Month: December 2024

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568: CHINA THROUGH THE US PRISM 2024

Pic Coutesy Net

 

The Department of Defence (DoD) of the USA released its annual report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”. The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China charts the course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military strategy and offers insight into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities, and activities as well as its future modernisation goals. This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC through early 2024.

 

This is a summary of the 182-page report.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE PRC’S STRATEGY

 

The PRC’s National Strategy. The PRC’s longstanding national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC’s national power and revise the international order to support the PRC’s governance system and national interests.

 

The PRC’s Foreign Policy. The PRC’s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into a “community of common destiny” to support its strategy to realise “rejuvenation.” PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an environment favourable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.

 

The PRC’s Economic Policy. The PRC acknowledges internal and external challenges that complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favourable factors in the PRC’s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC’s ongoing military modernisation objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.

 

The PRC’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy. In 2023, the PRC’s stated defence policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasising a more significant global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.

 

PLA FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

 

The PLA’s Modernisation and Reform. The PLA has sought to modernise its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counter space, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies, including commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.

 

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues its decades-long effort to modernise equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLAA demonstrated long-range joint fire capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.

 

PLA Navy (PLAN). Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is composed mainly of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLAN continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLAN carrier in a calendar year.

 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is rapidly modernising and indigenising its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems, matching U.S. standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLAN shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defence, and radar units to the PLAAF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC’s integrated air defence systems and the ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC’s national integrated air defence system network.

 

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernisation plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also explore developing conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

 

The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF). On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF and the alignment of its subordinate forces—Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)—directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF) under the CMC to coordinate the management of the military’s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organisational structure features four theatre-grade services—the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF—and four deputy-theatre-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).

 

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). JJSF improves joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilisation, the JLSF will probably rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.

 

PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is another paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.

 

Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite emphasising joint training, theatre commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it challenging to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.

 

PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing its capabilities to conduct military operations more profoundly in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken critical structural reforms, introduced a new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations, and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.

 

Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasised power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.

 

Advancements toward an Informatised and Intelligentised Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which is regarded as a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentised warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 

Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernise, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it with multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.

 

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC’S PERIPHERY

 

Theater Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with establishing the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands. These command structures are organised based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theatre Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theatre.

    • The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. In April 2023, the ETC executed the exercise JOINT SWORD, which was aimed at pressuring Taiwan.
    • The Southern Theater Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS. It can assume command, as needed, of the overall CCG and CMM ships, enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including deploying howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border.
    • The Western Theater Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asian borders. It focuses on the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.”
    • The Northern Theater Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security.
    • The Central Theater Command’s (CTC’s) mission is to defend Beijing while supporting other theater commands.

 

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and air defence identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicised major military exercises near Taiwan.

 

Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones that are useful for defending against PRC grey-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.

 

Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLAN, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.

 

PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behaviour. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced U.S. platforms’ coercive and risky air intercepts compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe manoeuvres near allied forces operating in the region.

 

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

 

The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLAN’s evolving focus from “offshore defence” to “open seas protection” and the PLAAF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.

 

PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theaters, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors the necessary experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest peacekeeper contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums.

 

Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalise its overseas presence and deepen defence ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), the MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and the BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC had expanded combined exercises with Russia since 2018 when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.

 

Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC seeks to expand its overseas logistics and base infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is likely already considering and planning additional military logistics facilities to support the projection of naval, air, and ground forces.

 

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNISATION

 

PRC Defence Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defence budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defence budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defence spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defence spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defence, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending.

 

Developments in the Defence Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have significantly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage. It can produce a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.

 

Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC will likely decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory quickly. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.

 

SPECIAL TOPICS

 

Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernisation goals. Between July and December 2023, 15 high-ranking military officers and defence industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernising China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions.

 

Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been strengthening and revitalising political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalise political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces.

 

PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualised across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources, as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates back to at least the 1960s, but in the 1980s, as the PRC developed the Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted CNP to measure China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist and the West’s capitalist systems. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.

 

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References and credits

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Summary Courtesy: DoD annual Report to USA Congress.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

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567: CHINA FLIES ITS SIXTH-GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE OF AIR COMBAT

Pics courtesy Net

My article published on the Chanakya Forum website on 27 Dec 24.

 

On December 26, 2024, China achieved a significant milestone in military aviation with the successful first flight of its next-generation, sixth-generation fighter jet. This news, shared through videos on social media, underscores China’s advancing aerospace capabilities and ambition to compete with global superpowers in the future of air combat. In November 2024, at the Zhuhai Airshow, China had unveiled a full-scale model of its sixth-generation fighter, named the “White Emperor” or “Baidi.” This aircraft is part of Project Nantianmen’s research initiative exploring future aviation technologies.

China has made significant strides in developing cutting-edge military technologies in the ongoing arms race among world powers. A prime example of this ambition is the country’s pursuit of a sixth-generation fighter jet. Unlike its predecessors, which were revolutionary in their own right, China’s sixth-generation fighter promises to redefine air warfare in the coming decades.

 

Sixth-Generation Fighter

Before delving into China’s specific design, it is essential to understand what distinguishes a sixth-generation fighter aircraft from its predecessors. The first generation of fighters began with piston-engine aircraft during World War I, evolving through successive generations of increasingly advanced jet-powered machines. By the time the fifth generation came into focus in the late 20th century, fighters like the U.S. F-22 Raptor and the Russian Su-57 showcased advanced stealth features, integrated avionics, and supercruise capabilities.

 

Sixth-generation aircraft are set to exceed the capabilities of the fifth-generation in multiple areas. China’s sixth-generation fighter is expected to embody many, if not all, of these attributes, setting the stage for a paradigm shift in air combat. Some of the most anticipated features of a sixth-generation fighter include the following.

 

    • Stealth. The focus will be reducing radar cross-sections and evading detection from multiple sensors, including infrared, radio frequency, and satellite-based tracking.

 

    • AI and Autonomous Capabilities. Artificial intelligence will play a pivotal role in operations, potentially offering more autonomous flight options, battlefield decision-making, and real-time data analysis.

 

    • Enhanced Supersonic Speeds. Supersonic or hypersonic speeds will allow faster response times and increased evasion capabilities.

 

    • Directed Energy Weapons. Laser weapons and high-powered microwave systems are expected to be integrated into future designs to counter incoming missiles and drones.

 

    • Increased Network Integration. These fighters will likely be part of a larger, interconnected combat system where communication and data-sharing between aircraft, ground stations, and satellite networks are seamless.

 

    • Space-warfare Capabilities. A highly ambitious feature, these aircraft might be capable of launching attacks from near or low Earth orbit, giving them an unprecedented range and scope of operations.

 

The White Emperor: China’s Flagship Sixth-Generation Fighter

 

 

The most publicised and speculated model of China’s sixth-generation fighter is the “White Emperor” (Baidi), revealed in November 2024 during the Zhuhai Airshow. While exact specifications and performance capabilities remain primarily classified, several key characteristics of the White Emperor may include the following features.

 

Design and Stealth Features. The aircraft’s design will likely incorporate advanced stealth technologies beyond those seen in fifth-generation fighters, such as the U.S. F-35 and China’s own J-20. The White Emperor features a sleek, angular frame with a small radar cross-section, indicating composite materials and radar-absorbing coatings. Its design may also include a more refined control surface to optimise aerodynamics while maintaining low detectability across various sensor types. A significant departure from earlier generations might be using adaptive camouflage and technologies capable of deceiving advanced detection systems. These stealth features would reduce the aircraft’s visibility to radar and lower its thermal signature, which is crucial in avoiding infrared tracking from enemy aircraft and satellites.

 

Hypersonic Capabilities. One of the most talked-about features of the White Emperor is its potential hypersonic capabilities. The aircraft is reportedly designed to operate at altitudes of up to 25,000 meters, well beyond the reach of traditional fighter jets, and possibly capable of achieving speeds greater than Mach 5 (the speed of sound at five times the speed of sound). This would give it a significant edge in terms of both offence and defence, enabling it to outmanoeuvre current air defences and launch attacks with minimal warning. Hypersonic flight would also enhance the jet’s ability to intercept ballistic missiles and conduct long-range strikes, positioning China as a leading power in the hypersonic arms race. Hypersonic weapons also have the advantage of unpredictable trajectories, making it harder for enemies to defend against them.

 

AI and Autonomy. One of the most innovative aspects of the White Emperor is the role of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. Unlike previous generations, which relied heavily on human pilots for tactical decision-making, sixth-generation fighters like the White Emperor could be equipped with AI systems capable of analysing vast amounts of data in real-time, making tactical decisions, and even controlling the aircraft’s operations during combat scenarios. The AI could assist the pilot by suggesting optimal manoeuvres, countering incoming threats, or engaging targets without direct human intervention. Furthermore, the aircraft may have options for fully autonomous missions, where the aircraft operates without the need for a pilot at all. This capability could dramatically increase the speed and efficiency of missions, particularly in high-stakes, high-speed engagements.

 

Directed Energy Weapons. The integration of directed energy weapons (DEWs), such as lasers or high-powered microwave systems, is another area where the White Emperor may surpass previous generations. Depending on the aircraft’s configuration, these systems can be used for air-to-air combat, air-to-ground, and air-to-space operations. Laser weapons can disable enemy drones, incoming missiles, and even aircraft at a distance without firing traditional munitions. This opens up new possibilities for offensive and defensive strategies, especially in contested areas where traditional missile defence systems may be overwhelmed.

 

Strategic Importance of China’s Sixth-Generation Fighter

 

 

China’s development of a sixth-generation fighter jet is a technological achievement and a strategic move that could alter the global balance of power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The country’s growing military capabilities, including advancements in naval power and missile technology, have been viewed with increasing concern by other world powers, especially the United States and its allies.

 

Deterrence and Power Projection. The deployment of a sixth-generation fighter would give China a significant deterrent against potential adversaries. With advanced stealth, AI capabilities, and hypersonic speeds, the aircraft would be capable of conducting strikes against enemies at a moment’s notice, potentially disrupting enemy forces’ operational capabilities. The aircraft’s space-warfare capability also positions it as a tool for projecting power in regions far beyond China’s borders. For China, The White Emperor represents more than just an air superiority platform—it symbolises the country’s growing influence in military and technological domains. The ability to deploy advanced air combat technologies would bolster China’s strategic posture, particularly in contested areas like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, where tensions with the U.S. and other regional powers have been rising.

 

Space and Cyber Warfare Integration. China’s sixth-generation fighter may also play a crucial role in the country’s broader efforts to dominate space and cyber warfare. The potential ability to strike from space—an area traditionally outside the reach of conventional fighters—would provide China with unprecedented operational flexibility. Moreover, integrating cyber warfare capabilities into such an aircraft could allow it to disrupt or degrade enemy communication, navigation, and surveillance systems, giving China an advantage in kinetic and non-kinetic warfare.

 

Geopolitical Implications. China’s development of sixth-generation fighters indicates a broader global military power shift. With its military modernisation efforts, China is positioning itself to rival the United States and Russia, which are also investing in next-generation air combat technologies. Moreover, China’s advancements could spark an arms race in air combat technology, with other countries seeking to develop their sixth-generation aircraft or advanced air defence systems to counter China’s growing military strength.

 

Implications for the U.S. and Allies. The United States and its allies have long dominated the skies with fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35. China’s leap into sixth-generation technology challenges this dominance and could prompt a significant shift in military strategies. In response, the U.S. may accelerate its development of sixth-generation aircraft, such as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, to maintain technological parity.

 

Regional Stability. In the Asia-Pacific region, the emergence of China’s sixth-generation fighter could alter the strategic calculations of neighbouring countries, especially in the context of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the ongoing tensions surrounding Taiwan. As China’s air combat capabilities grow, regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, and India may invest in their advanced fighter aircraft to maintain a credible deterrent against Chinese aggression.

 

Implications for India. The Baidi B-Type, alongside other advanced Chinese military assets, would enhance the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) capabilities, posing a challenge to India in the region. With potential deployment along contentious areas like the Line of Actual Control (LAC), these advanced jets may provide China with enhanced reconnaissance and strike capabilities, pressuring India’s defensive postures. India must accelerate its development or acquisition of sixth-generation technologies to maintain a competitive edge. This highlights the urgency for India to further its Indigenous defence programs, such as the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

 

Conclusion. China’s sixth-generation fighter aircraft represents a quantum leap in military aviation. With hypersonic speeds, AI-driven combat systems, and potential space-warfare capabilities, the White Emperor promises to be a game-changer in the evolving landscape of air combat. Its development underscores China’s growing military capabilities and desire to establish itself as a global superpower in conventional and unconventional warfare domains. As the world watches China’s next moves, its sixth-generation fighter’s implications will likely reverberate across global power dynamics for years to come.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

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CHINA FLIES ITS SIXTH-GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE OF AIR COMBAT

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References and credits

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References:-

  1. Jennings, Gareth. “China Flies Prototype of Sixth-Generation Fighter: Key Features Revealed.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 November 2024.
  1. Rogoway, Tyler. “What China’s Sixth-Gen Fighter Means for the U.S. Air Force.” The War Zone, 10 October 2024.
  1. Defense News. “China’s Sixth-Gen Fighter: First Look at the Prototype.” 18 November 2024, www.defensenews.com.
  1. Insinna, Valerie. “Understanding the Sixth-Generation Fighter Race.” Breaking Defense, 25 August 2024.
  1. Miller, Stephen. “Hypersonics, Stealth, and AI: The Components of Sixth-Gen Fighters.” Air Force Technology Blog, 5 October 2024.
  1. Singh, Ankit. “AI-Driven Combat Systems in Sixth-Generation Fighters.” IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, vol. 39, no. 5, 2024, pp. 34-40.
  1. Johnson, Mark. “The Evolution of Air Superiority: Analyzing the Shift to Sixth-Generation Fighter Technology.” Journal of Military Aviation Research, vol. 14, no. 3, 2023, pp. 45-61.
  1. Chen, Ming-Yu. “China’s Military Modernization: Sixth-Generation Fighter Programs in Context.” Asia-Pacific Defense Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 2022, pp. 23-34.
  1. Smith, Alexander. “Artificial Intelligence in Air Combat: Implications for the Sixth-Generation Fighter Race.” Aerospace Technology Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 2023, pp. 12-20.
  1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The Future of Airpower: A Comparative Analysis of Sixth-Gen Fighter Programs. Washington, D.C., 2024.
  1. Bronk, Justin. The Future of Airpower: Trends, Technologies, and Strategies. London: Routledge, 2021.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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566: UNINTENDED TARGETS:  ACCIDENTAL AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWNS

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

On December 25, 2024, an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer E190 aircraft, operating as Flight J2-8243, crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The flight departed Baku, Azerbaijan, en route to Grozny, Russia, but it was diverted due to adverse weather conditions. Initial reports suggest a bird strike may have caused an emergency, leading to the diversion. However, the holes in the fuselage resembling shrapnel or bullet marks indicate that there is the possibility that air defences mistakenly targeted the aircraft. The exact cause of the crash remains under investigation, with authorities from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia collaborating and assistance from the aircraft manufacturer Embraer. The plane’s black box has been recovered, which will aid investigators in determining the precise cause of the crash.

 

The overlap of civilian and military aviation domains creates a fertile ground for tragic errors. Airspace identification and management challenges must be recognised to understand accidental shootdowns. The need for improved communication protocols is urgent. Factors such as outdated radar systems, insufficient communication protocols, and human error contribute to these tragedies. The fog of war often amplifies the likelihood of misidentification, leading to catastrophic consequences. The accidental shooting down of aircraft is usually a consequence of a mix of misidentification, heightened geopolitical tensions, or technical failures, underscoring the dangers of operating in conflict zones or amidst deteriorating communication protocols.

 

Past Cases of Accidental Shootdowns

 

Iran Air Flight 655 (1988). Perhaps one of the most infamous cases, Iran Air Flight 655, was a commercial Airbus A300 en route from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai on July 3, 1988. The flight was shot down by the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Vincennes over the Persian Gulf, resulting in the deaths of all 290 passengers and crew. The USS Vincennes misidentified the aircraft as an Iranian F-14 fighter jet amid tensions during the Iran-Iraq War. Despite being in civilian airspace and broadcasting a commercial aircraft transponder signal, the plane was targeted by surface-to-air missiles. The incident provoked international outrage and strained U.S.-Iran relations. It highlighted the need for better protocols in distinguishing civilian aircraft from military threats.

 

Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (1983). On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747, was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor near Sakhalin Island. The aircraft had strayed into Soviet airspace while en route from Anchorage to Seoul. Navigational errors caused the aircraft to veer off course. Soviet forces, suspecting the plane was a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, ordered its destruction. Despite initial hesitation, they launched missiles, killing all 269 on board. The incident escalated Cold War tensions and spurred international aviation reforms, including the widespread adoption of GPS navigation.

 

Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (2014). Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was a Boeing 777 flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. On July 17, 2014, it was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a Buk surface-to-air missile. The missile was launched from a conflict zone controlled by pro-Russian separatists. The missile system crew likely mistook the civilian aircraft for a Ukrainian military transport plane. The use of advanced weaponry in a volatile region without adequate safeguards led to the tragedy. All 298 passengers and crew died, prompting international investigations. The incident further strained relations between Russia and Western nations and underscored the risks of civilian flights over conflict zones.

 

Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 (2001). On October 4, 2001, Siberia Airlines Flight 1812, a Tupolev Tu-154, was shot down over the Black Sea during a Ukrainian military exercise. The aircraft was en route from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk. An S-200 surface-to-air missile fired during a live-fire exercise accidentally struck the plane. The missile veered off course and locked onto the civilian aircraft. All 78 people on board perished. The incident highlighted the dangers of conducting military exercises near civilian airspace and prompted stricter regulations.

 

Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 (1973). On February 21, 1973, Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114, a Boeing 727, was shot down by Israeli Air Force fighter jets over the Sinai Peninsula. The plane had inadvertently entered Israeli airspace due to navigation errors. Despite attempts to guide the plane away, the Israeli Air Force ultimately fired on the aircraft, suspecting hostile intent. Of the 113 on board, 108 died. The incident raised ethical questions about proportional responses and the handling of airspace violations.

 

Consequences of Accidental Aircraft Shootdowns

 

Accidental aircraft shootdowns are among the most tragic events in aviation history, leaving lasting impacts on individuals, governments, and the global aviation industry. The human cost of such incidents, the loss of innocent lives, is immeasurable. The repercussions of such incidents extend far beyond the immediate loss of life, touching on humanitarian, political, legal, and economic domains.

 

Humanitarian Consequences. The most immediate and devastating consequence is the loss of innocent lives. Passengers and crew aboard these flights are often civilians travelling for business, leisure, or family reasons. Their untimely deaths leave families and communities in profound grief, struggling to cope with the emotional and psychological toll. Survivors (in rare cases) and first responders often endure lasting psychological trauma. Witnessing the aftermath of such incidents or being involved in rescue and recovery operations can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health issues.

 

Political Fallout. Accidental shootdowns frequently lead to significant diplomatic strains between nations. The downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983 by the Soviet Union heightened Cold War tensions. Similarly, the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 by the United States in 1988 strained U.S.-Iran relations, fostering mistrust that persists today. Such incidents often prompt international condemnation and demands for accountability, further complicating already tense geopolitical relationships.

 

Erosion of Trust in Governments and Militaries. When state actors are involved in accidental shootdowns, public trust in their competence and accountability may erode. Governments and militaries responsible for such tragedies often face domestic and international scrutiny, with critics questioning their operational protocols and decision-making processes.

 

Legal and Financial Repercussions. Governments and organisations responsible for accidental shootdowns are often required to provide compensation to the victims’ families. For instance, the United States paid $61.8 million in compensation to the families of those killed in the Iran Air Flight 655 incident. While monetary settlements cannot undo the loss, they are essential to acknowledging responsibility and offering redress. Accidental shootdowns often lead to lengthy legal disputes. Families of victims may file lawsuits against airlines, governments, or military entities. These legal proceedings can span years, as seen in the MH17 case.

 

Reputational Damage and Economic Strain on Airlines. Airlines linked to shootdowns may experience a loss of customer confidence. Passengers may associate the carrier with unsafe practices, even when the airline is not at fault, resulting in reputational harm. Airlines involved in these tragedies often face significant financial losses. In addition to compensation pay-outs, they may suffer from diminished passenger trust, leading to reduced ticket sales and reputational damage.

 

Factors Contributing to Accidental Aircraft Shootdowns

 

Accidental aircraft shootdowns are tragic events often marked by a complex interplay of technical errors, human misjudgements, and geopolitical tensions. Such incidents highlight vulnerabilities in modern airspace management and distinguishing between civilian and military aircraft. Understanding the contributing factors is essential to mitigating future risks and enhancing aviation safety.

 

Misidentification of Aircraft. One of the most common causes of accidental shootdowns is the misidentification of civilian aircraft as military threats. Civilian and military aircraft sometimes share similar radar signatures, leading to confusion. For example, larger planes like the Boeing 747 or Airbus A300 can be mistaken for military transport or reconnaissance planes, particularly in tense geopolitical contexts. Older or malfunctioning Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems often fail to distinguish between friendly, hostile, or neutral aircraft accurately. In high-pressure situations, this lack of clarity can lead to tragic outcomes.

 

Lack of Real-Time Information Sharing. Insufficient coordination between civilian air traffic control and military defence systems contributes to misidentification. Military personnel often rely on incomplete or outdated radar data, increasing the likelihood of errors.

 

Human Error and Cognitive Bias. Human operators play a critical role in air defence systems, but high-stress environments can impair decision-making. Cognitive biases and operational errors are significant contributors to accidental shootdowns.

 

Stress-Induced Overreaction. Operators may act defensively during military conflicts or heightened alerts, perceiving any unidentified aircraft as a potential threat. This “shoot first, verify later” mentality has led to several tragedies, such as the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988.

 

Training Deficiencies. Inadequate training for personnel handling sophisticated air defence systems can result in poor judgment. Operators may lack the skills to interpret complex radar data accurately, leading to hasty decisions.

 

Communication Failures. Miscommunication between different units or command levels can cause conflicting instructions, further exacerbating the risk of errors. Clear and concise communication is often sacrificed in fast-evolving scenarios, increasing the likelihood of mistakes.

 

Geopolitical Tensions and Conflict Zones. Aircraft operating near conflict zones face heightened risks due to the volatile environment. The presence of armed forces, advanced weaponry, and ongoing hostilities creates a dangerous landscape for both civilian and military aviation.

 

Use of Advanced Weaponry in Unstable Regions. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other advanced air defence systems deployed in conflict zones often lack proper safeguards. These weapons can lock onto unintended targets, as seen in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014.

 

No-Fly Zones and Restricted Airspace. While no-fly zones aim to protect civilian aircraft, their enforcement can lead to unintentional engagements. Pilots unaware of or accidentally straying into restricted airspace may be perceived as threats, resulting in their planes being shot down.

 

Political Mistrust and Escalation. Geopolitical hostilities heighten the tendency to view unidentified aircraft as enemies. This mistrust was a key factor in the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shootdown by the Soviet Union in 1983, where navigational errors led to the plane’s fatal incursion into Soviet airspace.

 

Technical Failures and System Malfunctions. Technological advancements in aviation and defence systems have improved safety, but technical failures contribute to accidental shootdowns.

 

Radar and Sensor Issues. Faulty or miscalibrated radar systems can misinterpret aircraft altitude, speed, or identity. Defence systems may sometimes fail to differentiate between civilian and military planes due to overlapping flight characteristics.

 

Malfunctioning Weaponry. Missiles and other air defence equipment are not immune to errors. For instance, stray projectiles can inadvertently strike civilian aircraft during live-fire exercises, as occurred with Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 in 2001.

 

Software Errors. As defence systems become increasingly automated, software glitches can lead to catastrophic outcomes. Reliance on automated decision-making processes without sufficient human oversight amplifies risks.

 

Airspace Violations and Navigation Errors. Aircraft unintentionally entering restricted or sensitive airspace are at high risk of being targeted. These violations often result from miscommunication, outdated navigation tools, or human error.

 

Outdated Navigational Systems. Pilots relying on older technology or misinterpreting coordinates may inadvertently breach restricted zones, which was a contributing factor in the tragedy of Korean Air Lines Flight 007.

 

Language Barriers and Miscommunication. International flights often require coordination across different air traffic control jurisdictions. Misunderstandings due to language differences or procedural discrepancies can lead to fatal airspace breaches.

 

Lack of Awareness of Local Regulations. Pilots unfamiliar with regional airspace restrictions may unintentionally enter prohibited zones, triggering defensive responses from military forces.

 

Lessons Learned and Preventive Measures

 

While rare, accidental aircraft shootdowns are catastrophic events that highlight vulnerabilities in global aviation and air defence systems. These tragedies underscore the importance of implementing preventive measures and learning from past incidents to reduce risks and enhance safety.

 

Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Technology. Modernising Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems is crucial for preventing misidentifications. Current technologies, such as Mode 5 IFF, use encrypted signals to identify civilian and military aircraft accurately. Expanding the adoption of such systems can reduce the likelihood of confusion during high-stress situations.

 

Civil-Military Coordination. Enhanced communication between civilian air traffic controllers and military defence units is essential. Military operators can make informed decisions by sharing real-time flight data, including aircraft location, speed, and identification. Joint training exercises can further improve understanding and coordination between these entities.

 

Universal Transponder Mandates. Ensuring that all aircraft, including small private planes, are equipped with functioning transponders can help prevent misidentifications. International organisations like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) can work toward universal transponder installation and usage mandates.

 

Avoiding High-Risk Areas. One of the most effective preventive measures is rerouting flights to avoid conflict zones. Airlines and aviation authorities should proactively adjust routes based on intelligence about active conflicts. For example, after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine, many airlines now avoid flying over areas with active hostilities.

 

Real-Time Risk Assessments. Governments and aviation organisations should conduct continuous risk assessments of global airspace. Platforms like the European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) Conflict Zone Information Bulletin provide valuable updates on high-risk regions, enabling airlines to make informed routing decisions.

 

No-Fly Zones and Buffer Regions. Clearly defined and well-enforced no-fly zones can help prevent accidental incursions into sensitive airspace. Additionally, creating buffer regions around conflict zones can reduce the chances of accidental shootdowns.

 

Comprehensive Training. Military personnel operating air defence systems must undergo rigorous training to handle high-pressure situations. Simulated scenarios, including drills that mimic real-world complexities, can improve their ability to distinguish between threats and non-threats.

 

Decision-Making Frameworks. Implementing structured decision-making protocols can help reduce errors during emergencies. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should require operators to verify the aircraft’s identity multiple times before engaging. Introducing mandatory approval from higher command levels for initiating fire can add a layer of oversight.

 

Automated Defence Systems with Human Oversight. While automation can improve response times, it also carries risks of misjudgement. Advanced defence systems should integrate automated threat detection with mandatory human oversight to ensure balanced decision-making.

 

Enhanced Radar and Sensor Systems. Upgrading radar and sensor technology can help differentiate civilian aircraft from potential military threats. Modern systems use artificial intelligence (AI) to analyse flight patterns and identify anomalies, providing operators with more accurate information.

 

Satellite Monitoring and Data Sharing. Real-time satellite monitoring can complement radar systems by providing additional data on aircraft movements. International collaboration on satellite-based surveillance can enhance situational awareness, particularly in conflict zones.

 

Global Standards and Agreements. International organisations like ICAO and the United Nations must establish and enforce global standards for airspace safety. Collaborative agreements can facilitate the sharing of intelligence and best practices among nations.

 

Confidence-Building Measures. Bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures can reduce the likelihood of misinterpretations during geopolitical tensions. Joint military exercises, hotlines for conflict resolution, and agreements on airspace usage can prevent misunderstandings that lead to tragedies.

 

Learning from Past Incidents. Analysing historical shootdowns provides valuable lessons for the future. Events like the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, Iran Air Flight 655, and MH17 have spurred significant changes in aviation protocols and defence systems.

 

Conclusion. Accidental aircraft shootdowns are a sobering reminder of the inherent risks in aviation, particularly in regions marked by conflict and tension.  The consequences of unintentional aircraft shootdowns are far-reaching, affecting individuals, governments, and the aviation industry on multiple levels. From the devastating humanitarian impact to the long-term political and economic repercussions, these tragedies leave indelible marks on global society. Misidentification, human error, geopolitical tensions, technical failures, and airspace violations all contribute to these devastating incidents.  While technological and procedural advancements have reduced their frequency, these incidents underscore the need for continued vigilance, cooperation, and innovation. By learning from past tragedies, the global community can strive to ensure that the skies remain safe.

 

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Unintended Targets: Accidental Aircraft Shootdowns (by Air Marshal Anil Khosla)

 

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References and credits

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