Author: Major General Vijay Pande, VSM (Retd)
(Views are personal)
“Whoever said the pen is mightier than the sword obviously never encountered automatic weapons.”
General Douglas MacArthur
A hard nosed Commanding General of a Division (most of them are like that) was on a visit to an Infantry Battalion for the first time after his arrival. The General carried a “no nonsense” reputation and his aversion for “bullshit” was known to all. Being the first visit, the Battalion had readied thoroughly, and no stone had been left unturned. The Commanding Officer had prepared a detailed briefing for the visitor. After the preliminary introductions, the CO started his briefing. He began by describing the history of the Battalion at great length but to his consternation he sensed that the General did not seem too impressed. He thereafter went on to extol the traits of his soldiers who came from a particular region and described them virtually as nothing short of supermen. Then he went on to declare that his Battalion was ready to undertake any mission at zero notice. The old General had had enough of it but did not show his angst to the audience. After a while he mildly interrupted the monologue and said to the CO, “tell me about your Sections and weapon detachments, the training done by them, standards achieved and the number of rounds fired by each one of them last month”. (For the uninitiated, a Section is a squad of ten men commanded by a Havildar and it is the smallest fighting team in the organisational hierarchy of a Battalion). The discomfort was evident all around as bluster had to be replaced by facts. After the briefing was over, the General went to the firing range and asked the CO to get all the men present in the unit to fire five rounds each “grouping fire”. The results were astonishing to the CO himself. The following day a complete battle physical efficiency test was held for the whole battalion. The results were no different. A similar situation prevailed with the snipers, mortar and rocket launcher detachments. The General was not surprised.
The net effects of “tall talk” were clearly evident. A fine outfit had been reduced to a charade due to misplaced priorities. Sure enough, in about two months’ time the battalion was back on track, mainly because the CO had seen the mistake and had resolved to rectify it sooner than later.
Rewind to 30 years earlier. A senior General had come visiting to a Battalion that was preparing itself for an operational deployment. Then also the CO went on making tall claims to impress the visitor. The good General heard him out patiently and then replied in Gurkhali, “Kura garera hoina, timi lai ground ma herchhu” (It is no use talking, I will see you on the ground).
The military debacle of the 1962 Sino Indian war is well known. Equally well known also is the sterling performance of the Indian armed forces in the 1965 Indo Pak war and later in the 1971 war. Before the 1965 war Pakistan had acquired the some of the latest weaponry from USA. These included the top of the line fighter aircraft of the time, the F 86 Sabre jet and the F 104 Starfighter supersonic fighter bomber. On ground the Pakistani armoured corps had been equipped with the M 48 Patton, a world class main battle tank. These acquisitions, combined with Pakistan’s assessment of the state of readiness and morale of the Indian armed forces after the 1962 war and a false sense of superiority of the Pakistani soldier vis a vis his Indian counterpart (“one Pakistani soldier is equal to four Indian soldiers”, such was their belief) emboldened them enough to launch “Operation Gibraltar” with the aim of seizing the ultimate prize, Kashmir.
What is not so well known is the quiet resolve of the Indian nation to quickly reequip the armed forces, raise new divisions and restore morale in a short span of three years between 1962 and 1965. It was a cold introspection into what had gone wrong and how it was to be set right followed by the task of restoration in right earnest. There was no accompanying hype or hoopla, no tall talk or bluster and no obfuscation. Predictably, the guns of the Indian soldier did all the talking in the war which followed. The Sabres were made to bite the dust by the diminutive Gnat fighter planes of the Indian Air Force flown by stalwarts such as the Keelor brothers, Trevor and Denzil. The famed Patton tanks met their graveyard at Khemkaran in Punjab when they faced the recoilless guns of soldiers like Havildar Abdul Hamid and commanders like General Harbaksh Singh who did what he had to do to stop the enemy in his tracks. If his seniors disagreed with him, he couldn’t care less and had the spine to say so.
Militaries need to constantly remember that their business end is not bombast, it is the muzzle of the gun. Tall talk and hype does not impress anyone, even if it does it is only for a short period. Past achievements are good for they inspire the present lot to excel, but that is where it ends. One is only as good as he is today and that is the only reality. The example of the paratrooper who must consider even his 1000th jump a new jump is most apt.
The dramatic arrival of the Rafale, (literally the “gust of wind”) has set adrenaline soaring all around. It is heartening to see the spurt in pride and national morale this long awaited acquisition has resulted in. Without doubt this is one of the deadliest war machines in the world now in the hands of some of the ablest airmen. The young media warriors in their frenzy would like us to believe that India’s enemies are already trembling in their pants as their destruction is preordained. Let not undue hype raise expectations beyond reality. Decades of indifference towards military acquisitions and a paltry defence budget allocation year after year, which is just sufficient to keep the war machine running cannot be wished away by nationalistic bluster. These five planes are definitely a huge force multiplier, but they are not the panacea and are certainly not enough to meet the grave challenges we face on our borders from our enemies. We must give due emphasis to national security during periods of dormancy and ensure timely equipping of our forces if we are to be prepared for emergencies.
And let’s cut the hype.