Month: December 2024

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571: THE BOOMERANG EFFECT: WHEN MILITANT GROUPS TURN ON THEIR SPONSORS

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

My Article Published in the Life of Soldiers (a premier monthly defence magazine) on 30 Dec 24.

 

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, played a significant role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the battle for Bakhmut. In May 2023, Wagner forces captured Bakhmut for Russia after intense fighting. In June 2023, tensions between Wagner’s leadership and the Russian military culminated in a brief mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s chief. The rebellion ended with an agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and charges against Prigozhin were later dropped. Following Prigozhin’s controversial death in a plane crash in August 2023, the future of Wagner became uncertain. By October 2023, elements of the group were integrated into Russia’s National Guard, Rosgvardia, indicating a restructuring under state control.

 

Boomerang Effect.

 

The phenomenon where militant groups turn on their sponsors is often called the “boomerang effect.” This happens when organisations or groups created, funded, or supported by a state or another actor shift their allegiances or use their skills and resources against their former backers. The reasons for this shift can be complex and multifaceted, involving ideological differences, changing power dynamics, or disillusionment with their sponsors’ objectives. Contributing factors are as follows:- 

 

Ideological Divergence. Initially, militant groups are often created with shared goals and objectives aligned with their sponsors. However, as they gain strength and experience, they may develop their agendas. Differences in ideology can lead to clashes, especially if the militants feel their sponsors are manipulating them for geopolitical gain.

 

Loss of Control. Sponsors often lose control over the militants they support. As these groups gain legitimacy and power, they may increasingly act independently, pursuing their objectives, which might not align with those of their sponsors. This can lead to a strategic shift where militants view their sponsors as obstacles rather than allies.

 

Disillusionment and Frustration. Sometimes, militants feel let down by their sponsors. They may believe that their resources or support are inadequate or misdirected. This frustration can lead to losing loyalty, with groups turning against their sponsors.

 

Changing Power Dynamics. As the geopolitical landscape changes, so too can militants’ strategic interests. They may switch sides in pursuit of more favourable conditions, especially when they see greater opportunities to achieve their goals with a different sponsor or on their own.

 

The Wagner Group Story

 

Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor (PMC), provides a recent example of a sponsored organisation turning against its sponsor. Initially backed by the Russian government, Wagner became a powerful, semi-autonomous entity with ambitions and interests, ultimately leading to a public confrontation with the Russian state.

 

Background. The Wagner Group was founded around 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian military officer, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to the Kremlin. It served as a proxy force for Russian interests in global hotspots, allowing Russia to exert influence without direct military involvement or the political risk of deploying official troops. Wagner operated in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and other countries, carrying out missions aligned with Russian geopolitical interests and reportedly receiving support and resources from the Russian state, including training facilities and equipment.

 

Tensions Leading to Conflict. As Wagner’s activities grew, so did its autonomy and influence. Wagner played a significant role in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, taking on critical combat roles. However, Prigozhin became increasingly outspoken about the Russian military’s failings, explicitly criticising the Ministry of Defence’s handling of the war. Wagner’s leadership grew resentful, accusing Russian military officials of incompetence, neglecting logistical support, and underestimating Wagner’s sacrifices on the front lines.

 

The Wagner Rebellion of 2023. This tension culminated in a dramatic turn in June 2023, when Wagner launched an armed rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Prigozhin led his forces into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, seizing an army headquarters, and then began an advance toward Moscow. Prigozhin demanded changes in the Russian military leadership, mainly targeting Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov. Although it was ultimately short-lived, this direct challenge to the Kremlin marked a sharp break with their previous sponsor, the Russian state. The rebellion ended after negotiations, reportedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin agreed to stand down in exchange for a safe passage to Belarus, and Wagner’s forces withdrew. However, the incident exposed significant rifts between Wagner and the Russian government, highlighting how sponsorship of militant or paramilitary organisations can backfire when these groups gain enough power to pursue their agendas.

 

Aftermath and Fallout. The fallout from the rebellion was significant. Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash in August 2023 was widely speculated to have been orchestrated by elements within the Russian state. Wagner’s operations were subsequently restructured, with many members reportedly re-assigned or integrated into other units more directly controlled by the Russian government.

 

Lessons and Analysis. The Wagner Group’s rebellion is a cautionary tale about the risks of using paramilitary organisations for state purposes. Once such groups gain power, resources, and a sense of autonomy, they can become difficult to control, and their interests may diverge from those of their original sponsor. In Wagner’s case, the group’s loyalty to Prigozhin and its operational independence contributed to a volatile situation where, ultimately, Wagner’s ambitions turned against the very state that enabled its rise.

 

Boomerang Effect: Notable Instances

 

Several historical examples exist of militant organisations that initially received sponsorship from governments or other entities but later turned against their sponsors. This phenomenon often results from shifting political dynamics, ideological conflicts, or changes. in militant groups’ objectives.

 

Al-Qaeda and the United States. During the 1980s, the United States, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided financial and military support to Afghan mujahideen fighters to combat the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Many of these fighters, including Osama bin Laden, received resources and training indirectly through the CIA’s Operation Cyclone. After the Soviet withdrawal, some of these fighters, including bin Laden, formed Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda grew increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, particularly due to its military presence in the Middle East and its support for governments seen as oppressive or contrary to Islamic principles. This hostility culminated in the September 11, 2001 attacks, marking a complete break from their former indirect sponsor.

 

The Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported the formation of the Taliban in the 1990s, seeing them as a potential ally to ensure a friendly government in Afghanistan, which would provide Pakistan with strategic depth against India. While the Taliban still maintains some ties with Pakistan, there have been periods of tension. Taliban-linked groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have turned against the Pakistani state, conducting attacks within Pakistan. The TTP aims to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a stricter interpretation of Islamic law, which has led to significant violence and conflict within Pakistan itself.

 

Hamas and Israel. During the early years of the Palestinian resistance, Israel indirectly supported groups that would later form Hamas, aiming to create a counterbalance to the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. This was based on the notion that Islamist movements could divide the Palestinian resistance, making it easier to manage. Hamas eventually became a formidable opponent to Israel, adopting a hardline stance and engaging in numerous conflicts with the Israeli state. Today, Hamas is a prominent political and militant force in Gaza and has carried out attacks against Israeli targets, becoming one of Israel’s most persistent adversaries.

 

The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Gulf States. During the Syrian Civil War, several Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, provided funding and weapons to Sunni rebel groups to oppose the Assad regime in Syria. Some of these groups either merged with or evolved into extremist groups like ISIS. Although Gulf States may not have directly funded ISIS, their support for anti-Assad rebels indirectly bolstered ISIS’s power. Once ISIS gained control of territory and declared a caliphate, it posed a threat to all governments in the region, including those in the Gulf. ISIS targeted these governments rhetorically and sometimes directly, seeing them as illegitimate and corrupt.

 

M23 Rebels and Rwanda. The M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was reportedly supported by neighbouring Rwanda, which viewed them as a means to secure influence in the DRC and counter the presence of anti-Rwandan Hutu militias. Over time, M23 developed its political ambitions, creating sporadic tensions with Rwanda. Although the relationship between Rwanda and M23 is complex and fluctuates, there have been instances where M23 acted independently, with a leadership not fully aligned with Rwanda’s objectives.

 

Fatah al-Islam and Syria. Syria was alleged to have supported Fatah al-Islam, a militant group in Lebanon, to destabilise the Lebanese government, particularly during times of political tension between Syria and Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam later became a problem for Syria and the broader region. The group’s activities and increasing autonomy led to clashes with the Lebanese government and other regional actors, pushing them further away from Syrian influence.

 

 

Conclusion

These examples illustrate how sponsorship of militant groups is fraught with inherent risks and unintended consequences. Such alliances with unpredictable partners often backfire as these organisations evolve ideologically, gain independence, or shift their focus based on changing political landscapes.  The short-term gains can lead to long-term instability, undermining the sponsor’s original goals and threatening regional and global security. They are stark reminders of the dangers of using militancy as a proxy for power, underscoring the need for more sustainable and ethical approaches to conflict resolution and statecraft.

 

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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The Boomerang Effect: When Militant Groups Turn On Their Sponsors

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References and credits

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References:–

  1. Byman, Daniel. “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79–115.
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  1. Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 3, 2008, pp. 469–488.
  1. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004.
  1. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
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  1. Galeotti, Mark. Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022.
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  1. Marten, Kimberly. “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir Al-Zour.” War on the Rocks, 2018.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s Private Military Companies: The Example of Wagner.” RUSI Journal, vol. 164, no. 1, 2019, pp. 20–28.
  1. MacFarquhar, Neil, and Eric Schmitt. “Inside the Wagner Group’s Mutiny Against the Kremlin.” The New York Times, June 2023.
  1. Seddon, Max. “The Wagner Group Mutiny: What It Tells Us About Putin’s Russia.” Financial Times, July 2023.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “The Russian Way of War: From Chechnya to Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs, 2022.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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570: DRAGON TIGHTENS ITS GRIP: CHINA’S MILITARY PRESENCE GROWS IN LARUNG GAR

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

Recent reports indicate a significant increase in Chinese military presence at Larung Gar Buddhist Academy, the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist study center in Serthar County, Karze, within Tibet’s traditional Kham province, now part of Sichuan Province.  On December 20, 2024, approximately 400 Chinese military personnel were deployed to the academy, accompanied by helicopter surveillance, signalling intensified monitoring of the religious site. In addition to the military deployment, Chinese authorities reportedly plan to implement new regulations at Larung Gar in 2025. These measures include limiting residency for monks and nuns to 15 years, a significant departure from the traditional lifelong commitment to religious practice, and requiring mandatory registration for all religious practitioners. This move could potentially lead to increased surveillance and control over the religious community. There are also plans to reduce the number of residents, with reports indicating that Chinese students are being asked to leave the institution.

 

Larung Gar had previously faced crackdowns, notably in 2001 and between 2016 and 2017, when thousands of residential structures were demolished and numerous practitioners were forcibly evicted. These actions significantly reduced the academy’s population. The recent military deployment and impending regulations have raised concerns among Tibetan communities and human rights organisations, who view these actions as part of a broader strategy to suppress religious freedom and Tibetan cultural identity. This strategy, which includes measures such as mass demolitions, forced evictions, and increased surveillance, is seen as an attempt to weaken the influence of Tibetan Buddhism and promote the dominance of the Chinese state. The international community continues to monitor the situation closely, with calls for protecting religious freedoms and preserving Tibetan cultural heritage.

 

Historical Significance of Larung Gar

 

Tibet, often called the “Roof of the World,” is unique in global spiritual and cultural heritage. Its monasteries, prayer flags, and serene landscapes symbolise centuries of spiritual devotion and resilience. Among these sacred sites, Larung Gar, a sprawling Buddhist monastic community nestled in the remote Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, has emerged as a beacon of Tibetan culture and religious practice.

 

Founded in 1980 by the late Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok, Larung Gar was established as a center for Tibetan Buddhist education and meditation. Unlike traditional monasteries, it welcomed monks, nuns, and lay practitioners from diverse backgrounds, fostering a unique blend of inclusivity and scholastic rigour that is now under threat. Over the decades, Larung Gar grew into the world’s largest Buddhist institute, with thousands of residents and visitors drawn to its spiritual teachings.

 

For Tibetans, Larung Gar is more than just a religious site; it symbolises cultural identity and resilience. The institute has played a crucial role in preserving the Tibetan language, traditions, and spiritual practices amidst external pressures, and the potential loss of this cultural heritage is deeply felt. Its vibrant community and serene surroundings embody the harmonious coexistence of spirituality and daily life.

 

Sinification as Chinese Statecraft

 

Sinification, the process of assimilating non-Han ethnic groups into Chinese cultural and political life, is a core component of China’s statecraft. Historically, this policy has been employed to consolidate power, integrate peripheral regions, and create a unified national identity. At its heart, Sinification seeks to promote the dominance of Han Chinese culture, language, and values across the diverse ethnic mosaic of China.

 

Historical Perspective. The concept of Sinification is rooted in China’s imperial history. Emperors of the Qin and Han Dynasties (221 BCE–220 CE) expanded China’s borders to include non-Han territories, such as Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, often through military conquest and colonisation. As these regions were integrated into the Chinese empire, local populations were encouraged or forced to adopt Chinese customs, language, and governance.

 

Revival. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has revitalised Sinification as a statecraft strategy. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the policy has renewed urgency, particularly in ethnically distinct regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. The CCP’s current approach is multifaceted, involving economic development, cultural integration, and political control to align minority populations with mainstream Chinese identity.

 

Forced Assimilation. Sinification is often framed as a means of fostering national unity and economic development. By promoting the Chinese language and culture, the state aims to create a shared sense of belonging and erase historical divisions between Han and non-Han groups. This is evident in the promotion of Mandarin Chinese as the lingua franca and the construction of Chinese schools and cultural institutions in minority regions. China claims these measures are essential for cohesion and stability in a country with diverse ethnic and religious groups.

 

Identity Erasure and Assertion. However, the policy also raises profound questions about identity. For many non-Han groups, Sinification is perceived as a form of cultural erasure, undermining indigenous languages, traditions, and religious practices. The process often includes the relocation of Han Chinese citizens into minority areas, the suppression of native languages, and the promotion of Chinese cultural norms. In this context, Sinification becomes a tool not just for integration but for asserting Han Chinese dominance and defining what it means to be “Chinese.”

 

Rights Violation. For many minority communities, particularly Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols, this form of assimilation is seen as a violation of their cultural and religious rights. In Tibet, the destruction of monasteries, the restriction on Buddhist practices, and the imposition of the Chinese language in schools are all part of efforts to assimilate the population. Similarly, in Xinjiang, the Uighur Muslim population faces forced labour, mass surveillance, and the imposition of Chinese cultural norms, all of which threaten their distinct identity.

 

Resistance. Resistance to Sinification is a defining feature of its history. For many ethnic minorities, the push to preserve their cultural autonomy is seen as a response to the state’s encroachment on their way of life. In Tibet and Xinjiang, protests, both violent and nonviolent, have occurred in opposition to the erosion of religious and cultural practices. Tibetan Buddhist monks, Uighur Muslims, and other ethnic minorities continue to advocate for greater autonomy and the right to preserve their heritage.

 

China’s Policy in Tibet and Militarisation of Larung Gar

 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained a contentious relationship with Tibet since its annexation in 1950. Framing Tibet as an integral part of Chinese territory, the PRC has implemented policies aimed at assimilation and control. These measures include restrictions on religious practices, promoting Mandarin over Tibetan, and infrastructural projects that often undermine local traditions.

 

Beijing views Tibet’s governance as a territorial and ideological issue. The region’s strategic location, rich natural resources, and potential as a geopolitical buffer make it a priority. However, the persistence of Tibetan resistance within and outside Tibet challenges the PRC’s narrative of harmonious integration.

 

The growing military presence in Larung Gar is a microcosm of broader trends in Tibet. Over the past decade, Chinese authorities have intensified their control over religious institutions, citing concerns about separatism and social stability. In Larung Gar, this has manifested through mass demolitions, forced evictions, surveillance, and military deployments.

 

Mass Demolitions and Forced Evictions. In 2016, Chinese authorities launched a large-scale campaign to downsize Larung Gar, citing overcrowding and safety concerns. Bulldozers razed thousands of homes, displacing monks, nuns, and lay practitioners. Estimates suggest that over 4,000 residents were forced to leave, with many relocated to distant areas under strict surveillance. For those evicted, the loss was not merely physical but deeply emotional and spiritual. Larung Gar had been a sanctuary for many, where they could pursue spiritual growth and community. The demolitions disrupted this ecosystem, creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

 

Surveillance and Military Presence. In addition to physical restructuring, the Chinese government has ramped up surveillance in Larung Gar. High-tech cameras, facial recognition systems, and checkpoints have transformed the area into a heavily monitored zone. Military personnel conduct regular patrols, further intimidating the remaining residents.

 

This militarisation reflects Beijing’s broader strategy in Tibet, where technological and physical control mechanisms are used to suppress dissent and enforce ideological conformity. Larung Gar, once a hub of spiritual freedom, now operates under constant scrutiny.

 

Implications

 

The Chinese government’s actions in Larung Gar profoundly affect Tibetan culture and religion. Tibetan Buddhism, which emphasises non-violence, compassion, and self-realisation, starkly contrasts the state’s authoritarian approach. By targeting Larung Gar, Beijing is not only undermining a religious institution but also eroding a cornerstone of Tibetan identity.

 

Loss of Autonomy. Larung Gar’s forced restructuring represents a direct assault on the autonomy of Tibetan religious institutions. Decisions about monastic administration, community size, and daily activities are now subject to government approval, stripping the institute of its independence.

 

Cultural Assimilation. The destruction of homes and the dispersal of residents disrupt the transmission of Tibetan cultural and religious knowledge. Monastic education, which relies heavily on the community’s cohesion, has been severely impacted. Furthermore, the promotion of Mandarin and state-approved curricula over traditional Tibetan teachings accelerates cultural assimilation.

 

Psychological Impact. For many Tibetans, the militarisation of Larung Gar is a source of profound psychological distress. The presence of armed personnel in a sacred space symbolises the state’s disregard for their spiritual values. The fear of surveillance and the loss of communal bonds compounds this emotional toll.

 

Geopolitical Dimensions. The situation in Larung Gar has not gone unnoticed on the global stage. Tibet’s plight is a flashpoint in international human rights discourse, drawing attention from governments, NGOs, and advocacy groups. However, geopolitical considerations often complicate responses.

 

International Reactions. Countries such as the United States and members of the European Union have expressed concerns about human rights violations in Tibet, including the militarisation of Larung Gar. However, their responses are often tempered by economic and strategic interests in maintaining relations with China.

 

Strategic Implications for China. The militarisation of Larung Gar aligns with Beijing’s broader efforts to secure its western borders. By tightening control over Tibet, China aims to prevent unrest that could spill over into other regions or embolden separatist movements. However, this strategy risks fuelling further resentment and international criticism.

 

Conclusion. The growing military presence in Larung Gar represents a critical juncture for Tibet’s cultural and spiritual heritage. As the Chinese government tightens its grip, the world must grapple with the implications of this erosion of a sacred space. By standing in solidarity with Tibetan communities and advocating for their rights, we can honour the resilience of a people whose spirit continues to inspire across borders and generations.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

Link to the article on the website:-

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chine-deploys-troops-choppers-in-new/

 

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References:-

ANI, “China deploys hundreds of troops to Larung Gar, intensifies religious crackdown in Tibet”,

https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/china-deploys-hundreds-of-troops-to-larung-gar-intensifies-religious-crackdown-in-tibet20241228142304/

  1. Central Tibetan Administration, “Tibet’s Larung Gar Buddhist Academy Faces New Restrictions as Military Presence Increases”, 27 December 2024
  1. TIMESOFINDIA, “China deploys 400 troops. Choppers at Larung Gar in Tibet”, 28 Dec 2024.
  1. Elliot Sperling, “Larung Gar: China’s Expansion into Tibetan Religious Spaces”, Journal of Asian Studies.
  1. James Millward, “China’s Military Footprint in Tibet: The Expanding Role of the PLA” International Security.
  1. Anne-Marie Blondeau, “Sacred Spaces Under Siege: Tibetan Religious Sites in the Age of Chinese Military Expansion” Asian Ethnology
  1. Report, “China’s Crackdown on Tibetan Buddhism: Religious Freedom Under Siege” – Human Rights Watch, 2016
  1. Report, “The Military Presence in Tibet: China’s Use of Force in the Himalayan Region” – Amnesty International, 2017
  1. Tsering Shakya, “The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947”.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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569: DURGA AND KALI: INDIA’S DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS PROGRAM

Pic courtesy net

 

India has long recognised the importance of technological superiority in modern warfare. With adversaries like China and Pakistan making significant strides in advanced defence systems, India has embarked on ambitious programs to achieve strategic dominance. Among these initiatives, the Durga and Kali programs are pivotal projects, focusing on Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) and advanced electronic warfare systems. These programs have underscored India’s commitment to Indigenous defence technologies and showcased its resolve to counter emerging threats in the evolving warfare landscape.

 

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). Directed Energy Weapons represent a paradigm shift in military technology. Unlike conventional weapon systems that rely on kinetic energy or explosives, DEWs employ highly focused energy—such as lasers, microwaves, or particle beams—to neutralise targets. The benefits of DEWs include:-

 

    • Speed of Light Engagement. DEWs operate at the speed of light, offering unparalleled response times.

 

    • Precision Targeting. These weapons minimise collateral damage by precisely targeting enemy assets.

 

    • Cost Efficiency. Once operational, DEWs can neutralise multiple threats at a fraction of the cost of conventional interceptors.

 

    • They can be deployed for missile defence, counter-drone operations, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite missions.

 

India’s Programs

 

Durga Program (Directionally Unrestricted Ray-Gun Array). The Durga program, an acronym for “Directionally Unrestricted Ray-Gun Array,” focuses on developing laser-based directed energy weapons. Initiated by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), this program aligns with India’s vision to create a robust, multi-layered defence architecture. The program aims to develop laser systems capable of intercepting and destroying enemy missiles during various stages of their flight. The DEWs would be integrated with India’s existing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems to enhance interception capabilities. It would also address the growing threat of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) by deploying tactical laser weapons to neutralise the enemy drones that pose risks to critical infrastructure and military assets. The developed weapons would be integrated on land, air, and sea-based platforms, ensuring operational flexibility across diverse terrains and scenarios. Open media reports suggest that prototypes of laser-based DEWs under the Durga program are undergoing testing. India is exploring power levels ranging from 10 to 100 kilowatts, sufficient for tactical and strategic applications.

 

Kali Program (Kilo Ampere Linear Injector). The Kali program, initiated by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and supported by DRDO, began as a scientific project to study high-energy particle acceleration. Over time, its potential as a defence tool was realised, and the project evolved to explore applications in electronic warfare and non-lethal weaponry. The Kali system generates powerful electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) capable of disabling electronic systems. These pulses can disrupt radar, communication, and missile guidance systems. The program also explores the use of particle beams for neutralising enemy assets. These beams can deliver immense energy to destroy or disable targets without explosives. The potential applications of these systems include disabling of enemy satellites. The Kali program has enormous potential for integration into India’s electronic warfare systems. For instance, it could be deployed as a non-lethal weapon to incapacitate enemy equipment without causing physical destruction. Its scalability makes it suitable for tactical operations and strategic deterrence.

 

Strategic Significance.

 

Countering Threats. India’s geographical location presents unique security challenges. With China advancing in hypersonic missile technology and Pakistan enhancing its nuclear arsenal, India needs innovative solutions to maintain a strategic edge. The Durga and Kali programs provide critical capabilities to counter these threats effectively.

 

Enhancing Indigenous Capabilities. Under the “Make in India” initiative, the government prioritises self-reliance on defence technologies. The Durga and Kali programs embody this vision by leveraging domestic talent and resources. Collaborations with Indian academic institutions and private firms ensure these projects remain at the forefront of innovation.

 

Strengthening Deterrence. Developing advanced DEWs and electronic warfare systems is a strong deterrent against potential adversaries. India reinforces its position as a formidable regional military power by demonstrating the ability to neutralise threats in real time.

 

Supporting Space Security. As space becomes an increasingly contested domain, the Durga and Kali programs could play a pivotal role in safeguarding India’s interests. By integrating DEWs into its space strategy, India can protect its satellites and ensure the reliability of its communication and navigation networks.

 

Challenges: The journey towards developing Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) has its hurdles. Ensuring sufficient power output, operational reliability, and effective integration into existing defence platforms are complex tasks. The research and development of DEWs and high-energy systems require significant investment and careful balancing with other defence priorities. These challenges underscore the importance and complexity of India’s defence technology initiatives.

 

In an era where technological innovation defines military power, the Durga and Kali programs are poised to shape the future of India’s defence strategy. These initiatives aim to equip India with the tools to address modern security challenges by focusing on cutting-edge technologies like directed energy weapons and high-energy pulse systems. The Durga program, for instance, has made significant strides in developing laser-based DEWs, with prototypes currently undergoing testing. On the other hand, the Kali program has successfully transitioned from a scientific project to a defence tool, exploring applications in electronic warfare and non-lethal weaponry. While significant hurdles remain, the progress achieved thus far reflects the nation’s determination to become self-sufficient in advanced military technology.

 

India’s Durga and Kali programs represent a bold step towards redefining its defence capabilities. As these programs mature, they will strengthen India’s defence posture and contribute to a broader strategic vision of self-reliance and technological leadership. In a world where countries like the United States, China, and Russia rapidly advance DEW technology, India must accelerate its efforts to remain competitive in this high-stakes domain. The urgency of this goal is clear, and India’s determination to achieve it is evident in these initiatives.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:–

  1. Singh, R. (2022). “Directed Energy Weapons in India: Strategic Implications and Challenges.” Strategic Analysis, 46(2), 150–162.
  1. Kumar, S. & Reddy, A. (2021). “Advances in High-Powered Laser Applications for Defense.” Indian Journal of Defense Technology, 17(4), 335–348.
  1. Subramanian, R. (2018). “India’s DRDO and the Quest for Directed Energy Weapons.” Journal of Defence Studies, 12(1), 75–95.
  1. Kelley, A. B. (2017). Directed Energy Weapons: Technologies and Future Applications. Artech House.
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  1. DRDO Annual Report 2022-2023. Defence Research and Development Organisation.
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  1. Centre for Air Power Studies. (2019). “Lasers and Microwaves in Modern Warfare.”
  1. The Wire. (2022). “Exploring India’s Pursuit of Directed Energy Weapons.” https://thewire.in
  1. Economic Times. (2023). “India’s Defense Research: KALI Laser Systems and Beyond.” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com
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