Author: puneet tiwari

Circa 2010 or so

No malice intended towards anyone

Hope the cynicism is unjustified

Crisis in Command

Is there a crisis looming in the Indian Army? Many feel the army is already in the midst of a crisis. I cannot, with any authority, comment on the Navy or the Air Force and, therefore, shall restrict my views to the army.

Whether there is an impending crisis or not, there are some factors that have obviously changed and the authorities need to take cognizance of these, analyse their possible consequences and, if required, take corrective measures before they reach a point of criticality. In many ways, this line of thought may well be past its expiry date. As mentioned earlier, the army may already be in the middle of such a crisis, even if it isn’t clearly evident yet. The signs of a deeper malaise are unmistakable, seen from within and without.

A ‘toe the line’ army which rewards sycophantic obedience over good honest argument, even at the discussion stage, is an unhealthy army. Many officers have also fallen prey to temptations and the carrots dangled by the civilian babus – and led to the demeaning of the entire uniformed fraternity.

Some of the contributing factors, which are at times also a symptom of the malaise :-

Disruption of the Chain of Command

There is a short circuiting of and complete centralization in the chain of command particularly at the unit level. The NCO level in particular has been seriously marginalized. The reasons are :-

• The ubiquitous no–error syndrome where an officer is asked to supervise the preparation and conduct of every event – and he is also micro-managed.
• The Senior NCO is treated like any jawan and has no powers. How many Section Commanders/ Platoon Havaldars/ Troop Dafadars/ Gun Nos 1 have any say at all in the deployment and employment of the men under their command even in peace-time. Truthfully, none at all – and yet, in war tomorrow, he will be expected to exercise authority over them. All post disaster studies will continue to berate the junior leader problem – no senior leader problem ?
• Very often these days, the detailed employment of men, for even the most frivolous routine tasks, is done at the unit level, leaving no leeway at the sub-unit and below level. Tomorrow’s battles are going to be more and more biased towards the small unit. Our command procedures are emphasizing the opposite.

The Young Officer Deficit is Serious and ACRs

There is another factor that is contributing to this overly centralized system. The shortage of officers at the junior level has led to a situation where a young officer is de-facto a sub-unit commander at a very early stage in his service, sometimes within the first year. While, ostensibly, this should assist in his professional development, the reverse is more often the case. The reasons are :-

• He does not spend enough time in going through the nitty-grittys at each level. Specifically, he needs to go through the trials, tribulations and joys of everyday life in a military unit for sufficient time with the men to appreciate the dynamics of unit functioning, a necessary aspect if he is to employ it effectively in operations. In addition, such interaction develops a lasting bond that will be a crucial factor in war.
• So, a well-intentioned youngster with stars in his eyes, quickly becomes a cynical old man.
• Very often, this young officer spends much time engaged in a proliferation of a varied range of activities, unrelated to anything remotely professional but apparently contributing towards a ‘well rounded personality’, as he is told, especially in peace stations. Many end up convinced that organizing a party is much more important than commanding a troop of tanks well. Some out of naiveté and others because of an unhealthy abundance of worldly wisdom.
• He needs a friendly and wise hand. Apart from the senior officers, a sensible lot of senior JCOs are the ones best suited to advise the young officer pitch-forked into positions of responsibility. Our emerging system does not encourage this. The few JCOs who may try this soon give up as they find that in general they are likely to be the ones ‘fixed’ in their ACRs. Sometime back, mention of an ‘ACR’ at the officer level was bad form and at the JCO and men level, unheard of and meaningless. It now seems to be the raison d’etre at every level.

What then is the solution ? There is obviously no easy answer but something needs to be done.

• The chain of command must be restored – even to the point of over-elaboration. This must be done honestly and keeping in mind the spirit of the issue.
• It would perhaps be futile to expect any change in the ubiquitous ‘no-error’ syndrome. However, to those overly disposed towards such a tendency, may I recommend they attempt telling their subordinates what they want done and not how they want it done – to the last ‘T’. And then not suffocate their boys by standing over their heads while they are trying to do what they have, in any case, been told in great detail. They may be pleasantly surprised.
• The over-arching importance of the ACR has to be reduced considerably. Only then will voices that dissent or moderate for the larger good be heard more clearly.

‘Stamping’, Morals and Ethics

The other trend is that of ‘stamping’ i.e. trying to get the correct stamps on one’s record. This, some years back, led to a situation where there was a rush for field postings. This would have been very laudable if it was for altruistic and organisational reasons. Obviously, it was not. In any event, as far as the organisation is concerned, this should not matter as the organization should benefit. It does not – the rush was more towards the ’safe’ quasi-field postings – with a known to be ‘generous’ Reporting Officer if possible.

As regards morals and ethics, judging by the amount of correspondence on the issue, the seminars being held and the emphasis on inclusion of the subject in every course, there is obviously a recognized problem here. But, are we actually addressing it ? Or are we taking the superficially safe route here too by listing the problems including the ubiquitous ‘junior leader failure’ while as an organisation, continuing to promote a system that rewards quite the contrary.

Here especially, there is a particularly difficult problem as it involves honest soul-searching and particularly at the senior level.

Awards On Staff Including Personal Staff

There is another disquieting activity that seems to have become well-entrenched and quite insidiously – or was it always like this? This is the system of awards. I am referring to the spate of awards (because they contribute towards promotions etc) that are awarded for routine activity, especially at the staff level. How can a military person on staff be awarded for something beyond the call of duty ? For pushing a file extra efficiently ? Yet, a large percentage of awards are dished out on staff including an inordinately high number at Army Headquarters. What are these for ? For good staff work ?

There is the other advanced version of the same thing – a commander’s personal staff. There is a variety of officer who attaches himself to a rising senior officer, gets posted around with him and, inevitably, gets at least one award. And becomes a senior officer ! The cycle continues. If the better half also contributes, better the chances of success. The ‘better half’ aspect is a subject in itself. Maybe some other time.

This is another part of the ‘points’ racking up system that assists him in his promotion prospects.

Surely, such clearly undeserved awards are detrimental to an organization. I recommend :-

• Ban all awards other than gallantry awards. And naively hope, people won’t dishonour their dignity by manipulating even them.
• Ban all awards on staff including personal staff other than for gallantry.

Command Tenures and a Personality Based Army

The truncated command tenures at every level, whatever the need be from a management viewpoint, is harming the army by affecting the entire value system and encouraging the unscrupulous.

Let me elaborate. A command tenure of, approximately two years, give or take a few months, had matured as a good balance between too short and too long a tenure, each with its attendant pluses and minuses. The present greatly truncated tenure, means that a commander has little time to ‘project’ himself. Thus, ‘events’ have emerged as the chosen method of ‘projection’. Most try to fit in as many ‘events’ as possible in the short tenure they have, all targeted at the person(s) writing their report. The superior is equally at fault for allowing or even encouraging such a system. Maybe, he did it too and is doing the same upwards. Whatever the compulsions, a long-term perspective is becoming redundant. This can only have negative repercussions for the army.

We need to recognize the serious drawbacks of this system, whatever its short term gains, and correct it.

And while we are at it, let us mature as a people and as an army and have a long-term perspective for major issues at every level, not one that changes with each gung-ho commander. Let each commander believe that, while he is a competent and well-intentioned professional, the one(s) before him and the ones after him were and will be equally, if not more, so. If the harvest is good, someone sowed good in the past. Our system was to do one’s duty with pride and integrity and then fade away.

What Next

Many would claim that there is no crisis. Perhaps not, but there are far too many disquieting signs to be blasé about the whole matter. The army continues to suffer at the hands of a surprisingly antagonistic bureaucracy and seems to be unable to assert itself on the national stage even in routine matters like ensuring mere rightful equivalence in pay. Is this a sign that the bureaucracy, along with their political masters, are ensuring that only pliant officers are making it to senior ranks ?

The number of senior officers, including ex service chiefs, whose names are surfacing for reasons that are the opposite of ‘naam, namak, nishan’ doesn’t exactly fill the young officer or jawan with pride.

I believe the army’s health is not SHAPE – 1. I believe treatment is required now, before it gets worse. There is a need to go back to the basic military ethos of duty, honour, integrity. Sycophancy and superficial grandiosity must be put down. Sadly, I am not optimistic about the near future. All I can exhort those who see my point is – do it within your sphere of influence though you will probably have to pay a price for it.

Maybe our adversaries will do us a favour and force a war upon us. For all its horrors, it will do the army’s soul a lot of good.

The Factor of Fratricide

Circa 2005

Fratricide is the inflicting of casualties by fire from own troops –  the cruelly termed ‘Friendly Fire’. A degree of fratricide has always existed in warfare and is perhaps inevitable. However, in all likelihood, the problem is much more significant than is generally appreciated.

While there have been instances of fratricide mentioned through history, there have been few consolidated studies that have taken a comprehensive look at this phenomenon. Lately, with all events taking place in the glare of media scrutiny, this has changed. The information revolution has had its effect on this aspect as well.

In both World War I and II, allied casualties are documented at approximately 2% of lethal casualties. In the US engagement in Vietnam, it is admitted at 2.9%. It is not known whether all these figures are authentic. It may be safe to assume that the actual figures are much higher. Today, when information is more freely available, or perhaps, difficult to obfuscate, the figures show a rather dramatic increase.

A U.S. War College journal studied the phenomenon of friendly fire and  the study estimated that somewhere between 13 percent and 24 percent of U.S. troop casualties in the 20^th Century — between 177,000 and 250,000 soldiers — were inflicted by fellow American soldiers !

It is not known what percentage of the casualties we have suffered in our wars have been due to fratricide – and such figures will undoubtedly be kept confidential, even if reported. However, if studies such as the US War College one are any indication, the problem is far more serious than is generally thought, and is increasing with the reach and lethality of modern weapons.

 

The Increasing Incidence of Fratricide

 

There are a number of well documented cases of fratricide from history. For example, in the First World War, there was the annihilation at Verdun of a full French battalion – the 351^st – by own artillery fire.

Similarly, in World War II, there are  many recorded examples including the shooting down of 23 US transport planes in Italy by own ground fire, resulting in the death of over 400 men. Incidentally, the commander of Allied Army Ground Forces in World War II at the time — Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair was killed by his own troops at Normandy in 1944.

There are a number of cases in Vietnam, including of full fledged fire fights between two units. The figures accepted for Vietnam – 2.9% – are undoubtedly under reported, given the nature of the war and the serious command problems that the US experienced, exemplified most starkly by the practice of ‘fragging’ i.e. the killing of own officers.

A study of the number of casualties suffered by the US in Gulf War I suggest that about 25% of deaths and 10% of injuries were due to fratricide. In official reports, the Pentagon has admitted that of the 148 American servicemen and women who died on the battlefield in Operation Desert Storm, 24 percent of the total killed in action were victims of ‘friendly fire’. Eleven more Americans were killed when un-exploded Allied munitions blew up, raising the ‘friendly fire’ percentage to 31 percent.

These facts are quite well known now. But what is less known is that during Desert Storm, more than 75% of the fratricide casualties occurred in ground-to-ground engagements.  Fratricide accounted for 77% of the U.S. armored vehicles damaged in battle. The same conflict saw British Forces lose more personnel through fratricide than were killed by Iraqis.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US has admitted to a fratricide rate of 11%. This is after the lessons of Desert Storm and the consequent stringent technological and planning measures undertaken to reduce these. This still means that for every 100 soldiers killed in war, 11 are going to be killed by own fire ! Surely, even one is one too many.

A large number of the ground-to-ground incidents occurred when M1 tank crews mistakenly identified U.S. vehicles as Iraqi targets.  In most cases this occurred while using thermal sights in reduced visibility over long distances.  In battle an unidentified vehicle seen through a thermal viewer, may be an enemy tank or it may be friendly.  The man who fires the first shot is probably the one who’s going to live.  It’s a difficult decision for the young soldier in that situation. If he is uncertain, he is likely to fire.

There is an unending catalog of fratricide instances. In addition, with modern more lethal weapons, the likelihood is only going to increase. Have we taken enough specific measures to address this problem. Realistically, no. What then are we going to suffer due to fratricide in the next war unless we address this aspect on a war footing ?

The American and British experience is of countries that have the most advanced technology available to any armed forces. The capability available to us is obviously less. It must be remembered that our problem is even more acute as our likely adversary has equipment, which, from a distance, will be indistinguishable visually. Then, the soldiers on both sides are generally undistinguishable physically and follow fairly similar tactics.

For mechanised forces especially, the enhancement of the capability of our equipment brings with it the danger of using this enhanced capability against our own troops. Today’s weapons have the capability of engaging targets beyond ranges at which visual IFF, which in any case is difficult, is done. We need to urgently address this aspect or else we are going to be in a position where we will be facing serious and avoidable casualties  – due to accurate fire from our own much more capable weapons.

 

 

The Causes of the Problem

 

The causes are manifold. Some indicative ones are discussed below.

Lack of awareness of the tactical situation. The ‘fog of war’ has always been a problem but has been compounded manifold today by all the clichés used to describe the modern battlefield such as the increasing tempo, and complete non-linearity of the battlefield. Armies today do not stand behind clearly identifiable lines and fire away at each other. There are actions being fought simultaneously at multiple echelons. The enemy, in our case, is going to be at near parity as regards capability and so the outcome of some of these actions is going to be uncertain leading to further complications. A pre – programmed ‘schedule of work’ is not going to work. We must not let the one-sided gulf wars colour our perspective beyond a point. Then, there is the range, response times and lethality of modern weapons, compounded by the problem of EMI and an information overload leading to much higher stress levels.

 

Navigation problems including incorrect position reporting. GPS systems and other automatic systems will assist but, as the coalition experience in Iraq has shown, such systems come with their own complications. In short, there is no foolproof method.

 

Problems in planning and coordination. The reasons for this are not just personal capabilities but the uncertain nature of war. There will always be a large element dose of uncertainty in a plan which a commander will have to cater for. Such is the nature of command decisions. Unfortunately, these same uncertainties will certainly sometimes manifest themselves as shortcomings in coordination.

 

Incorrect identification of own troops remains the single most contributing factor. This will continue to be the case. More importantly, increasingly, this recognition and identification will need to be electronic as well as visual. In addition, with the increased accuracy and lethality of the weapons and systems available now, a target once engaged, is almost certainly likely to be hit. So, while the enemy is likely to suffer more damage, at the same time, mistakes are likely to be more costly on own troops as well.

 

Equipment failure, it may be argued, has reduced as the capability of modern technology increases the reliability of equipment. That is undoubtedly true, but what is also undeniable is the complexity of equipment and the complete reliance on the same. Such a system, while increasing efficiency, is prone to catastrophic errors as the human element in the system reduces.

 

There is the added factor of greatly increased stress on a commander today due to the close unsympathetic scrutiny by agencies like the media or human rights organisations that have little or no appreciation of the stresses on a soldier – or choose to play down the aspect for their own means.

 

Complicating Factors

 

It is often said that admitting there is a problem is half the solution. The issue is such that it is not easily accepted.  There are a number of reasons for this. There is the factor of blame, morale, mistrust between units and many others. Not surprisingly then, most commanders prefer to ‘hush up’ such incidents. While the intention is perhaps good, the end result is that the issue remains inadequately addressed.

 

Even if the issue is admitted, there is no easy solution. The issue needs to be addressed on a number of planes. Obviously, one of the most restricting factors is availability of funds. Resources will always be limited leading to a need to priortise requirements. This is the logical process that leads to priority enhancements in the areas deemed to be of more importance. The system depends critically on intelligently identifying the critical requirements and addressing them in time. Have we done this correctly in the past and are we planning well for the future ?

 

We have perhaps been amiss in the past in certain vital aspects. Two such aspects are the inadequate and late attention paid to Fire Control Systems and Night Fighting Capability.

 

It will, of course, be argued that economics did not allow this. While undoubtedly true, this may be over-simplifying the issue. The fact is that these aspects were perhaps not adequately identified early enough as critical problem areas and an alarm sounded. This situation has persisted till after Operation Parakram. We are lucky we haven’t been called to go in for a tank to tank battle with these critical shortcomings. We might have had to pay a big price.

These aspects have now been addressed, though perhaps at least a decade too late, even given economic restrictions. Are there any such aspects that we need to urgently address for the immediate future ? An analysis suggests that the problem of fratricide has been inadequately addressed, is getting distinctly more problematic and hence there is a need for urgent action in this area including suitable integrated automatic IFF (Identification  Friend or Foe) equipment. Ideally, this must be integrated across the three services. However, should inter-service organisational procedures and procurement priorities complicate this, it must be integrated in the army, at least, as soon as possible.

 

 

How Can Fratricide Be Reduced ?

 

As mentioned earlier, admitting the scale of the problem is the first step towards solving it. The approach has to be multifold to include training and the employment of technological means.

Training. Training must specifically include awareness of  the probability of fratricide and the measures to avoid the same. This includes the incorporation and use of technological devices that assist in the same. This is not done at present. Live fire training is usually tightly controlled with an elaborate safety staff, SOPs etc. It must be remembered that these will not be around in war. It must be emphasised that training to prevent fratricide does not imply merely the incorporation of aircraft and AFV recognition lessons plus the military markings of own arms and services and the likely enemy’s in cadres and courses. It has to be a much more broad-based approach to include a clear statement of the problem, its extent and specific measures to overcome or at least reduce it. It would also obviously mean the incorporation of and training on sensible, preferably automatic equipment and the working out of simple, do-able procedures to ensure this. Fire discipline is another area which needs to be emphasised more. While this aspect is included in training, it is with the aim of ammunition conservation and usually covered in a cursory manner. Anyone who has seen the fire discipline of troops operating in a CI/ ROP environment in the initial stages must realise that there is a problem. It must, of course, be ensured that the ‘discipline’ is not such that the soldier is inhibited from getting a round off first in a fire-fight.

 

Situational Awareness. The best method of IFF is undoubtedly a good reading of the battlefield i.e. situational awareness. For obvious reasons, in war, this is easier said than done. The importance of this is only going to be increased  as response times decrease while the tempo of modern warfare continues to increase. There is also the effect of the ‘computer screen syndrome’ i.e. the taking of decisions by commanders based on assessments  and plans presented neatly in Powerpoint presentations which may be unable to convey the true ground situation.

 

Communication Procedures. The traditional hierarchical military communication does not lend itself to lateral proliferation of information.While it may be naïve to think that a lateral communication system is the answer to all problems, there is undoubtedly a  need today to ensure a lateral flow of information to reduce fratricide.

 

Visual Methods. As regards visual solutions, the Americans have tried a number of devices like the DARPA light, the BUDD light and thermal tape strips. The percentage of casualties suffered was after many of these devices were used. The value of visual ad-hoc methods is obviously questionable. In our army, a number of ‘local’ methods have been worked out by units and formations with varying degrees of effectiveness, none satisfactory. A more effective system which is integrated with the Air Force is needed.

 

Technological Solution. In today’s battlefield, this is the critical area where there must be development if we are to address the problem adequately. This has not happened so far as somehow the gravity of the problem has not been appreciated. To stress this gravity once again, are we prepared to accept that for every 100 casualties that we suffer in war, at least 10, and more likely many more, are going to be caused by own fire ?

Whatever technological solutions we adopt, the importance to apply judgment in application must be stressed to avoid the dangerous tendency to believe that the ‘computer is always correct’. One of the fallouts of increased automation is that a soldier is apt to go against his better judgment if it is in conflict with what the computer says – which may be out of perspective. The cold unemotional logic  of Spock of Star Trek has to be tempered with the human command judgment of Captain Kirk – remember, the enemy is also a human.

 

With the advancements in technology, it is felt that a simple and comparatively affordable effective automatic IFF system should be possible. Such a system will, it is believed, be of critical value in any conflict in the future. Visual systems have their limitations and these are only getting more enhanced with increased ranges of weapons and sights. The specific technological measures would need more detailed and expert analysis. Some of the measures being used, developed or considered in armies around the world are – a much wider proliferation of GPS equipment, equipping vehicles with automatic IFF transponders,  laser warning receivers which warn the target if it is being lased on a particular frequency and responds, signature recognition equipment,  and the like.

 

It would be beyond the scope of this paper to recommend the specific devices that we need. That must be arrived at after a detailed analysis and it is essential that we bid for it intelligently. This must be worked out holistically and not be done by submitting a list of the devices we want. Else we could find ourselves in the predicament of the British army in the second world war who, when confronted with the night bomber raids of the German air force, asked for a device with which to see aircraft at night – they got searchlights. The air force asked for a system that could tell them of the location of aircraft – they got radar. There must be a army wide, if not inter-service system that reduces, if not removes fratricide completely. It needs a full system analysis to develop a system to actively counter the menace of fratricide.

 

Conclusion

 

It is submitted that the factor of casualties in war due to fratricide is a far more serious factor than it is generally considered. The complexity of modern warfare is enhancing this problem. Due to the nature of the issue and its many implications, it has perhaps not been adequately addressed. It is time that this be done immediately. At the very least, a more detailed analysis of this aspect must be carried out. The aspect must also get due weightage in our training while at the same time there is an urgent need for developing technological IFF means which can be incorporated to counter this aspect.

This is a factor on which an urgent increase in emphasis is required and this will pay off in tomorrow’s conflict. Ignoring this aspect, at the very least, is likely to lead to a heavy avoidable price being paid in casualties.