{"id":6543,"date":"2023-10-29T06:01:52","date_gmt":"2023-10-29T00:31:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/?p=6543"},"modified":"2025-01-04T14:44:42","modified_gmt":"2025-01-04T09:14:42","slug":"us-report-on-china-excerpts-western-theatre-command-india","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/55nda.com\/blogs\/anil-khosla\/2023\/10\/29\/us-report-on-china-excerpts-western-theatre-command-india\/","title":{"rendered":"403: US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS WESTERN THEATRE COMMAND & INDIA"},"content":{"rendered":"

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WESTERN THEATER COMMAND<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

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Key Takeaways<\/span><\/h5>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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  • The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along China\u2019s Central Asia borders.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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    • The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang<\/span>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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      • Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command\u2019s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 along the PRC border with India\u2019s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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        The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as \u201cterrorist threats\u201d in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th<\/sup> and 77th<\/sup> Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State\u2019s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices<\/em>, in the PRC, \u201cgenocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.\u201d Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of \u201ccombatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,\u201d information from the international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.<\/span><\/p>\n

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        Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command\u2019s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC\u00a0<\/span>regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17th<\/sup> round of talks. The Western Theater Command\u2019s deployments along the LAC will likely continue through 2023.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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        2022 Western Theater Command Leadership<\/span><\/span><\/h5>\n

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        Commander\u2013 General Wang Haijiang <\/strong>[\u6c6a\u6d77\u6c5f<\/strong>] Previous position: <\/strong>Commander, Xinjiang Military District DOB: <\/strong>July 1963<\/span><\/p>\n

        Age: <\/strong>59<\/span><\/p>\n

        Birthplace: <\/strong>Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province<\/span><\/p>\n

        Education: <\/strong>Unknown<\/span><\/p>\n

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        Political Commissar\u2013 General Li Fengbiao <\/strong>[\u674e\u51e4\u5f6a<\/strong>] Previous position: <\/strong>Commander, Strategic Support Force DOB: <\/strong>October 1959<\/span><\/p>\n

        Age: <\/strong>63<\/span><\/p>\n

        Birthplace: <\/strong>Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province<\/span><\/p>\n

        Education: <\/strong>Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master\u2019s degree in strategic studies from National Defense University<\/span><\/p>\n

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        Chief of Staff\u2013 Major General Li Zhonglin <\/strong>[\u674e\u4e2d\u6797<\/strong>]<\/span><\/p>\n

        Previous position: <\/strong>Commander, 71st<\/sup> Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army<\/span><\/p>\n

        DOB: <\/strong>Unknown<\/span><\/p>\n

        Age: <\/strong>Unknown Birthplace: <\/strong>Unknown Education: <\/strong>Unknown<\/span><\/p>\n

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        \"\"<\/span><\/p>\n

        PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

        INDIA\u00a0<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

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        Key Takeaways<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n

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        • In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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          • Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing perceived advantages on the border.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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            Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other\u2019s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India\u2019s territory. On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was the deadliest clash between the two since the <\/span><\/span>1962 Sino-Indian War. (Actually this incident was the deadliest clash between the two since 1967 clash at Nathu la with nearly 500 <\/span><\/span>causalities<\/span>).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

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            Following the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.<\/span><\/p>\n

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            • In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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              • In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western sector of the China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed forces remain in place along the LAC.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                • On July 17th<\/sup>, China and India held the 16th<\/sup> round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining border issues. Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                  • On September 8th<\/sup>, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16th<\/sup> round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                    • On October 14th<\/sup>, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25th<\/sup> Meeting of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The 24th<\/sup> WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from the western sector of the LAC.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                      • On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms along the border\u2014instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons\u2014however both Chinese and Indian forces sustained injuries. Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                        • On 20 December, China and India held the 17th<\/sup> round of Corps Commander-level talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in This round of talks was not announced\u2014unlike previous talks\u2014and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India. No agreements were made during this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic channels.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

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                          COMING UP<\/span>: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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                          Suggestions and value additions are most welcome<\/u><\/span><\/p>\n

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