WHAT IS COOKING IN THE DRAGON’S MILITARY CAULDRON

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet (Freepik)

 

The Purge

 

The PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) underwent a reshuffle in 2022 following the 20th National Party Congress, and a new cabinet and defence minister were appointed in early 2023 at the 14th National People’s Congress in Beijing. A number of these officials, hand-picked by President Xi Jinping for their positions in the CMC, have since been implicated in an anti-corruption investigation in China.

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLARF oversees China’s land-based nuclear missiles and the Equipment Development Department. PLARF’s commander and its political commissar were replaced in August 2023. Vice Admiral Wang Houbin (PLAN) replaced the PLARF commander and General Xu Xisheng (former deputy political commissar of the Southern Theatre Command) replaced the PLARF political commissar. Both replacements were drawn from outside the PLARF.

 

Defence Minister. Defence Minister Li Shangfu was ousted from his role. General Li previously served as the head of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department. The Equipment Development Department stated on its social media account that it was investigating corruption allegations related to procurement bids and the formation of private cliques within the armed forces at high levels that resulted in cronyism and a lack of focus on the core task of building combat readiness. Former defence minister Wei Fenghe (formerly commanded the PLARF) also disappeared from public view, reportedly under investigation.

 

Comments.

 

    • Corruption alone is an unlikely explanation for the removal by Xi of top military officials that he had appointed just months earlier, raising the possibility that intelligence leaks may have triggered the action.

 

    • The leadership changes also suggest that despite Xi’s calls for absolute loyalty and a zero-tolerance approach to corruption, problems within the PLA persist.

 

 

PLA Army.

 

PLA Army is studying and analysing the lessons emerging out of the Ukraine war. Some of the areas, being looked into are as follows:-

 

    • The heavy use of UAVs by both Russia and Ukraine is likely behind the higher prominence accorded to the discussion of the concept of ‘low altitude control and dominance’ by the PLA Army.

 

    • The protracted nature of the fighting in Ukraine is likely to drive the PLA Army to re-examine operational plans for long-term industrial and logistic sustainment, as well as for casualty evacuation and treatment.

 

    • Review of the recruitment process, and policies related to conscription and reservists. In 2023, the PLA revised its existing regulations covering the recruitment of civilian and military personnel, including conscripts.

 

    • Russia’s struggles to mobilise personnel for service in Ukraine would influence the CMC’s ability to conduct wartime mobilisation.

 

    • In 2023, the PLA continued to roll out new armour, artillery and air-defence platforms to its combined arms units, and the re-equipment of combined arms regiments in Xinjiang Military District now appears to be nearing completion.

 

    • PLA is continuing the re-equipment of aviation brigades with the Z-20 medium helicopter, with priority to PLA Army’s air assault formations assigned to the Eastern and Western theatre commands, as well as the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts.

 

Comments

 

    • Given the scale of a 2017 army reorganisation, a new round of major force-structure changes within the regular service is unlikely in the short term.

 

    • The PLA Reserve Force may attract greater attention.

 

    • A review of the recruitment process seems to be aimed at the goal of enlisting and retaining greater numbers of high-quality recruits, particularly college graduates and those with key scientific and engineering skill sets.

 

    • Significant changes to the army’s re-equipment plan are unlikely before the start of the next five-year plan in 2026.

 

PLA Navy.

 

Assertiveness. China’s naval and maritime security arms became increasingly assertive in their activities. China’s navy increased operations in the waters around Taiwan, while the Chinese coast guard undertook activities that bordered on aggressiveness. Beijing’s maritime militia assets, which purport to be part of its fishing fleet, conducted operations in the waters disputed with the Philippines around the Spratly Islands and in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

 

Force Development.

 

    • Surface Ships. The PLAN in 2023 added the eighth Type-055 (Renhai) cruiser to its operational fleet along with additional Type-054A frigates. It also launched its new Type-054B frigate, which appears to be larger and considerably more capable. The new frigate promises to be a major addition to the PLAN’s blue-water fleet as a component of future task-group deployments.

 

    • Aircraft Carrier. China is progressing with its third indigenous aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Type-003). It is claimed to be more potent and capable than the existing Liaoning (Type-001) and the Shandong (Type-002) aircraft carriers. The new carrier is expected to be commissioned in 2025.

 

    • Submarines. PLAN’s focus has increased towards developing sub-surface forces. Those efforts include the development of the new-generation Type-095 nuclear-powered attack submarine and Type-096 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. It is assessed that the PLAN has equipped its Type-094 ballistic missile boats with a longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20). That would represent a significant step up in capability.

 

    • Amphibious Capability. PLA Navy appears to be strengthening its LHD forces. It launched the fourth Type-075 Yushenclass LHD in December. The navy has also added at least two new Zubr-class air-cushion landing craft to its inventory, as well as other landing craft.

 

Force Deployment. PLAN is expanding its pattern of long-range deployments.

 

    • The PLA Navy continued to develop its bluewater deployment capabilities, including with more significant formations. Units led by Type-075 (Yushen) amphibious assault ships (LHDs) made two forays into the Western Pacific, including waters near Japan.

 

    • PLA Navy also gradually pushed carrier operations further out with the Liaoning and Shandong sailing out towards Guam and undertaking more intense air operations. The PLAN, in September 2023, carried out a further large-scale carrier exercise in the Western Pacific.

 

    • The PLAN carried out exercises with Russia and Iran and with Russia and South Africa, port visits in the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, and a rare foray to Africa’s Atlantic coast with a port visit to Nigeria. Another set of manoeuvres with Russia off Alaska in August 2023 further underscored that the.

 

 

Comments.

 

    • The PLAN is now regularly and widely hyped as ‘the world’s largest navy’.

 

    • While the PLAN’s fleet has evolved to be more modern, it still lags behind the US Navy in terms of total tonnage and capability. The gap seems to be narrowing.

 

    • PLAN, despite its increasing emergence in the world’s oceans, is still significantly concentrated in waters closer to home.

 

PLA Air Force

 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) received considerable numbers of combat aircraft in 2023, in part from an unexpected source. Along with the new-build Chengdu J-10C Firebird, Shenyang J-16 Flanker N and Chengdu J-20 multi-role fighter aircraft, the service received upward of 200 tactical combat aircraft from the PLAN. Many of the transferred aircraft are unlikely to be retained in the medium term. The initial version of the Xi’an JH-7, the JH-7 Flounder A, as well as the even older Shenyang J-8 Finback, may be retired.

 

Maritime Air. The PLAN appears to be divesting itself of almost all its land-based multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, bomber aircraft and numerous air bases. The PLAAF appears to be taking on the roles of the transferred formations. The PLA Air Force would, therefore, be responsible for land-based maritime strike tasks, requiring considerable coordination with the PLAN. The addition of the PLAN aircraft will bolster the PLAAF’s inventory of modern aircraft types.

 

J-20 Aircraft.  The J-20 heavy multi-role fighter is the premier combat aircraft in PLAAF service, introduced in 2017–18. China had built around 200 J-20s by the fourth quarter of the year and operates six operational brigades equipped with it.  An upgraded J-20 is undergoing flight tests. The aircraft’s forward fuselage has been modified with a revised cockpit profile and a raised fuselage section to the rear of the cockpit. The aircraft may have been fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 afterburning turbofan engine. The WS-15 offers more power than the previously used Shenyang WS-10.

 

Other Aircraft.

 

    • The PLAAF continued to induct Shenyang’s two-seat J-16 Flanker aircraft, enhancing its long-range surface-attack capability. As an air-to-air platform, it is likely to carry under development PL-17 (CH-AA-X-12) very long-range air-to-air missile.

 

    • PLAAF’s low-observable bomber, the Xi’an H-20 continues to be under development.

 

    • The roles of the PLAAF bomber force continued to expand. The Xi’an H-6 carries the air-launched Mach 3+ WZ-8 reconnaissance UAV that, post-release, climbs to an altitude of up to 100,000 feet to fly its mission profile. The WZ-8 has now entered service.

 

Comments

    • There is an important lesson to be learnt (Indivisibility of airpower) from China’s reorganisation and placing all the air assets and roles under the PLAAF.

 

    • China’s aviation industry is well established.

 

    • PLAAF is expanding rapidly in numerical strength.

 

    • Doubts still exist about the stated and claimed capabilities of its aircraft.

 

PLA Rocket Force

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has been enhancing and expanding its capabilities across all ranges, at varying qualitative and quantitative paces. The PLARF’s capabilities are evolving most rapidly through the introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to replace some medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that are being retired.

 

DF-26 with Swappable Warheads. Variants of the DF-21 (CH-SS-5) MRBM, including the nuclear-armed DF-21A (CH-SS-5 Mod 2) and conventional DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4), are being swiftly replaced by the longer-range DF-26 (CH-SS- 18) IRBM. The DF-26 is designed to allow crews to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and to conduct precision strikes against land and maritime targets up to the second island chain.

 

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). The PLARF is also developing and inducting an IRBM armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that appears to be similar to the DF-26 and is known as the DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24).  The PLARF is re-equipping some of its brigades (in eastern China) with the DF-17 (CH-SS-22) medium-range missile carrying an HGV. The DF-17’s HGV is more manoeuvrable and therefore more capable of evading adversary missile defences than traditional ballistic missiles of similar ranges. Its features suggest the weapon was developed to strike high-value targets such as air and missile defences at the outset of a conflict, opening the way for less manoeuvrable systems to reach their objective with a lower probability of being intercepted.

 

ICBMs with MIRV. China continues to modernise its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. The DF-41 (CH-SS-20) is the PLARF’s newest ICBM and is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thereby providing China with a higher number of warheads with a smaller force. The DF-41 brigades will be equipped with fewer launchers than with the DF-31.

 

Enhancement of Survivability and Responsiveness. PLARF is upgrading the DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2) to the more mobile and responsive DF-31AG configuration with an integrated transport erector launcher that is off-road capable. The PLARF is also expanding a small number of silos for the older DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM at several locations. A 2021 report also revealed that China was building three large ICBM silo fields (in the. western part of the country), to enhance survivability and responsiveness.

 

Comments.

 

    • The DF-26’s so-called hot-swappable warhead would introduce a potential escalation dilemma, adversaries targeted with the weapon may be unsure if they are under nuclear or conventional attack before the warhead detonates.

 

    • Hypersonic weapons and MIRV capability will change the dynamics of warfare and start a new arms race.

 

    • China may be moving from a stated policy of nuclear no-first-use and a minimum credible deterrent to a launch-on-warning posture.

 

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References and credits

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

References:-

The International Institute for Strategic studies, “The Military Balance 2024”.

COLLECTIVE DEALING WITH NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

 

Non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources.

 

 Non-traditional security challenges:

 

    • Terrorism and violent extremism.

 

    • Transnational organised crime.

 

    • Irregular migration and human trafficking.

 

    • Environmental degradation.

 

    • Climate change

 

    • Resource scarcity.

 

    • Epidemics and pandemics.

 

    • Natural disasters.

 

    •   Food shortages.

 

    •  Drug Trafficking.

 

These challenges can destabilise countries, destroy the social fabric and risk derailing peace processes or progress on peace and security especially in fragile countries.

 

These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive – political, economic, social – responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.

 

Common Characteristics:-

 

    • The threats are transnational in nature with regards to their origins, conceptions and effects.

 

    • They do not stem from competition between states or shifts in the balance of power, but are often defined in political and socioeconomic terms.

 

    • Non-traditional security issues such as resource scarcity and irregular migration cause societal and political instability and hence become threats to security.

 

    • Other threats like climate change are often caused by human-induced disturbances to the fragile balance of nature with dire consequences to both states and societies which are often difficult to reverse or repair.

 

    • National solutions are often inadequate and would thus essentially require regional and multilateral cooperation.

 

    • The referent of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty or territorial integrity), but also the people (survival, well-being, dignity) both at individual and societal levels.

 

Aspects: Collective Dealing

 

Over time, various aspects of these non-traditional security challenges have received varying levels of attention.

 

Multilateral peace operations are not necessarily being considered to deal with non-traditional challenges.

 

UN is mandated to take on various tasks linked to the consequences of these challenges.

 

Advantages. There are clear advantages in multilateral peace operations taking on tasks linked to non-traditional security challenges. One of the advantages is the availability of resources and established logistics. UN has agencies and specialised organisations for dealing with non-traditional security challenges. It also has a capacity for retaining institutional memory.

 

Disadvantages.  The disadvantage is that the multilateral peace operations are already overstretched. Multilateral peace operations are generally deployed for shorter periods, whereas, non-traditional security challenges, require long-term investment and commitment. Budget availability is another challenge.

 

Depending upon the challenges, their area of influence and effects, either global or regional organisations would be suited to deal with them.

 

Regardless of which organisation is mandated, it is important to collaborate, cooperate and coordinate with all the actors involved (all components of the organisation, national partners, host government, civil society, international/external actors and global/regional organisations).

 

The tasks and division of labour need to be spelt out clearly without any ambiguity.

 

 

Recommendations

 

    • Develop policies on dealing jointly with non-traditional security challenges.

 

    • Operationalise dealing structure and mechanism.

 

    • Set up multi-country and multi-organisational cooperation forums.

 

  •  
    • Strengthen coordination mechanisms.

 

    • Resort to joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation.

 

    • Increase awareness about these operations.

 

  •  
    • Allocate adequate budget and resources.

 

 

Coming up:- detailed article on the subject.

 

 

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References and credits

SIPRI

About Non-Traditional security

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COURAGE: ESSENTIAL TRAIT FOR LEADERSHIP

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

“Courage is the virtue that is at the centre of the golden mean between foolhardiness (excessive courage) and cowardice (insufficient courage)”.

-Aristotle

 

Courage is essential for great leadership. Without courage, leaders can’t do the things they must do. Courage is the mental and moral strength which helps us venture forth, confront danger, face our fears and challenges, and persevere.

 

Courage is one quality that drives transformational leadership and personal and institutional success. It is the single most decisive trait in a leader. Without it, one cannot lead as leaders without courage are not inspiring and not worth following.

 

“leaders who lack courage aren’t leaders.”

-John McCain, former U.S. Senator and Navy veteran

 

We often think of physical courage, but there are different types of courage – emotional, intellectual, social, moral, and spiritual courage.

 

Widely popular beliefs are that “Courage is big heroic acts” and “it is an attribute that only a few extraordinary leaders possess because they are born with it”.

 

Most courageous acts are small, but they are never insignificant. Small courageous acts stacked upon each other add up. These even include doing the right thing when it’s not easy and trying again right after failing.

 

One of the definitions of Courage is – “ability to do something that frightens you.”

 

Being fearless is not the same as being courageous.

 

Courageous leaders create clarity, not confusion.

 

A lack of courage creates stagnation.

 

Courage is a skill that anyone can develop.

 

Courageous leadership entails many things, including:-

 

    • Stopping ourselves when we’re about to do something wrong.
    • Challenging others when they’re about to do something wrong.
    • Setting boundaries and saying no sometimes even when it may disappoint or anger others.
    • Challenging injustices.
    • Making decisions and moving forward despite limited information.
    • Stepping into challenging situations where there’s conflict, instead of avoiding such situations.
    • Being willing to be wrong sometimes.
    • Shaking things up to move forward instead of playing it safe and maintaining the status quo.
    • Taking risks and being willing to fail fast and learn.
    • Demanding action.
    • Following through to make sure things are done right.
    • Holding people accountable for core commitments.

 

Building up Courage:-

 

    • Quantify the Best Possible Outcome. Our brains constantly evaluate either the pain or gain in every situation. Highlighting the benefits and allowing the brain to visualise them is a decisive step in the process of being more courageous.

 

    • Acknowledge your Fears. Write Down the Worst Possible Outcome. The human brain processes fear and control the responses to it. It is wired to avoid things that can be harmful. Getting in the habit of writing down the worst possible outcome often provides insight that the worst scenario isn’t actually all that bad.

 

    • Deal with the Emotions. Emotions such as doubt or fear do exist and being open and honest about them is not a weakness but a strength.

 

“Emotions are data, not directives. We get to choose who we want to be; our emotions don’t.”

 

    • Trust your Instincts. Sometimes, the most courageous thing you can do is trust your gut. If something feels off, don’t be afraid to speak up and voice your concerns.

 

    • Stretch Yourself. Challenge yourself by taking the initiative to push yourself out of your comfort zone. This is where real growth begins.

 

    • Take Calculated Risks. Before making any decision, consider the potential risks and benefits, and weigh them carefully. If you believe the benefits outweigh the risks, then take the leap.

 

    • Fail to Succeed. There’s not a single success story on the planet that didn’t evolve out of some mistake or the other. When you fail, take the time to reflect on what went wrong and what you would do differently the next time.

 

A courageous leader sets his fears aside and leads his people, team, and organisation to a better place.

 

“Courage is not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it. The brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear.” 

-Nelson Mandela

 

 

 Quotations

 

“It’s easy to stand with the crowd. It takes courage to stand alone.”

-Mahatma Gandhi

 

“Without courage, all other virtues lose their meaning.”

-Winston Churchill

 

“You’ll never do anything in this world without courage. It’s the greatest quality of the mind next to honour.”

-Aristotle

 

“Courage faces fear and thereby masters it. Cowardice represses fear and is thereby mastered by it.”

-Martin Luther King

 

“God, grant me the courage not to give up what I think is right even though I think it is hopeless.”

 -Chester Nimitz, U.S. Navy Admiral

  

 “When we practice the behaviours of courage, we become courageous.”

-Gus Lee with Diane Elliott-Lee

 

 “One man with courage makes a majority.”

 -Andrew Jackson

 

 

“Courage was the X factor in change. Courage is the virtue that’s needed if we’re truly going to transform our lives. Courage is the virtue that’s needed if we’re going to enact anything that is significantly important to us. Courage is the virtue that’s needed if we’re going to change the status quo.”

-James Kouzes and Barry Posner, A Leader’s Legacy

 

 

“Courage is not the absence of fear, but the capacity to act despite our fears.”

-John McCain, war hero and former U.S. Senator

 

 

“You gain strength, courage, and confidence by every experience in which you stop to look fear in the face. You must do the thing which you think you cannot do.” 

-Eleanor Roosevelt, former First Lady, diplomat, and activist

 

 

“Success is not final, failure is not fatal: It is the courage to continue that counts.”

-Winston Churchill, former British Prime Minister

 

“Courage is contagious. When a brave man takes a stand, the spines of others are stiffened.”

-Billy Graham

 

 

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Disclaimer:

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