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(Facts and figures are from open sources. These could have been inflated or repressed as part of the propaganda\/Information warfare. A clearer picture would emerge with the passage of time)<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n 900 strikes in 12 hours. Supreme Leader eliminated on Day 1. 15,000 targets struck by Day 14. Six weeks and Iran is still fighting.<\/span><\/p>\n Tactical dominance does not mean a strategic outcome.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Opening Salvo<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Air power can destroy (punish). It cannot always<\/strong> compel. <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Coalition Air Campaign<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The scale was extraordinary. 60% of mission-capable B-1s flew from RAF Fairford. Two carriers operated in the theatre. Some relevant aspects for consideration are: –<\/span><\/p>\n The F-35 being tracked is the campaign’s most significant disclosure. Stealth does not mean invisibility. <\/em>The margin is further narrowing as detection technology proliferates. Air warfare is gradually shifting from platform-centric to weapon-centric. Any air plan built around the stealthy penetration capability of new-generation platforms requires reassessment.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Iran’s IADS<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n Air superiority is not binary in nature; there are shades.<\/em> It exists on a spectrum. The prevailing conditions across the spectrum determine the operational options. An honest assessment of that position is vital for planners.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Mosaic Defence (Reason for Decapitation Failure)<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The strategic shock was not that Iran’s air defences survived. It was that Iran’s will and capacity to fight survived the killing of its supreme leader.<\/span><\/p>\n China’s systems destruction warfare operates on precisely the same logic. It has designed its offensive capability to execute decapitation (at numerous levels). For India, planning against both adversaries simultaneously makes this aspect the defining operational challenge.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Iran’s Air Campaign (Asymmetry Counter Air)<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n This is the democratisation of warfare made operational. It is an era of low-cost systems as the primary weapons of air warfare. The drone swarms and loitering munitions in adequate numbers are a must. Counter-drone capabilities that do not rely on expensive interceptors as the primary response are equally urgent. Project Kusha points in the right direction. The counter-drone dimension needs equivalent investment.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Strait Of Hormuz<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n India’s energy security depends substantially on hydrocarbons from the Gulf. Closure of the Strait has direct and severe economic consequences for India. It is a wake-up call. Energy security requires a holistic review (sources, supply routes, alternative energy, and indigenous capabilities).<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Some Tactical Aspects<\/u><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n What the Campaign Could Achieve<\/u><\/strong>: –<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n What the Campaign Couldn’t Achieve<\/u><\/strong>: –<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Bottom Line<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Iran apparently spent 20 years studying American air power and designing a system specifically to absorb its most devastating application.<\/span><\/p>\n India must study this campaign (along with other contemporary ones) with rigour.<\/span><\/p>\n The lessons are glaring. Institutional will is required to learn and implement them rather than relearning the hard way.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n\n
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