strategy
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY
- In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防御).
- PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”
- In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.
- During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.
- In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi- Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.
- COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not significantly impact PLA combat readiness.
FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION
- The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
- The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project power globally.
- People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the policy are not clear.
- People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
‒ It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023. In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
‒ The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
- People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF and PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.
- People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
‒ The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
- Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations. The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain.
- Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.
- Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT
- The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
- The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain (FIC).
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION
- The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
- Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.
- Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM The PRC has also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of its IADS.
- Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue to transform the PLA’s missile The system is possibly intended to replace some older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.
COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
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