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Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master\u2019s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany.\u00a0Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been\u00a0writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Her article on Kargil Operations (Op Safed Sagar)\u00a0 was published on 01 Jun 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n (Besides the two quotes, the views of the author are her own)<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n By Ritu Sharma – 01 Jun 2024<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n On May 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which saw the deployment of air power at 18,000 feet. As the intruders, backed by the Pakistan Army, entrenched themselves on the treacherous heights of the Kargil sector, the IAF deployed its entire fleet, and the pounding continued for the next 60 days.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n On May 21, the IAF launched a Canberra PR57 to conduct a reconnaissance of the Kargil area to assess the extent of intrusion. The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet, just two miles from the LoC, and was just 4,000 feet above the highest Himalayan points. The Canberra sustained a hit on its right engine by what was later determined to have been a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. This called for a change in tactics by the IAF.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Indian government had given the green light for the use of air power, albeit with one caveat \u2013 the Indian fighter jets were not allowed to cross the border with Pakistan. India began the air bombing on May 26 with MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fighters carrying out six attacks against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n On the second day, the force lost two fighter jets\u2014a MiG-27 and a MiG-21. The Pakistan-backed insurgents were using Stinger, a Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) that operates as an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM). The IAF MiG-21 piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, tasked with photo reconnaissance during the Kargil conflict, was shot down by ground-fired missiles over Batalik along the Line of Control in Ladakh. He ejected in time but parachuted down into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was later executed by the Pakistan forces in contravention of the Geneva Convention. On the third day of air operations, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed again by an enemy shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile while conducting a low-level attack. After this, the IAF stopped using all slow-moving air assets in the conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n India had pressed its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000s into the attack of the enemy positions within a small target area of just 5-12 km from the Line of Control (LoC). These fighters flew at 30,000 feet to avoid Pakistan missiles. The Pakistan and Indian Air Forces did not have dogfights. But, the Indian MiG-29s called \u2018Baaz\u2019 (or Eagle) did have whoever blinks first games with Pakistan\u2019s F-16 \u2018Falcons.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cWhile PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR Air-to-Air missiles could lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps,\u201d a Strategy Page report said in the aftermath of the conflict. During the Kargil War, the PAF\u2019s director of operations later reported isolated instances of IAF and PAF fighters locking on to each other with their onboard fire control radars.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The IAF pilots carried out 6,500 sorties, including strikes, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation, and logistic support. In a 2012 report by Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled \u201cAirpower at 18,000 feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War\u201d explained how the IAF pummelled the Pakistan Army and the PAF: \u201cThroughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were underway in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India\u2019s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The result was that PAF F-16s maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the border. The report quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: \u201cI think my insistence on mounting CAPs across the (command\u2019s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that we were ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.\u201d Then IAF Chief AY Tipnis later recalled that he had \u201cauthorised the escorting fighter pilots to chase away Pakistani aircraft further back across the LoC.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Talking to the EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) said: \u201cMig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.\u201d \u201cThe effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike,\u201d Khosla added.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter jets had to manually dive to bomb the targets as they lacked modern equipment to locate them. However, this tactic did not work well in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. Hence, the IAF introduced the French Mirage 2000H equipped with day\u2014and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods. On June 24, the IAF\u2019s two Mirage 2000Hs dropped the first-ever laser-guided bombs of the force in a combat mission and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry\u2019s command and control bunkers. The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Air Marshal Khosla said: \u201cInterdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI\u2019s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).\u201d However, he adds, “helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in confined and contested air space\u201d. This holds even in today\u2019s battleground. Air Marshal Khosla underscores that airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges during the Kargil conflict were manifold, including the high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, and self-imposed restrictions like not crossing the border.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The IAF\u2019s MiG-21s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots navigated with handheld GPS gadgets. The Indian Air Force integrated the 1000-kg bombs with laser-guided weapon pods. The IAF selected weapon impact points that would snowball into landslides or avalanches.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The IAF also deployed its \u2018Super Spy\u2019 MiG-25 Foxbat for reconnaissance missions. With an operational flight of over 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, the fighter jet had regularly flown reconnaissance missions. Such was the clarity of the camera fitted in the belly of the aircraft, which allowed it to click photos of humans on a Pakistani tarmac. The Foxbat would create a sonic boom and escape before PAF could scramble its interceptors. In 1999, however, its mission parameters were different\u2014it was to fly low and slow to map the targets on the Pakistani side for the Mirage-2000s bombing. The aircraft flew at a lower height, which was never envisaged, and there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) laid down. Also, it needed to maintain a velocity and height ratio for the camera to click clear photographs. At the given height, the aircraft was well beyond the range of the surface-to-air missiles, but the only threat was from aerial interception. To overcome that, the aircraft was escorted by Mirage-2000s during the mission.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.<\/u><\/span>\u00a0<\/u><\/p>\n <\/p>\nWhen Eagles Kept Falcons At Bay \u2013 How IAF\u2019s MiG-29 Fighters Triumphed Pakistan\u2019s F-16s At 18,000 Feet<\/span><\/h1>\n
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