<\/p>\n
My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website <\/span><\/p>\n on 29 Apr 25.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n “Blood and water cannot flow together” <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The World Bank brokered it and governs the use of the Indus River system, which includes six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus River system is critical for both countries’ irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.<\/span><\/p>\n India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. India’s decision, citing national security concerns, grants it greater control over the western rivers, potentially impacting Pakistan’s agriculture and water supply. Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” suspending the Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but lacks enforcement power. This development heightens regional instability and raises concerns about future conflicts and diplomatic relations.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Key Provisions<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Division of Rivers<\/u>. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for limited Indian uses (e.g., domestic, non-consumptive, and specified agricultural purposes). Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) are allocated to India for unrestricted use.<\/span><\/p>\n Water Sharing<\/u>. Pakistan receives about 80% of the Indus system’s water (around 135 million acre-feet annually), while India gets 20%.<\/span><\/p>\n Infrastructure<\/u>. India can build run-of-the-river dams on Western Rivers for hydropower, but cannot store water beyond specified limits. Pakistan can object to designs that violate the treaty.<\/span><\/p>\n Permanent Indus Commission<\/u>. A bilateral body with representatives from both countries meets regularly to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Context and Significance<\/u><\/strong>. <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The treaty was necessitated by the 1947 partition, which split the Indus basin, leaving canal headworks in India and irrigated lands in Pakistan. A 1948 standoff, when India briefly cut off water to Pakistan, underscored the need for a formal agreement. It is considered one of the most successful water-sharing treaties globally, surviving three wars.<\/span><\/p>\n The Indus system originates in the Himalayas, with major tributaries flowing through Indian-administered Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making it geopolitically sensitive. In 2016, after a terrorist attack in Uri, India reviewed the treaty. In 2022 and 2023, India issued notices to Pakistan for treaty modification, citing \u201cfundamental changes\u201d like cross-border terrorism and environmental challenges, but no formal revocation has occurred. In 2023, Pakistan sought arbitration over Kishanganga and Ratle, while India challenged the arbitration process, preferring Neutral Expert resolution.<\/span><\/p>\n Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus for 90% of its water needs, fears reduced flows due to Indian projects or climate change. Delays in its storage infrastructure (e.g., Diamer-Bhasha Dam) exacerbate vulnerabilities. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and floods (e.g., 2010, 2022) strain the treaty\u2019s framework, which lacks provisions for climate adaptation.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Recent Development<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n India has officially held the IWT with Pakistan in abeyance, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations. This decision was announced on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. India invoked Article XII(3) of the IWT and sent a formal notice to Pakistan. The Ministry of Jal Shakti cited Pakistan\u2019s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, shifting demographics, and energy demands as reasons the agreement could no longer continue \u201cin good faith.\u201d\u200b<\/span><\/p>\n With the treaty placed in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to share information regarding water storage levels or flow in the rivers of the Indus River System with Pakistan.\u200b India has ceased sharing hydrological data (e.g., water flow, snowmelt, flood updates) with Pakistan, halted technical meetings, and stopped allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian projects. India is no longer bound by treaty restrictions on building storage or hydropower projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Adverse Impact on Pakistan<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) poses significant adverse impacts on Pakistan, particularly in agriculture, water supply, energy, and economic stability.<\/span><\/p>\n Agriculture<\/u>. Pakistan relies on the Indus River system for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, supporting 16 million hectares of farmland. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan under the IWT provide 93% of its irrigation water. A 10-20% reduction in water availability could lead to significant declines in agricultural output, threatening food security and rural livelihoods. Pakistan\u2019s agriculture sector, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP, faces severe risks. While India\u2019s current infrastructure limits immediate large-scale water diversion, future dams or storage projects could reduce water availability, especially during critical sowing seasons (e.g., Rabi and Kharif), reduced flows could lower crop yields for wheat, rice, and cotton\u2014key staples and export crops.<\/span><\/p>\n Water Scarcity in Urban Centres<\/u>. Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad depend on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water and industrial use. Any reduction in river flows, even temporary, could exacerbate existing water scarcity. Pakistan already faces a per capita water availability of ~1,000 cubic meters, close to the \u201cwater scarce\u201d threshold. Water rationing, public health crises, and industrial slowdowns could occur, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which rely heavily on the Indus.<\/span><\/p>\n Energy Sector<\/u>. Pakistan generates significant electricity from hydropower plants like Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW), which rely on consistent river flows from the Indus and Jhelum. Reduced or irregular water flows could lower power generation, worsening Pakistan\u2019s energy crisis. For example, a 10% reduction in Tarbela\u2019s water inflow could cut its output by hundreds of megawatts, affecting millions of households.<\/span><\/p>\n Economic<\/u>. Energy shortages could disrupt industrial production and increase reliance on costly imported fuels, straining Pakistan\u2019s foreign exchange reserves. A decline in crop production would reduce export revenues (e.g., rice and cotton) and increase food import costs, exacerbating Pakistan\u2019s trade deficit. Reduced agricultural output could lead to job losses in rural areas, driving migration to urban centers and rising social unrest. Higher food and energy prices and potential infrastructure damage from flooding (if India releases water abruptly) could fuel inflation. Pakistan\u2019s external debt (~$130 billion in 2025) limits its ability to fund mitigation measures. A 2023 World Bank study estimated that a 20% reduction in Indus water flows could shave 5-7% off Pakistan\u2019s GDP over a decade.<\/span><\/p>\n Social and Political Fallout.<\/u> Water shortages could spark protests, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, where water allocation disputes between provinces are already contentious. Provinces like Sindh, which rely on downstream flows, may accuse Punjab of hoarding water, exacerbating internal political divides.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n India\u2019s Justification and Legitimacy<\/u><\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n India\u2019s justification and Legitimacy for holding in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) hinges on the principle of a \u201cfundamental change of circumstances,\u201d as outlined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. New Delhi argues that Pakistan\u2019s continued support for cross-border terrorism, especially following incidents like the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, violates the underlying premise of peaceful bilateral relations that formed the basis of the IWT in 1960. India contends that a country facilitating terrorist activity cannot expect continued cooperation on vital issues like water sharing. While the IWT lacks a unilateral withdrawal clause, India maintains that suspension, not withdrawal, can be a legitimate, proportionate response to persistent security threats.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Diplomatic and Legal Aspects<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Pakistan\u2019s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the suspension an \u201cact of war\u201d and announced retaliatory measures, including suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border.<\/span><\/p>\n Pakistan may seek World Bank mediation or international arbitration. The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, and India\u2019s suspension may not be easily challenged under international law if framed as a response to terrorism (per Article 62, Vienna Convention). Experts argue India\u2019s suspension is permissible under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a \u201cfundamental change of circumstances\u201d due to Pakistan\u2019s alleged terrorism support for terrorism. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but cannot enforce compliance.<\/span><\/p>\n Pakistan may seek neutral expert mediation or arbitration, but India\u2019s refusal to cooperate could render these mechanisms ineffective. Escalating the issue to the UN or other forums may gain Pakistan sympathy but will unlikely force India to reverse the suspension.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Only Way out for Pakistan<\/u>.<\/span><\/p>\n The only viable way for Pakistan to restore the Indus Waters Treaty is through diplomatic engagement coupled with tangible actions to address India\u2019s core security concerns, particularly those related to cross-border terrorism. India\u2019s decision, justified under the \u201cfundamental change of circumstances\u201d clause in international law, is rooted in accusations of Pakistan\u2019s support for militant activities. Therefore, Pakistan would need to:-<\/span><\/p>\n Ultimately, Pakistan\u2019s path to treaty restoration lies not just in legal appeals but in restructuring the political and security context in which the treaty was suspended. Only by addressing the root causes\u2014especially terrorism\u2014can the IWT be revived in a stable, sustainable way.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n\n
\n
\n