{"id":6553,"date":"2023-11-01T06:02:45","date_gmt":"2023-11-01T00:32:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/?p=6553"},"modified":"2025-01-04T14:45:27","modified_gmt":"2025-01-04T09:15:27","slug":"us-report-on-china-excerpts-bri","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/2023\/11\/01\/us-report-on-china-excerpts-bri\/","title":{"rendered":"406: US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS BRI"},"content":{"rendered":"

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CHINA\u2019S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)<\/span><\/span><\/h1>\n

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Key Takeaways<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/h5>\n

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  • The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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    • In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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      • Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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        Detailed explanation of aspects summarised as takeaways above<\/strong><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

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        First announced in 2013, the PRC\u2019s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic policy advanced by Xi that rebranded and further expanded China\u2019s global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade links to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI by financing, constructing, and developing transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, hydropower projects, digital connectivity, and technology and industrial parks worldwide. As of 2022, at least 147 countries had signed BRI cooperation documents, up from 146 in 2021, 138 in 2020, and 125 in 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial integrity, energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability and diminish threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern periphery. Similarly, through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it builds through BRI to pursue additional economic cooperation with participating countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        Since 2022, two distinct trends have developed relative to BRI. First, the share of PRC financial investment relative to construction increased to its highest levels, with investments almost doubling. Beijing experienced strong growth in their East Asian and the Middle Eastern investments but a decline in their Sub-Saharan Africa efforts. Conversely, spiraling construction costs over the past three years have resulted in $78 billion in bad loans which needed to be written off or renegotiated in 2022. Second, Beijing began to replace previous BRI rhetoric with language\u00a0highlighting cooperation and partnership, which likely is designed to make BRI more appealing to foreign partners. The official name of \u201cBelt and Road Initiative\u201d was removed from the English version of many of Xi\u2019s speeches in 2022 and replaced with phrases such as \u201cBelt and Road cooperation.\u201d After launching the GDI in September 2021, Xi mentioned Belt and Road Cooperation eight times while referring to GDI more than 16 times.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        China has continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy opportunities through its \u201cHealth Silk Road (\u5065\u5eb7\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def)\u201d (HSR), \u201cDigital Silk Road (\u6570\u5b57\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def)\u201d (DSR), and \u201cGreen Silk Road (\u7eff\u8272\u4e1d\u7ef8\u4e4b\u8def)\u201d (GSR), respectively. Improving each of these \u201croads\u201d offers Beijing benefits beyond economic integration.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        • HSR is the PRC\u2019s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing medical assistance through BRI transportation In the future, it may help the PRC expand the international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role as a global public health leader, and identify the need for \u2013 and justify \u2013 new BRI projects.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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          • GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects; this initiative aligns with the PRC\u2019s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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            • DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing seeks to facilitate transfer of PRC technology to partner countries, which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it seeks to set global standards for next-generation technology. Announced in 2015 as a digital subset of BRI, the PRC\u2019s Digital Silk Road initiative, seeks to build a PRC-centric digital infrastructure, export industrial overcapacity, facilitate expansion of the PRC\u2019s technology corporations, and access large repositories of data. As of 2016, 16 countries had signed memorandums of understanding with Beijing to participate in the DSR. The PRC hopes the DSR will increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free trade zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech leaders by providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production opportunities for PRC tech firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, including next-generation cellular networks\u2014such as fifth-generation (5G) networks\u2014fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and data The initiative also includes developing advanced technologies including satellite navigation systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and export. International opponents of China\u2019s DSR fear that Beijing will encourage recipient countries to use this technology as a tool of repression modeled on China\u2019s authoritarian-style government. Likewise, host country political elites would probably risk their sovereignty by becoming vulnerable to espionage and political blackmail.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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              Since BRI\u2019s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international concerns over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with suspicion of the PRC\u2019s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. China has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party- state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

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              As the PRC\u2019s overseas development and security interests expanded under BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will increase accordingly to protect those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI\u2019s planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2022, for example, five PRC citizens were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where Chinese nationals were known to stay.<\/span><\/p>\n

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              China has therefore sought to extend its ability to safeguard its overseas interests, including BRI, by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and supporting host- nation security forces through military aid, including military equipment donations. In an October 2022 speech to the National Party Congress, Xi spoke of the need to become more adept at deploying the PLA to protect China\u2019s national security interests. Xi also said, \u201cWe will better coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production factors between the military and civilian sectors.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

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              The PRC has adopted new security legislation establishing a legal basis to violate people\u2019s data privacy and includes the aforementioned National Intelligence and Cybersecurity Laws of the People\u2019s Republic of China. Under the auspices of national security, the PRC and its security services have the authority to compel any private Chinese company to turn over all data collected by their systems, if desired. GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects \u2013 an initiative that aligns with the PRC\u2019s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.<\/span><\/p>\n

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              The PRC has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries. As the PRC\u2019s overseas development and security interests expand under BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI\u2019s planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2022, for example, five PRC nationals were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where Chinese nationals were known to stay.<\/span><\/p>\n

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              COMING UP<\/span>: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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