reasons and Investigating Challenges.

Attribution in these incidents is particularly tricky. Likely suspects include state actors, insurgent groups, or proxy forces. Given Myanmar’s strategic location, speculation could even involve state actors like China and Bangladesh, Non-state groups or Myanmar’s junta with access to affordable spoofing technology. The blame cannot be attributed to anyone due to the lack of evidence.

Possible Reasons for resorting to GPS jamming could include geopolitical messaging. Disrupting a high-profile humanitarian mission could demonstrate technological prowess or warn against foreign presence in Myanmar, a region with contested influence among powers like China, India, and the U.S. These flights offer an opportunity to test spoofing technology without the fear of escalation of conflict. Given Myanmar’s prevailing situation, the spoofing may not have specifically targeted relief aircraft but affected them as part of broader electronic warfare in the region.

Investigating such incidents is fraught with several challenges. Spoofing signals, often from ground-based or airborne, static or mobile platforms, are hard to trace. Distinguishing deliberate attacks from accidental interference demands advanced signal analysis. India’s limited access to Myanmar’s territory would restrict the ground-based evidence collection. Accusing a state without proof could escalate tensions.

 

Countering GPS Spoofing

A multi-pronged approach, including technological, operational, regulatory, and collaborative measures, is vital to safeguard against GPS spoofing. These are listed below:-

Technological Solutions

    • Alternative Navigation. Integrate India’s NAVIC, Galileo, or ground-based aids like DME and ILS.
    • Indigenous Innovation. Develop affordable anti-spoofing tech through India’s NAVIC and defence R&D. Retrofit aircraft with resilient systems.
    • Sensor Fusion. Combine INS, radar, and visual systems to navigate without GPS.
    • Encrypted Signals. Use systems like Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) to verify GPS authenticity.
    • Multi-Antenna Systems. Cross-check signals to detect discrepancies.
    • Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA). Filter out false signals for enhanced resilience.

Operational Strategies

    • Pilot Training. Equip crews to spot spoofing signs, such as sudden coordinate shifts, and switch to backups as done in this case.
    • Pre-Flight Briefings. Issue warnings for high-risk zones, as done for subsequent aircraft post-initial incident.
    • Real-Time Detection. Install systems to alert pilots of interference instantly.

Regulatory and Collaborative Efforts

    • Global Standards. Adhere to ICAO and EASA guidelines for GNSS resilience.
    • Data Sharing. Collaborate via groups like OPSGROUP to map spoofing trends.
    • Cyber security Audits. Regularly test navigation systems for vulnerabilities.
    • Diplomatic Advocacy. Push for international bans on spoofing to deter state-sponsored attacks.

 

Conclusion

The GPS spoofing of IAF aircraft in Myanmar exposes the fragility of modern aviation in an era of electronic warfare. While India’s pilots averted disaster, the incident underscores the need for vigilance and innovation. By blending advanced technology, rigorous training, and global cooperation, the aviation community can neutralise this stealthy threat, ensuring safe skies for humanitarian and operational missions.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1210
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

Link to the article on the website:-

U.S.-Supplied C-130J, C-17 Come “Under Attack” Over Myanmar; What Really Happened With IAF Aircraft?

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Moneycontrol News. (2025, April 13). IAF relief aircraft hit by GPS spoofing in Myanmar skies.

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/iaf-relief-aircraft-hit-by-gps-spoofing-in-myanmar-skies-12993114.html

  1. The Hindu Bureau. (2025, April 13). Indian Air Force planes faced GPS spoofing in Myanmar during an earthquake relief mission.
    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-planes-face-gps-spoofing-in-myanmar/article68008159.ece
  1. YouTube – Asian Defence Updates. (2025, April 13). Pilots Thwart GPS Spoofing Attempt Over Myanmar During Relief Ops.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKbLKravM1c
  1. Hindustan Times. (2025, April 13). Indian aircraft delivering quake relief in Myanmar faced GPS spoofing. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-aircraft-delivering-quake-relief-in-myanmar-faced-gps-spoofing-101712998144360.html
  1. The Week. (2025, April 14). IAF aircraft faced GPS spoofing over Myanmar during the quake relief mission. https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2025/04/14/iaf-aircraft-face-gps-spoofing-over-myanmar-during-quake-relief-mission.html
  1. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Spoofing the Sky: EW in Asia-Pacific.” 2023.
  1. RAND Corporation. Air Power and Counter-Spoofing Tactics. 2022.
  1. Reuters. “Suspected Chinese EW Operations Affect Civil and Military GPS in Southeast Asia.” March 2024.
  1. GPS Spoofing & Electronic Warfare, Humphreys, Todd E. Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer. University of Texas at Austin, 2008.
  1. Goward, Terry. “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Spoofing and Jamming – How to Protect Your Assets.” Inside GNSS, 2019.
  1. Pathak, Sriparna. “China’s Deepening Role in Myanmar’s Military and Tech Infrastructure.” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 2023.
  1. Thakur, Ramesh. China’s Grey Zone Warfare in the Indo-Pacific. Lowy Institute, 2023.
Posted on

648: SAINT MARTIN’S ISLAND: A STRATEGIC GEM IN THE BAY OF BENGAL

 

My article published on the IIRF website

on 14 Apr 25.

 

Nestled in the northeastern Bay of Bengal, Saint Martin’s Island, known locally as Narikel Jinjira or Daruchini Dwip, is a small coral island spanning just three square kilometers. This unassuming landmass holds outsized geopolitical significance, located approximately nine kilometers south of Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula and eight kilometers west of Myanmar’s northwest coast. Despite its modest size and population of around 3,700, the island’s strategic location near critical maritime routes and its proximity to the Bangladesh-Myanmar maritime border have drawn the attention of regional and global powers, including the United States, China, India, and others.

 

Historical Context and Sovereignty

Saint Martin’s Island has a rich history intertwined with regional geopolitics. Millennia ago, it was an extension of the Teknaf peninsula, but rising sea levels submerged parts of the land, creating the island as it exists today. Named after Saint Martin by British colonial authorities in the 19th century, it was previously called Jazira by Arabian merchants who settled there in the 18th century. The island became part of British India in 1900, Pakistan after the 1947 partition, and Bangladesh following its independence in 1971. A 1974 agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, later affirmed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2012, solidified Bangladesh’s sovereignty over the island, despite occasional tensions with Myanmar over maritime boundaries.

The island’s economy is modest, primarily driven by fishing, rice cultivation, coconut farming, and seaweed harvesting. Tourism is gaining traction due to its pristine beaches and coral reefs. However, its strategic value far outweighs its economic contributions, making it a focal point in South Asian geopolitics.

 

Strategic Location in the Bay of Bengal

Saint Martin’s Island’s location is its most defining asset. Situated near the mouth of the Naf River and close to the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar, it lies at the crossroads of vital sea lanes in the Bay of Bengal. The bay is a critical maritime zone connecting the Indian Ocean with Southeast Asia and serving as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific. It hosts some of the world’s busiest shipping routes, including those passing through the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint for global trade, particularly for energy supplies. Control over Saint Martin’s Island offers a vantage point for monitoring maritime traffic, conducting surveillance, and projecting naval power in this strategically significant region.

The island’s proximity to the Matarbari Deepsea Port, currently under development in Bangladesh with Japanese investment, further amplifies its importance. The port is set to enhance Bangladesh’s role in regional trade, and Saint Martin’s Island could serve as a complementary outpost for securing maritime routes. Additionally, the island falls within Bangladesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), granting access to marine resources like fish, oil, and gas, which adds an economic dimension to its strategic value.

 

Environmental and Economic Significance

Beyond its geopolitical role, Saint Martin’s Island is an ecologically sensitive area. As Bangladesh’s only coral island, it supports diverse marine life, including coral reefs, sea turtles, and various fish species. However, environmental degradation poses a threat—studies estimate that 70% of its coral reefs were lost between 1980 and 2018 due to anthropogenic factors like overfishing and pollution. Conservation efforts are critical to preserving this biodiversity, which also underpins the island’s tourism potential and fishing-based economy.

Tourism is a growing sector, with the island attracting visitors for its natural beauty and cultural heritage. However, a nine-month tourist restriction starting February 1, 2025, has been imposed to address environmental concerns and regional tensions, particularly with Myanmar. The island’s isolation during the rainy season, when rough seas cut off access to the mainland, underscores its vulnerability and strategic significance as a self-contained outpost.

 

Interests of World Powers

The Bay of Bengal has emerged as a theater of great power competition, and Saint Martin’s Island is a pawn in this geopolitical chessboard. The interests of major powers—particularly the United States, China, and India—stem from the region’s growing importance in global trade and security.

United States. The United States views the Bay of Bengal as a critical component of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, aimed at countering China’s growing influence. Allegations by former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024 suggested that the U.S. sought control over Saint Martin’s Island to establish a military base or airbase, a claim denied by Washington. Such a presence would allow the U.S. to monitor Chinese naval activities, secure shipping lanes, and strengthen its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific. The island’s proximity to the Strait of Malacca makes it an ideal site for surveillance and power projection. While the U.S. has officially dismissed these claims, the island’s strategic value aligns with its broader objectives, including partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, Japan, and Australia.

China. China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, driven by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has heightened its interest in the Bay of Bengal. Beijing has invested heavily in regional infrastructure, including Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar port and a submarine base near Dhaka. Saint Martin’s Island could be a strategic foothold for China to monitor maritime routes and counter U.S. and Indian influence. Reports of Chinese intelligence facilities on Myanmar’s Coco Island, near the Strait of Malacca, underscore Beijing’s ambitions in the region. Control over Saint Martin’s Island would enhance China’s ability to project power and secure its energy imports, which rely heavily on these sea lanes.

India. As a regional power, India is vested in maintaining influence over the Bay of Bengal, which it considers part of its strategic backyard. Saint Martin’s Island’s proximity to India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a key military outpost, makes it a concern. India is wary of foreign powers—particularly China or the U.S.—establishing a presence on the island, which could undermine its regional dominance. New Delhi has supported Bangladesh’s sovereignty over the island and provided economic and military assistance to counterbalance Chinese influence. Any foreign control over Saint Martin’s Island could serve as a “checkpoint” for India’s maritime activities, heightening tensions.

Other Actors. Myanmar’s proximity to Saint Martin’s Island has led to occasional tensions, including cross-border firing and disputes over maritime boundaries. The ongoing conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, involving the Arakan Army, has spilled over into the island’s waters, raising security concerns for Bangladesh. Japan’s investment in the Matarbari port also reflects its interest in the region’s economic potential, which is indirectly tied to the island’s strategic location.

 

Geopolitical Tensions and Allegations. Saint Martin’s Island has been at the center of political controversies in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 claims that her ouster was linked to U.S. pressure over the island sparked widespread debate. She alleged that foreign powers sought to lease or control the island, a narrative her son later disputed. These accusations reflect the island’s role as a lightning rod for sovereignty, foreign influence, and regional security discussions.

 

Conclusion

Saint Martin’s Island may be small, but its strategic location in the Bay of Bengal makes it a coveted prize for world powers. Its proximity to vital maritime routes, economic potential, and environmental significance amplify its importance in a region of great power competition. The United States, China, and India, among others, recognise the island’s value as a potential outpost for surveillance, power projection, and securing trade routes. For Bangladesh, maintaining sovereignty over Saint Martin’s Island is a matter of national pride and a strategic necessity. As geopolitical tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, this tiny coral gem will likely remain a focal point of intrigue and contestation, underscoring the complex interplay of power, sovereignty, and strategy in the modern world.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1210
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

Link to the article on the website:-

Saint Martin’s Island: A Strategic Gem in the Bay Of Bengal (by Air Marshal Anil Khosla)

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Online Research Foundation (ORF), Article: “St. Martin’s Island: A new flashpoint in the Bay of Bengal?” August 21, 2024.
  1. The Financial Express, “St. Martin’s Island: A strategic jewel in the Bay of Bengal – Explained”, August 12, 2024.
  1. India Today, “All about St Martin’s Island, its geopolitical importance amid Bangladesh crisis”, August 11, 2024.
  1. Business Today, “The island that toppled a government: Was Sheikh Hasina ousted over this tiny coral gem in the Bay of Bengal?” August 12, 2024.
  1. ETV Bharat, “Explained | Hasina And The Geostrategic Importance Of St Martin Island In Bangladesh”, August 11, 2024.
  1. Firstpost, “Bangladesh crisis: What could the US gain from acquiring St. Martin’s Island?” August 11, 2024.
  1. The Indian Express, “What is Bangladesh’s St Martin’s Island, under spotlight after Sheikh Hasina’s resignation?”, August 15, 2024.
  1. Moneycontrol, “St Martin’s in Bangladesh: Did this island lead to Sheikh Hasina’s downfall?” August 11, 2024
  2. ABP Live, “St Martin’s Island: Why This Tiny Island In Bangladesh Is Under Spotlight After Sheikh Hasina’s Ouster”, August 11, 2024.
  1. The Business Standard, “Bangladesh strategically vital in Indo-Pacific”, February 28, 2022
  1. Eurasia Review, “Bangladesh’s Balancing Politics with Big Powers in Strategic Bay Of Bengal – OpEd”, December 28, 2021
  1. War on the Rocks, “The Bay of Bengal Could Be the Key to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, June 17, 2022
Posted on

647: BANGLADESH: SHIFTING ALLIANCES, STRATEGIC PROJECTS, AND INDIA’S CONCERNS

 

My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 14 Apr 25.

 

During his four-day visit to China from March 26 to 29, 2025, Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, made provocative statements against India. Speaking in Beijing, Yunus referred to India’s northeastern states, known as the “Seven Sisters,” as a “landlocked region” with “no way to reach the ocean.” He positioned Bangladesh as this region’s “only guardian of the ocean.” He suggested that this geographical situation presented a “huge possibility” for China to expand its economy through Bangladesh. He proposed that China could “build things, produce things, market things, bring things to China, and distribute them to the rest of the world,” effectively framing Bangladesh as a strategic gateway for Chinese economic influence.

These offensive remarks triggered strong reactions in India. They underscore the “persistent vulnerability narrative” associated with India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow strip connecting the Northeast to the rest of the country. These statements reflect a deeper strategic consideration and longstanding agenda. Yunus’s pitch came during a time of strained India- Bangladesh relations, following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 and his decision to prioritise China over India for his first state visit. His comments were seen as an attempt to leverage Bangladesh’s geographic position to attract Chinese investment. This shift in Dhaka’s alignment toward Beijing potentially complicates regional security dynamics, especially given the Northeast’s proximity to the sensitive Chicken’s Neck corridor. Prime Minister Narendra Modi later cautioned Yunus during a meeting on April 4, 2025, at the BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand, urging him to avoid rhetoric that “vitiates the environment” and emphasising the need for constructive bilateral ties.

 

Political Upheaval and Anti-India Sentiment. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government marked a turning point in Bangladesh’s domestic and foreign policy. Hasina’s administration had fostered strong ties with India, emphasising economic cooperation, security partnerships, and infrastructure development. However, her ouster, driven by student protests and political unrest, brought to power an interim government that has adopted a less conciliatory tone toward India. Anti-India utterances have gained traction under the new regime. Additionally, public and political discourse in Bangladesh has seen a rise in criticism of India, often centered on issues like water-sharing disputes and perceived interference in Bangladeshi politics. These sentiments are partly rooted in historical grievances and domestic pressures to assert sovereignty but have strained bilateral ties.

 

Cozying Up to China

Bangladesh’s deepening relationship with China is a significant development under the interim government. Beijing has long sought to expand its influence in South Asia, and Bangladesh’s strategic location makes it a key partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Yunus government has actively courted Chinese investment, signaling a shift from Hasina’s cautious balancing act between India and China.

China’s involvement in Bangladesh spans infrastructure, trade, and defence. In March 2025, Dhaka welcomed Chinese participation in multiple projects, including modernising Mongla Port and expanding the China Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram. Bilateral agreements signed during Yunus’s visit to Beijing included cooperation in the blue economy, maritime dialogue, and a potential Free Trade Agreement. These moves indicate Bangladesh’s intent to leverage China’s economic might to bolster its development agenda.

However, this pivot toward China has raised eyebrows in New Delhi. India views China’s growing presence in Bangladesh as part of a broader strategy to encircle it through the so-called “String of Pearls” – a network of strategic assets in the Indo-Pacific. The shift is particularly concerning given Bangladesh’s proximity to India’s northeastern region, which is connected to the mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” The potential threat of China’s growing presence in Bangladesh is a cause for concern in India.

 

The Teesta River Project: A Geopolitical Flashpoint

The Teesta River, which originates in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal and enters Bangladesh, has long been a point of contention between India and Bangladesh. The river is vital for irrigation and livelihoods in both countries, but disagreements over water sharing have persisted for decades. Bangladesh accuses India of restricting water flow through upstream barrages, particularly during the dry season, affecting millions in its northern districts like Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, and Kurigram.

The Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, estimated at $1 billion, has emerged as a new arena for Sino-Indian rivalry. Under Hasina, Bangladesh had leaned toward India for the project, with New Delhi expressing interest in funding it to counter China’s earlier proposal. However, the interim government has shifted course, inviting Chinese participation. In February 2025, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Environment announced plans to collaborate with China on a master plan for the river’s conservation, involving dredging, embankment construction, and township development. This decision was framed as a response to public demand, with hearings held to build consensus.

For India, Chinese involvement in the Teesta project is alarming. The river’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor means that Chinese personnel or infrastructure near the border could provide Beijing with strategic leverage. India fears that data on water flow or the presence of Chinese engineers could be used to monitor or influence the region’s security dynamics. The project’s geopolitical implications underscore the delicate balance Bangladesh must strike between economic development and regional stability.

 

The Lalmonirhat Airfield Project: A Security Concern

Another development raising red flags in India is Bangladesh’s plan to revive the World War II-era airfield in Lalmonirhat, located just 10 kilometers from the Indian border. Reports suggest Dhaka has sought Chinese assistance to transform the abandoned site into a modern airbase, with discussions reportedly held during Yunus’s China visit. While Bangladesh frames the project as part of its military modernisation under the Forces Goal 2030 initiative, India is wary of its potential implications.

The location of the Lalmonirhat airfield, near the Siliguri Corridor, presents a sensitive issue. If developed with Chinese support, the airbase could serve as a dual-use facility, potentially hosting Chinese military assets disguised as civilian infrastructure. The mere prospect of Chinese involvement so close to India’s border is viewed as a provocative move, particularly in light of Bangladesh’s recent overtures to Pakistan, another rival of India.

 

The Chicken’s Neck: India’s Strategic Redline

The Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken’s Neck, is a narrow strip of land in West Bengal, approximately 20-60 kilometers wide, which connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states. Bordered by Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, it is one of India’s most strategically located regions. The corridor is a lifeline for trade, communication, and military logistics to the northeast. Any disruption in the Chicken’s Neck could isolate the northeast, a scenario India has long sought to prevent. The corridor’s importance has prompted New Delhi to bolster its defences, deploying advanced assets like Rafale fighter jets, BrahMos missiles, and the S-400 air defence system.

Bangladesh’s moves to involve China in projects near the corridor – particularly the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield – are seen as direct challenges to India’s security. A Chinese presence in these areas could enable intelligence gathering, influence local dynamics, or even give Beijing a foothold to pressure India in a crisis. The corridor’s proximity to the Chinese-controlled Chumbi Valley, where tensions flared during the 2017 Doklam standoff, further heightens India’s concerns.

 

Improving Connectivity: Kaladan Project

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is a significant infrastructure initiative to enhance connectivity between India and Myanmar, foster economic growth, and strengthen bilateral ties. Launched in 2008 under India’s Act East Policy, the project seeks to connect Kolkata’s seaport with Sittwe in Myanmar’s Rakhine State by sea, then link Sittwe to Paletwa through the Kaladan River, and finally extend from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border in Mizoram by road. Spanning approximately 539 km by sea, 158 km by river, and 110 km by road, it offers an alternative route to India’s northeastern states, bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor and reducing travel distance by about 1,328 km.

Fully funded by India at an estimated cost of $484 million, the project faced numerous challenges, including delays due to political instability in Myanmar, the Rohingya crisis, conflicts involving the Arakan Army, and logistical issues like monsoons and rugged terrain. While the Sittwe port and Paletwa jetty were completed by 2017, with dredging finalised, the road from Paletwa to Zorinpui remains under construction. Recent control of Paletwa by the Arakan Army has raised concerns about the project’s viability, though assurances of cooperation have been made.

The project promises substantial economic benefits, boosting trade and development in India’s landlocked Northeast by providing sea access to Southeast Asian markets. Strategically, it enhances India’s regional influence, countering China’s presence. However, ongoing conflicts and coordination issues underscore the need for diplomatic engagement with local stakeholders to ensure timely completion, making the Kaladan Project a critical yet complex endeavour for regional connectivity and economic integration.

 

Indian Concerns and Regional Implications

India’s concerns about Bangladesh’s recent trajectory are multifaceted. First, the rise in anti-India rhetoric threatens to erode the goodwill built over decades of cooperation. Projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and India’s $8 billion in credit lines for Bangladeshi infrastructure underscore the depth of bilateral ties, but these are now at risk due to political uncertainty.

China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh challenges India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood. New Delhi fears that Bangladesh could become a key node in China’s regional strategy, undermining India’s role as a counterweight in the Indo-Pacific. With planned visits by its foreign minister and secretary in April 2025, Pakistan’s involvement adds another layer of complexity as Islamabad seeks to capitalise on Dhaka’s shift.

Further, the strategic projects near the Siliguri Corridor raise immediate security concerns. India has responded by enhancing its military posture but recognises the need for diplomatic engagement. The meeting between Yunus and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in April 2025 was described as “constructive,” with discussions on water sharing, border issues, and minority rights. However, tangible progress remains elusive.

 

Indian Retribution.

Since 08 April, India has terminated a transhipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to route export goods through Indian ports, airports, and land customs stations to third countries. Established in 2020, the arrangement had facilitated cost-effective and efficient trade, particularly for Bangladesh’s garment industry, which relied on Indian infrastructure to reach markets in Europe and the Gulf.

India cited logistical challenges, including port and airport congestion, as the primary reason for the withdrawal. Indian exporters, especially in apparel, had long complained that the facility strained capacity, inflating costs and delaying shipments. However, the timing suggests a strategic response to Bangladesh’s growing alignment with China, raising regional security and influence concerns. Exceptions were made for exports to Nepal and Bhutan, aligning with World Trade Organization obligations for landlocked nations. The move disrupts Bangladesh’s trade logistics, forcing reliance on longer, costlier routes through its ports like Chittagong.

 

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s recent developments reflect a complex interplay of domestic priorities and geopolitical ambitions. The interim government’s outreach to China and anti-India rhetoric have set off alarm bells in New Delhi, particularly regarding the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield projects. The Chicken’s Neck remains a critical concern, with India taking no chances to secure its lifeline to the northeast. As Bangladesh navigates its path, it must balance economic imperatives with regional stability, while India grapples with the challenge of maintaining influence in a rapidly changing neighbourhood. The coming months will test the resilience of India-Bangladesh relations and the broader dynamics of South Asian geopolitics.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1210
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

Link to the article on the website:-

Bangladesh Tries Creating Thorns In India’s Achilles Heal, A Region Defended By Rafale, BrahMos, S-400

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. The Economic Times, April 6, 2025: “Chinese airfield plan in Bangladesh district close to Chicken’s Neck area raises Indian concerns.”
  1. The Diplomat, May 22, 2024: “Teesta River Project Pushes Bangladesh into China-India Cold War.”
  1. The Hindu, March 28, 2025: “Bangladesh welcomes China to participate in Teesta project.”
  1. Business Today, April 8, 2025: “India Alarmed as Bangladesh Plans Strategic Base near Chicken’s Neck with China’s Help.”
  1. Indian Defence Research Wing, April 8, 2025: “Bangladesh Seeks China’s Assistance for Lalmonirhat Airbase: A Strategic Concern for India.”
  1. Pant, Harsh V., & Sahu, Premesha. “China’s Strategic Entrenchment in Bangladesh: Implications for India.” ORF Issue Brief, 2021.
  1. “Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act: Navigating India-China Rivalry.” ISAS Insights, 2022.
  1. Ganguly, Sumit. “India’s Neighborhood First Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?” Carnegie India, 2021.
  1. “Bangladesh’s Mega Projects and the BRI Footprint: Analyzing the Economic and Strategic Layers.” SAM Analysis, 2023.
  1. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia: Strategic Implications for India.” CSIS Briefs, 2021.
English हिंदी