Author: Major General Vijay Pande, VSM (Retired)
(Views are personal)
Recap
In my post of 25 Jun 2020 with the same title, I had ventured to read the mind of the Chinese leadership during the ongoing crisis along the Indo Tibetan Border in Ladakh. I delved into historical examples of the Sino Soviet War of 1969 and the Sino Vietnam war of 1979 to understand the mind of the Chinese leadership. Let me reproduce some relevant extracts of my erstwhile post. (The complete writeup is available on my blog http://55nda.com/blogs/vijay-pande)
“In any military confrontation it is necessary to locate and identify the military hardware, troop deployments and activities of the enemy, using various means at our disposal. Interpretation of these gives us an assessment of the probable courses of action available to the opponent. The Duke of Wellington said, “the whole art of war consists of guessing what is on the other side of the hill”. However, what remains an enigma for all military planners is the intention of the enemy commanders. “What is playing on his mind” is the perpetual question to be answered. It is not an easy call to make. In this piece I will try to delve into some examples from recent history and try to get some pointers towards the “mind of the enemy commander”. There are no prizes for getting it right, the loser will end up eating crow!!
xxxxxxxxx
There are striking similarities in China’s behaviour and actions on the Ussuri river and Vietnam with the happenings on its Indian border. Today China has upped the ante against India with somewhat similar thoughts. It is not happy with India’s growing influence, it is not happy with India’s growing proximity to the US, it is not happy with India opposing the BRI and more importantly it believes it can still “teach India a lesson”. Maybe it is also testing the limits of US support to India. War ultimately is all about “imposing one’s will upon the enemy” to quote Clausewitz. Knowing the enemy and more importantly assessing his intentions are crucial at all levels. In the end national resolve, superior leadership, superior planning and tenacity as well as courage of the man behind the gun will decide the outcome.”
Since then much water has flown down the Indus and Shyok rivers and the situation has rapidly developed.
Where do we stand today?
Let me stick out my neck a little further. After all the crow is still there for the eating!!
During the early years of the onset of the 21st century, it was widely believed that China was avoiding confrontations on its periphery while it accelerated the relentless pace of economic growth and military modernisation which had started since 1978. It was also perceived that China would gain sufficient economic clout and military capability around 2020 to be able to assert itself while protecting its regional interests. In the long term, China was assessed to be preparing to overtake USA as the premier global power by 2040. So, China’s current assertiveness vis a vis its neighbours should come as no surprise. However, it is still some distance away as far as directly confronting the United States is concerned.
Now it is becoming increasingly clear that India’s assertion of its claim over entire Jammu and Kashmir including Aksai Chin in 2019 and the rapid development of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi (DSDBO) Road was construed as an aggressive intent by the Chinese. India’s opposition to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor as it passed through areas considered by India as her territory also had not escaped the attention of the Chinese strategic planners.
With this as a backdrop, China executed what could be considered as a classic pre emptive manoeuvre by occupying tactically important stretches of territory all along the northern and central sub sectors in Ladakh. China managed to achieve strategic, operational and tactical surprise with this manoeuvre. At the strategic level, India had believed that diplomacy and personal chemistry at the highest leadership levels would ensure that a war with China could be averted as both countries were on a common trajectory on mutual relations and the resolution of the boundary question. At the operational level, India failed to read the Chinese intent behind massing offensive formations, artillery and airpower within striking distance in the Tibetan plateau under the garb of training (a very cliched ruse indeed) and at the tactical level the true intent of the ground forces only started becoming evident after the deadly clashes at Galwan, which were unprecedented in many ways. For one, the choice of weaponry by the Chinese soldiers indicated a pre meditated intent. At the same time, the Chinese also probably underestimated the Indian response and were doubtless taken aback by the grit and fighting spirit of the Indian soldiers.
The Chinese had managed to seize the initiative by this initial manoeuvre. Calibrated belligerence by Pakistan simultaneously also sent unmistakeable signals of a looming collusive threat. The intention was to coerce India to accept the ‘status quo post’ and consequently successive rounds of negotiations at the military and diplomatic levels made no headway. A psychological war campaign was also unleashed by the Chinese to paint India as the aggressor and the weaker side. China also exploited the political divide and ideological freedom in India which saw opinions sharply divided and blatantly propagated in the TRP hungry media channels by hyperventilating anchors. Retired diplomats, military officers, ‘investigative’ journalists and politicians freely dished out narratives depending upon which side of the political and ideological divide they were on, much to the glee of the adversary. No wonder the credibility of the Indian media and that of the ‘experts’ has fallen to an all time low.
Sensing the gravity of the situation, the nation began to put its might behind the armed forces. On the ground, the Indian armed forces went about their task in the only manner befitting a supremely trained, motivated and professional force. It is true that India was initially not sufficiently balanced operationally, tactically or logistically for any counter manoeuvre in the theatre at that time. Once adequate forces and logistics were built up, the Indian army executed what could be again construed as a brilliant pre emptive manoeuvre to secure the heights on the Kailash ranges east of Chushul and south of the Pangong Tso. India also occupied some features dominating the Chinese positions on the northern bank of the lake. The occupation of the Kailash ranges in the Rezangla and Richenla areas gave India many advantages. It provided depth to the main defence line in the Chushul sector and provided a firm base for any future offensive operations along the Spangur gap. It also reinforced India’s intent to stand up to the Chinese coercion. Employment of the Vikas Battalion subtly signalled a possible review of India’s approach towards Tibet.
So What Now?
Clearly the bluffs have been called and the gloves are off. The cycle of manoeuvres and counter manoeuvres could continue in other sectors as well. China will be wary to let India retain the tactical advantage in the Spangur Gap area. However, offensive actions to evict the Indian positions on the Kailash range will get more and more difficult as time passes since the defender would consolidate his defences and the onset of winter will compound the difficulties of the attacker manifold. While the situation remains fragile, the shooting war has not yet started and efforts are on to avert it.
A rapid offensive by the Chinese special forces followed by mechanized columns and infantry backed up by sufficient artillery and airpower to recapture the positions on the Kailash Ranges appears quite probable before the winter sets in.
At the same time it must not be forgotten that survival on those heights through the winter will also be a major logistical challenge for Indian troops and adequate preparations will have to be made within the ever reducing time window before the passes on the main arterial highways go under the snow. India has the advantage of vast experience of planning and conduct of operations in extreme high altitude areas. This will stand us in good stead in the weeks and months ahead.
At the same time, a bit of increased alertness and shedding of complacency will come in handy.
“Opportunities multiply as they are seized.”
Sun Tzu