{"id":8858,"date":"2024-12-28T16:13:45","date_gmt":"2024-12-28T10:43:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/?p=8858"},"modified":"2024-12-28T16:13:45","modified_gmt":"2024-12-28T10:43:45","slug":"568-china-through-the-us-prism-2024","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/2024\/12\/28\/568-china-through-the-us-prism-2024\/","title":{"rendered":"568: CHINA THROUGH THE US PRISM 2024"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Pic Coutesy Net<\/span><\/p>\n

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The Department of Defence (DoD) of the USA released its annual report to Congress, \u201cMilitary and Security Developments Involving the People\u2019s Republic of China\u201d.<\/strong> The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People\u2019s Republic of China charts the course of the PRC\u2019s national, economic, and military strategy and offers insight into the People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities, and activities as well as its future modernisation goals. This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC through early 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

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This is a summary of the 182-page report.<\/span><\/p>\n

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UNDERSTANDING THE PRC\u2019S STRATEGY<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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The PRC\u2019s National Strategy<\/u>. The PRC\u2019s longstanding national strategy is to achieve \u201cthe great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation\u201d by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC\u2019s national power and revise the international order to support the PRC\u2019s governance system and national interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The PRC\u2019s Foreign Policy<\/u>. The PRC\u2019s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into a \u201ccommunity of common destiny\u201d to support its strategy to realise \u201crejuvenation.\u201d PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting \u201cnew strategic opportunities\u201d to create an environment favourable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The PRC\u2019s Economic Policy<\/u>. The PRC acknowledges internal and external challenges that complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favourable factors in the PRC\u2019s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC\u2019s ongoing military modernisation objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The PRC\u2019s Defence Policy and Military Strategy<\/u>. In 2023, the PRC\u2019s stated defence policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasising a more significant global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA FORCES AND CAPABILITIES<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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The PLA\u2019s Modernisation and Reform<\/u>. The PLA has sought to modernise its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counter space, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies, including commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Army (PLAA)<\/u>. The PLAA continues its decades-long effort to modernise equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLAA demonstrated long-range joint fire capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Navy (PLAN)<\/u>. Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is composed mainly of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLAN continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLAN carrier in a calendar year.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Air Force (PLAAF).<\/u> The PLAAF is rapidly modernising and indigenising its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems, matching U.S. standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLAN shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defence, and radar units to the PLAAF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC\u2019s integrated air defence systems and the ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC\u2019s national integrated air defence system network.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)<\/u>. The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernisation plans to enhance its \u201cstrategic deterrence\u201d capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also explore developing conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF).<\/u> On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF and the alignment of its subordinate forces\u2014Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)\u2014directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF) under the CMC to coordinate the management of the military\u2019s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organisational structure features four theatre-grade services\u2014the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF\u2014and four deputy-theatre-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).<\/span><\/p>\n

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Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).<\/u> JJSF improves joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilisation, the JLSF will probably rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces<\/u>. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC\u2019s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People\u2019s Armed Police (PAP) is another paramilitary component of the PRC\u2019s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Special Operations Forces (SOF).<\/u> Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite emphasising joint training, theatre commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it challenging to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.<\/span><\/p>\n

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PLA Capabilities in Development<\/u>. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing its capabilities to conduct military operations more profoundly in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken critical structural reforms, introduced a new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations, and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Joint Capabilities for Power Projection<\/u>. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC\u2019s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasised power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Advancements toward an Informatised and Intelligentised Military<\/u>. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which is regarded as a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary\u2019s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls \u201cintelligentised warfare,\u201d defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Nuclear Capabilities<\/u>. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernise, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it with multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.<\/span><\/p>\n

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OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC\u2019S PERIPHERY<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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Theater Commands<\/u>. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with establishing the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands. These command structures are organised based on the PRC\u2019s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theatre Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theatre.<\/span><\/p>\n